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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis looks at the way that the European states system operated and affected 
the Ottoman-Russian relations between 1815 and 1856. The 1815 Settlements 
established a new system of international relations in Europe. Russia played the 
greatest role in foiling the Napoleonic bid for hegemony. The most distinguishing 
characteristic of this new system was that its structure made cooperation effective 
within the framework of the institution of Concert of Europe. In this respect the 
four victorious great powers, i.e. Russia, England, Prussia and Austria, did not 
exclude the defeated power, France, and they took on the governance of 
international affairs.   
 
The new system was built on the political and territorial balance. To this end, the 
restriction of France and moderation of Russia was necessary. Both countries had 
some revisionist objectives. Consequently, Near East became the centre stage of the 
international politics after 1815. Ottoman Empire did not take part in the 1815 
Settlements. Therefore, Ottoman-Russian relations were to continue on a bilateral 
base.  
 
Russia’s strategic goal to secure her south-east frontiers clashed with her 
responsibility for maintaining the provisions of 1815 Settlements in Central Europe 
since any change in Near East would affect the territorial and political balance in 
Central Europe, too.  
 
Under these circumstances, Russia faced a dilemma in her relations with the 
Ottoman Empire. Russia was very advantageous owing to her enormous power and 
her treaty rights regarding the Ottoman Empire which had acquired since 1774.  
 
Ottoman-Russian relations developed around three main events during 1815-1856: 
the revolt of Greeks (1821-29), the rebellion of Viceroy of Egypt (1833 and 1839) and 
the Holy Place Issue (1852-1854). In all those events Russia was successfully 
restrained against the Ottoman Empire by the structure of the new system. 
 
The thesis draws a number of conclusions. The underlying economic structure of the 
new state system almost remained the same during the 1815-1856 period. The thesis 
concludes that the course of Ottoman-Russian relations was increasingly determined 
by the elements of relationship structure. In particular, the foreign policy objectives 
of France played the significant role in shaping the Ottoman-Russian relations 
during 1815-1856.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The entry of the Russian Tsar, Alexander I, into Paris in 1814 
effectively brought to an end two decades of turmoil in Central Europe 
resulting from France’s attempt at hegemony under the leadership of 
Napoleon.  
 
In the aftermath of their victory, Russia, Great Britain, Austria and 
Prussia laid down the parameters for a new states system in several treaties, 
creating a complex mechanism of balance of power politics and cooperation 
among them. The defeated France was not punished, but was rather 
accommodated into the mechanism; thus, the task of governing international 
politics and maintaining general peace was entrusted to the oligopoly of the 
five great powers of Britain, Russia, France, Austria and Prussia, known as 
the ‘Concert of Europe’ in the history of the European States System.   
 
The map of Europe was redrawn by the victorious powers in 1814–
1815: France was reduced to her pre-1790 territories; Russia obtained two-
thirds of Poland, the rest of which was divided between Prussia and Austria. 
Prussia, wedged between France and Russia, was compensated with some 
territories of Saxony in return for her losses in Poland, and her territories 
were extended into the Rhineland; while Austria [or the Habsburg Empire] 
gained some territories in the north of the Italian peninsula. Most 
importantly, a federation made up of the various German states was founded 
in Central Europe, and independent Holland was established.   
 
The political setting of Europe was also restructured. France was 
restricted and encircled by the independent states, while the influence of 
Austria was extended and consolidated over the Italian peninsula. Both of 
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the Germanic powers, Austria and Prussia, became kind of power brokers in 
the administration of the German Federation. 
 
Russia came out of the Napoleonic wars [1793–1815] as the most 
dominant of the continental powers. Not only had she managed to stop 
Napoleon’s ‘Grande Armee’, which had advanced as far as Moscow, but 
continued to wage war against France until Napoleon’s final surrender. The 
Russian army in the battlefield and the Tsar at the table were the major 
determinants in the establishment and organisation of the coalitions in their 
defeat of Napoleon’s attempts at hegemony, even after the latter’s expulsion 
from Russian soil.  
 
Russia’s military supremacy and strong political posture made her the 
major player in the post-Napoleon Settlements too. She strengthened her 
presence in Central Europe by keeping two-thirds of Poland. This meant that 
Berlin and Vienna, two important capitals in Europe, were just 100 miles 
away from Russian territory, well within striking distance of the Russian 
army. This dominant position enabled Russia to become a significant actor in 
European affairs, and thus she was able to play an active role in the course 
of the political events of the post-Napoleonic era.  
 
The disproportional Russian military might and political influence 
made counter-balancing Russia an urgent issue for the other victorious 
states in the new European States System after 1815, along with keeping 
France under control. The problem of the disproportional power of Russia 
was not only its effect on the balance of power in Central Europe, but also 
the high level of influence she had secured in the Near East, where the 
Ottoman Empire was situated.  
 
Russia had been expanding for 100 years in the Balkans and north 
Black Sea to the account of the Ottoman Empire, whose territories were of 
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great strategic importance not only for the balance of power in the Near East, 
but also Europe. In the words of one historian, her territories were so vast 
and strategic ‘that European balance of power would have been upset if the 
empire had been appropriated by any one of the powers’.1 Therefore, her 
disintegration or appropriation could have been a serious source of 
destabilisation in the Near East and would disrupt the balance of power in 
Europe.  
 
 By the beginning of the 19th century, Russia was firmly settled in the 
north Black Sea and had started threatening the Ottoman capital city of 
Istanbul and the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, which were the last 
obstacles in the way of her aspirations in the Mediterranean. Russia had 
been at war with the Ottoman Empire at the time of Napoleon’s assault on 
Russia in 1812, and the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) had been hastily 
concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia at the demand of the 
latter when the French were looming on the horizon. Under that treaty, 
Russia gained control of the Bessarabia region, bringing her territories 
adjacent to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under 
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. This territorial gain raised concerns in 
Austria, as the Principalities had been all that stood between her and Russia. 
Even the Principalities were not unaffected by the strong influence of Russia, 
as Russia’s treaty rights over the Principalities, which gave her pre-approval 
rights in the appointments and dismissals of the rulers by the Sultan, were 
already pitting Austria against Russia. 
 
Another power that was concerned on the policies and objectives of 
Russia in the Near East was Britain. By this time, Britain had become the 
most industrialised power and had extensive colonial possessions and 
dependencies that stretched from the Atlantic to India. As an island, her 
                                                 
1
 L. S STAVRIANOS, The Balkans Since 1453 (London: Hurst&Company. 2000), p. 215 
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political and economic interests deterred her from pursuing any territorial 
gain in continental Europe, maintaining as a priority the strategic sea and 
land routes under her control for the free, safe and secure trade and 
transportation among her colonies. In this respect, halting Russian 
expansion in the Near East, and ensuring the stability and integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire, became Britain’s primary goals, making her not only the 
defender of the status quo in Central Europe but also in the Near East after 
1815. 
  
For the reasons summarised above it was no surprise when Austria 
and Britain raised the issue of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of 
Vienna in 1814, proposing her inclusion under the general guarantee of the 
multilateral arrangements of the Congress. The Ottoman Empire had not 
joined the third coalition of Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia against 
Napoleon, and so did not attend the Congress. Britain and Austria failed in 
their efforts, in part due to the unwillingness of the Ottoman Empire to 
become subject to international agreements which could have caused the 
interference of the signatory powers, specifically in her relations with her 
autonomous dependencies, namely the Principalities and Serbia. More 
importantly, Russia raised strong objections to the proposal on the grounds 
that she was in dispute with the Ottoman Empire over the implementation of 
the bilateral Treaty of Bucharest (1812), and so was against any agreement 
in this regard until such disputes had been settled.  
 
It seemed that Russia did not want the Near East to become subject to 
multilateral arrangements. She was implicitly regarded the Near East as her 
neighbour, and so did not want any other great power to become involved in 
the region.  
 
Russia’s prominent position and pressure from other overriding 
matters did not leave much room for the other participants to resist and 
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overrule Russia’s objections to discussion of the Ottoman Empire at the 
Congress of Vienna; supported by the unwillingness of the Ottoman Empire 
to join the Congress of Vienna.  
 
The Ottoman Empire, by 1815, was overwhelmed by enormous 
domestic problems. While the Sultan still commanded huge territories in the 
Balkans, his sovereignty over some of them was questionable. For example, 
Serbia and the Principalities, which were autonomous entities, were 
practically under the influence and control of Russia rather than their 
suzerain in Istanbul; while other non-Muslim subjects were under the 
ideological influence of the French revolutionaries and the Russian pan-
Slavic and Orthodox influences. The Slav and Orthodox subjects fixed their 
eyes on Russia and considered the Tsar as their protector, rather than their 
sovereign in Istanbul.   
 
Under those circumstances, the Ottoman Empire was looking for a way 
to stop its rapid decline, as both the ruling elite and the general public were 
living with the trauma of falling from a great power status into a lamentable 
condition. This situation made it difficult for all levels of society to unite 
around a single reform programme. The government’s priority in its foreign 
policies was to maintain peace for as long as possible in order to win enough 
time to focus on domestic issues, however the Empire lacked sufficient power 
to deter any of its neighbours, namely Russia, from breaking the peace that it 
very much needed. It was already apparent from the Treaty of Kucuk 
Kaynarca Treaty (1776) that the Ottoman Empire could not stand alone 
against Russia, and its decline became more rapid and its situation further 
deteriorated against Russia as a result of the successive defeats between 
1774 and 1812. The territorial gains by Russia around the Black Sea after 
those battles put the Ottoman capital of Istanbul under a permanent 
Russian military threat. 
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The situation of the Muslim provinces and subjects was not very 
encouraging either, where emergent notables were holding the economic and 
political reins of power and were challenging the will of the Sultan to assert 
his authority over their fiefs. In desperation, the Sultan had to consent to a 
formal written contract – a Sened-i Ittifak (Convention of Unity) – in 1809 to 
recognise their privileges in return for their support of his domestic reforms. 
The only ray of light in that bleak picture of 1815 was the arrival of a strong 
and reform minded leader, Sultan Mahmut II, who had a clear-cut vision 
about what needed to be done for the survival of the Empire. 
 
Although there had been no meaningful change in Ottoman-Russian 
relations in the 1774–1815 period, there was a huge shuffle in the 
international states system of which both states were a part before and after 
the Napoleonic Wars, the consequences of which would materialise in 1856 
in Paris.  
 
 In a meeting reminiscent of the 1814 Congress of Vienna, the same 
great powers were again sitting around the table in 1856, but this time in 
Paris. The difference was not only the venue of the Congress but also the 
position of Russia. The Congress, which brought a formal end to the Crimean 
War (1854–1856), saw discussions of how to restrict Russia and keep it 
restrained within the European States System. In systemic terms, it brought 
about a restructuring of the European States System while keeping the core 
characteristic of balance of power through multi-polarity. As a part of the 
restructuring, the Ottoman Empire was formally admitted into the Concert of 
Europe, which gave it and its citizens’ equal status in terms of legal affairs in 
the public law of Europe. More importantly, the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the signatory great powers. How can this 
be explained, given that all of the major actors were the same as in 1814? 
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The aim of this thesis is to explain the most notable differences in 
Ottoman-Russian relations and the positions of the great powers of Russia 
and France between 1815 and 1856 by analysing the operation of the 
structure of the international states system that prevailed in the 1815–1856 
period.  
 
Focus will be on the events that most significantly affected Ottoman-
Russian relations in 1815–1856, being: the Greek Rebellion (1821–1830), the 
Rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt, (1833 and 1839), the Holy Places Dispute 
in Jerusalem (1852–1854) and the subsequent Crimean War (1854–1856).   
 
The narration of these events and their effects on Ottoman-Russian 
relations will be told in three distinct but related perspectives: The breakout 
of those events and how the Ottoman government handled them; the reaction 
and interference of Russia in those events; and the involvement of the other 
great powers.  
 
The thesis will be organised in five chapters. The general aim of 
Chapter I is to present the methodological framework of the thesis and to 
provide a very short historical overview of Ottoman-Russian relations until 
1815, opening with an explanation of the aim and scope of the Research 
Question. This will be followed by an explanation of the significance and 
originality of the study and a Literature Review, before ending with the 
Conceptual, Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks. 
 
The Second Chapter will analyse in detail the structure of the 
European States System that prevailed in 1815–1856 in accordance with the 
Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks. On the basis of this analysis, some 
hypotheses will be proposed regarding the operation of the structure of the 
European States System and its likely effects on Ottoman-Russian relations. 
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 With the conclusion of the Second Chapter, the first leg of the 
research will have been completed. The following three chapters will focus on 
analyses of Ottoman-Russian relations around the events of the Greek 
Rebellion, the Rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt, the Holy Places Dispute and 
the subsequent Crimean War.  
 
The Third Chapter will explain the role of the European States System 
in connection with the Concert of Europe in Ottoman-Russian relations, 
revolving around the Greek issue of 1821–1829. In this respect, the start and 
spread of the Greek revolt, its links with Russia, the involvement of Russia, 
and her restraint in the first phase of the revolt will be narrated and 
analysed. Then, the events leading to the shift in Britain’s position, her 
approach to Russia, their agreements on how to deal with the Greek 
question, and the repercussions of that consensus over the Holy Alliance of 
Russia, Austria and Prussia will be explained. Lastly, the chapter will focus 
on how Russia’s war objectives with the Ottoman Empire were limited, and 
how she had to agree to the formation of the new Greek state under the 
tutelage of the Concert of Europe instead of letting her become a satellite 
state of Russia, despite her enormous losses in both human and economic 
terms as a result of the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War. 
 
The Fourth Chapter will explain the scope of Ottoman-Russian 
relations after 1830, with a focus on the shift in Russian foreign policy 
towards the Ottoman Empire aimed at bringing it under her tutelage rather 
than destroying her through coercive means. To this end, an explanation will 
be made of how Russia dispatched her navy and army to the aid of the 
Ottoman Sultan when the army of Mehmed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, threatened 
Istanbul; and then how the bilateral defence Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi 
between the two states was agreed. The reaction of the other great powers to 
the predominance that Russia gained through her unconditional and bold 
support to the Sultan, and their efforts, specifically those of Britain and 
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France, to reduce the Russian prominence and advantage in Near East will 
form the main body of the Fourth Chapter. 
 
The Fifth Chapter will analyse Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1841–
1856 period, and will explain how Russian prominence in the Near East was 
terminated and replaced by the Concert of Europe. Put differently, it will be 
about how the Near East came to be included under the collective guarantee 
of the European States System.  To this end, the chapter will specifically 
focus on the new search of France for areas of influence and her initiatives in 
Near East after Napoleon III had taken the reins of the state within the new 
international environment following the revolutionary waves of 1848. 
France’s overtures to ally with Britain against the Holy Alliance of Russia, 
Austria and Prussia and to end her isolation in Europe will be discussed. The 
issue of the Hungarian refugees and of the Holy Places and their effects on 
Ottoman-Russian relations will be analysed in the light of the new quests of 
France. The chapter will also touch specifically on how Russia interpreted the 
French actions and steps in the Near East. In this respect, the Menshikov 
mission, the Russian occupation of the Principalities, the start of the 
Crimean War, the diplomatic initiatives, and finally the arrangements of the 
Congress of Paris will be narrated.  
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Chapter I 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with an explanation of the main Research 
Question posed by the thesis, the main elements of which will be outlined 
through a description of its aim, nature and scope. A further explanation 
will be made in the section addressing the ‘Justification/Significance of 
the Study’ and the ‘Literature Review’, which will clarify how this research 
differs from previous studies into Ottoman-Russian relations, and how it 
contributes to the body of literature on the subject.  
 
The methodology section will begin with a presentation of the 
‘Conceptual Framework’ of the study, in which the essential concepts of 
the research question associated with the inherent variables will be set 
out. This will contribute further to the understanding of the aim and scope 
of the research question of this study.  
 
Following on from this, an outline of the ‘Theoretical Framework’ will 
be presented, in which the relevant theoretical approaches that will guide 
the research will be explained. This will include a clarification of the 
theories, or combinations of theories, that will be employed when 
attempting to establish the nature and scope of the relationship between 
the dependent, the independent and the intervening variables of the 
research. 
 
The chapter will close with a presentation of the ‘Analytical 
Framework’ through which the scheme of the research will be defined, and 
an explanation of how the relationship between the variables in the 
structure of the 1815 European States System and Ottoman-Russian 
relations in the 1815–1856 period will be analysed. To this end, an 
 11 
operational definition of the variables of the research question will be 
provided.  
 
1. Research Question: Aim, Nature and Limitations of the 
Research  
 The main research question involves understanding and explaining 
of the underlying structural nature of Ottoman-Russian relations in the 
1815–1856 period by focusing on the operation of the current European 
States System of which they were a part. To this end, particular attention 
will be paid to the roles and functions of the institution of the Concert of 
Europe as a distinctive element in the European States System. The 
research question will be further clarified through an explanation of the 
aim, nature and scope of the study. 
 
The key objective of the presented study is to examine in detail the 
position of the Ottoman and Russian Empires within the European States 
System1 in the 1815–1856 period and to find out how it affected their 
relations in that period.  
 
Within the limits of the main question and key objective, the 
answers to following secondary questions will constitute the essence of the 
study: What was the distinctiveness of the European States System in the 
1815–1856 period? How was its structure composed? How did it operate 
and affect the course of the key events which took place between Ottoman 
Empire and Russia in the 1815–1856 period? 
    
It is important to note that the presented work will not be a wholly 
narrative-based2 historical study, as it will also draw upon some 
                                                 
1
 The expressions ‘the 1815 States System’, ‘the 1815 European States System’, ‘the 1815 International 
System’, ‘the post- Napoleonic States System’ and ‘the System’ will be used interchangeably throughout this 
research, however all refer essentially to the same phase in the European States System that came into 
existence after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. 
 
2
 Stone defines ‘narrative’ as ‘the organisation of material in a chronologically sequential order, and the 
focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots’, L. Stone, ‘The past and the present 
revisited ’, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 74. 
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conceptual premises related to the system and theories in international 
relations. To elaborate further, the research will narrate the sequence of 
events and human interactions in the specified time period, with the 
assumption that non-human forces also played a role in shaping 
Ottoman-Russian relations. 
 
Accordingly, the research will combine narrative-based and theory-
based explanations,3 in other words, a synthesis of impersonal and 
socially constructed elements, with the intention being to explain a certain 
period in the history of Ottoman-Russian relations. 
 
The research question contains three main inter-related variables. 
These variables, and their levels of analysis, are as follows:  
 
 The independent variable is the ‘Structure of the 1815 European 
States System’ that functioned at the system level, meaning that while its 
effects were systemic in nature, they could be observed at the unit level. 
The dependent variable, on the other hand, is ‘Ottoman-Russian 
relations’. 
 
 Another systemic variable in the research question is the ‘Concert 
of Europe’, which displays both independent and intervening 
characteristics in its effect on the dependent variable of Ottoman-Russian 
relations. When the Concert of Europe functions as a ‘structural 
modifier’4, that is, acting as if it was structure, to affect the dependent 
variable, it becomes an independent variable. The collective tutelage of the 
five great powers and its working principles and norms can be defined as 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
3
 For the methodological differences between theory-based and narrative based explanations, see J. Levy, 
‘Too Important to Leave to the Other, History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations’, 
International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27–31. 
 
4
 According to Snyder, structural modifiers are a class of systemic factors having system-wide influences. 
They modify the effects of the more basic structural elements on the interaction process but they are not 
interaction itself. He gives norms and institutions as an example of structural modifiers. H.G. Snyder, 
‘Process Variables in Neo-Realist Theory’, Security Studies, vol. 5, no.3, 1996, pp. 168-171. 
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examples of the structural modifier characteristic of the Concert of 
Europe. However, when the Concert of Europe functioned to alleviate the 
anarchic conditions in international politics in the 1815 European States 
System, and paved the way for security cooperation instead of 
competition, for example, by not allowing the process of security 
dilemma,5 to occur, it became an intervening variable.  
 
There is already a considerable amount of literature on this subject, 
but in order to remain within the parameters of a PhD thesis this research 
will be subject to the following limitations: 
 
 The main body of the research will be an analysis of the 
political/military and economic interactions and processes6 in 
the 1815 European States System. Also touched upon will be 
the economic capabilities of the unit states in the System, in 
that they influenced to some extent the course of Ottoman-
Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period. 
 The impacts of cultural/societal interactions fall generally 
outside of the scope of the study, except in cases when they 
affected significantly Ottoman-Russian relations. 
 From a geographical point of view, the research will be also 
limited to the processes and interactions involving Europe; 
with the relations and policies of the great powers concerning, 
for example, America, Central Asia and Africa only taken into 
consideration in exceptional cases were they had an effect on 
Europe-wide politics. 
 Finally, the main focus of the research will be on the 
interactions and processes that took place among the great 
                                                 
5
  On the definition of security dilemma, see ‘G. Evans and J. Newnham ‘The Penguin Dictionary of 
International Relations’, (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 494-495. 
 
6
 Interaction is the actual communication between states or some physical actions. Process is naturally 
occurring or designed sequence of operations or events, possibly taking up time, space, expertise or other 
resources. Snyder (1996), op. cit., p. 170. 
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powers7 rather than those of the unit states of the second 
order in the 1815 European States System. As may be 
understood from an analysis of the working of its structure in 
the following chapter, it was their military and economic 
capabilities that were the main determining factors in the 
emergence of the structural (impersonal and personal) forces 
of the 1815 European States System.  
 
2.  Justification of the Study 
The justification for this research lies in its explanation of the 
distinctness of the 1815–1856 period in the international politics of the 
European States System. 
 
 The 1815 Settlements8 brought an end to France’s aspirations to 
establish hegemony after her defeat by the Quadruple Coalition of Great 
Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia and introduced a new pattern of 
international relations. This new pattern restored some of the 
characteristics of the system that had been in effect before the French 
revolution in 1789, but also introduced some new elements into 
international politics. This will be referred to hereon in as the ‘1815 
European States System’ in order to distinguish it from the previous and 
later phases of the System9 
  
                                                 
7
 According to Levy, great powers are the states which possess a high level of military and economic 
capability, making it invulnerable to military threats apart from those of the other great powers and their 
interests and objectives are continental or global rather than regional or local.  He also argues that it is the 
great powers that determine the structure, major processes and the general evolution of the states systems, J. 
S. Levy, ‘War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975’, (Lexington:  Kentucky University Press , 
1983), pp. 8  and 16-19. 
8
 The 1815 Settlements comprises the Treaty of Chaumont (March 9, 1814), the First Treaty of Paris (May 
30, 1814), the Conventions of the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Second Treaty of Paris and the Holy 
Alliance (15 September, 1815), the Quadruple Alliance (20 November, 1815) and the Protocol of Conference 
and Declaration of the Five Cabinets (15 November, 1818) at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. For text of 
those treaties, see E. Hertslet, ‘Map of Europe by Treaty; showing the Various and Territorial Changes 
which have taken place since the General Peace of 1814’, (London: Butterworths and Harrison, 1875).  
 
9
 The detailed distinguishing characteristics of the 1815 European States System will be covered in the 
second chapter.  
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The most distinguishing characteristic the 1815 European States 
System was the introduction of a new institution: the Concert of Europe. 
This allowed Great Britain, Russia, France, Austria and Prussia to 
collectively exercise tutelage over the states of the second and the third 
orders, and was for the first time a collective/shared hegemony in the 
history of European States System. It also served to alleviate the anarchic 
conditions of the structure of the 1815 European States System, and as 
such facilitated cooperation in security issues. 
 
Ottoman-Russian relations took on a completely new form under the 
new structure that bore little resemblance to the relationship during pre-
1815 and pre-1789 European States Systems. 
 
 Russia was a key actor in the construction of the 1815 Settlements 
and subsequently she became the guardian of the new international order 
in Central Europe against the French revisionist aspirations and against 
the destabilising revolutionary movements between 1815–1856. Therefore, 
she was one of the most effective members of the oligopoly of five great 
powers which taken the responsibility of governance of international 
politics.  
 
In contrast, the Ottoman Empire was at her weakest, and had 
become subject to the tutelage of the oligopoly of the great powers under 
the Concert of Europe, retaining only minor influence in international 
politics in the 1815 European States System. The Ottoman Empire’s lack 
of influence was demonstrated by her lack of participation at the Congress 
of Vienna, during which the post-Napoleon order was forged.10   
 
Despite her weakness, the existence and stability of the Ottoman 
Empire was a key factor in the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, 
given her strategic territories in the Balkans and the Middle East and in 
this regard she could not be categorised alongside the states of the second 
                                                 
10
 A. Cevdet Paşa, Tarihi-i Cevdet, (Istanbul: Uçdal Neşriyat, 1984), 5.Cilt, p. 2579. 
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order. In this context, the Ottoman Empire played a stabilising role in the 
Balkans and Middle East that was similar to that played by the Hapsburg 
Empire (Austria) in Central Europe. Both regions contained many different 
and intertwined ethnic and/or religious nations, all of which were under 
the influence of nationalist and liberal ideologies. This situation of being of 
the upper body over the conglomeration of different ethnic and religious 
groups in Balkans and Middle East made the Ottoman Empire’s existence 
unavoidable for the maintenance of the 1815 Settlement. The uncertainty 
of what kind of political establishment would replace the Ottoman Empire, 
or who would take possession of the Ottoman territories in case of her 
downfall, was a serious concern for the great powers after 1815. It was 
certain that these territories would give their owner a key advantage at the 
expense of the other great powers so that none of them would consent to 
their redistribution without war.   
 
Under those circumstances specified out above, the Ottoman-
Russian relations between 1815 and 1856 constituted a very unique 
phenomenon for the analysis of the operation of the 1815 European States 
System and for the identification of its structural imperatives.  So the 
question of whether the Ottoman-Russian relations would follow the same 
pattern as that seen in the second part of the 18th century, or not became 
the most significant challenge for the 1815 European States System. If it 
did not, what was the role of the structure of the 1815 European States 
System in that or to what extent did they affect Ottoman-Russian 
relations between 1815 and 1856?   
 
These questions necessitate presenting a very brief summary of the 
background of Ottoman-Russian relations until 1815. Particular focus will 
be on two political/military events that occurred in the second half of the 
18th century, as their effects continued to shape Ottoman-Russian 
bilateral relations after 1815. These events were the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca following the1768–1774 Ottoman-Russian War and “the Greek 
Project” in the last decades of the 18th century.  
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The roots of Ottoman-Russian relations date back to the 14th 
century, however the Ottoman Empire and Russia only came into direct 
contact in the mid- to late-17th century when Russia’s place in the 
European States System became more firmly established.11  Up until that 
time, the Ottoman Empire’s involvement with Russia had been through 
her vassal, the Crimean Khanate.12 As the 17th century gave way to the 
18th century, Russia’s power and influence developed so that the relations 
between the two states began to take on greater significance and reach 
level similar in importance to that of Britain, France and the Hapsburg 
Empire (Austria).13 
 
Russia’s foreign policy strategies in the 18th century had their roots 
in the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725).14 At the core, they envisaged 
the extension of Russian sovereignty towards the Baltics and the Black 
Sea, and this would remain as the basis of the Russian foreign policy until 
the French Revolution and the subsequent French bid for the domination 
in Europe. The main challengers to Russia in the execution of its strategy 
had been Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Peter the Great had 
successfully dealt with the Swedish challenge and had devised a novel and 
rather satisfactorily solution to the Polish problem; however he failed to 
resolve satisfactorily the expansion into the Black Sea, and consequently 
to reduce the Ottoman Empire to the level of a weak or vassal state.15 His 
Black Sea strategy would only be realised by his successors in the last 
quarter of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, when 
                                                 
11
 For a detailed account of the early Ottoman-Russian relations, see A. N. Kurat, ‘Türkiye ve Rusya’, 
(Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990).  
 
12
 Ibid, p. 35 
 
13
 Halil Inalcık, ‘Turkey and Europe in History’, (Istanbul: Eren Press, 2006,), p. 123. 
 
  
14
 E.V. Ansimov, ‘Imperial Heritage of Peter the Great’, in H. Ragsdale.- V. N. Ponomarev, (eds), Imperial 
Russian Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 21-35 
 
15
Ibid, p.31-35  
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Russia was able to remove at last the Ottoman Empire from its list of the 
potentially aggressive states.   
 
Russian goals for expansion with regard to the Ottoman Empire, 
specifically, her aspirations towards the Black Sea, were facilitated by her 
alliance with the Hapsburgs, who regarded Russia as their key ally against 
the Ottoman Empire – their main rival in the Balkans and Central Europe. 
Moreover, Russia’s constant struggle against Poland and Sweden, which 
were also hostile to the Hapsburgs, further consolidated the Austro-
Russian alliance. France was supporting Poland and Sweden due to their 
pressure on the Hapsburgs in the north, meaning that Russia was also a 
hostile country to France.  
 
Under those conditions, the Ottoman Empire, regarding Russia as a 
threat in her north-west, had to choose to ally with France, Poland and 
Sweden. But, the alliance with Poland and Sweden and the vacillation of 
France did not provide the Ottoman Empire with enough support in her 
confrontations with the more powerful Austro-Russian alliance in the 
Balkans in the first half of the 18th century. 
 
The second half of the 18th century witnessed a further isolation of 
the Ottoman Empire against the Austro-Russian alliance as result of a 
shift in alliances in the European States System.16 The shift itself, which 
has come to be known as the Diplomatic Revolution, took place in 1756 
and involved the establishment of two opposing blocks: Anglo-Prussian on 
one side, and Franco-Austrian on the other. The establishment of the new 
alliances in the European States System, formalised by the 1756 Treaty of 
Versailles, meant that Russia became an ally of France, and was thus in a 
better position to move against a weakened and further isolated Ottoman 
Empire.17 In this way, the Ottoman Empire lost the support of France, 
                                                 
16
 F. Israel, Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967, (Chelsea House Publishers, 1967, New 
York,), p. 264. 
  
17
 Ibid, p. 264-265. 
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which had been her ally in the European States System since the 16th 
century. The first opportunity for Russia to take advantage of the new 
alliance came in 1768 when the Ottoman Empire initiated military action 
against Russia in an attempt to stop her turning Poland into a vassal 
state, which the Ottoman Empire viewed as threat the regional balance of 
power in her north west.18 
   
The 1768–1874 Ottoman-Russian War ended with the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire, which had struggled to engage in the six-year campaign 
without the assistance of any other great power, either direct or indirect.19 
Russia had already secured the neutrality of Austria, France and Britain 
through the reshuffling of the alliances as specified out above. Another 
key factor in Russia’s victory was the presence of the Russian navy in the 
Mediterranean for the first time in history, having sailed from the Baltic 
Sea with the logistic and personnel support of the British navy.20 This was 
the beginning of Russia’s naval ambition in the region for the future, and 
heralded the roots of the rivalry between the maritime powers of Britain, 
France and Russia in the decades to come. 
 
The end of the conflict was marked with the conclusion of the Treaty 
of Kucuk Kaynarca,21 which was the most notable agreement related to 
Ottoman-Russian relations and the European States System prior to 
1815. Renowned Balkan historian L. S. Stavrianos explained the 
significance of the Treaty for the future of Ottoman-Russian relations, “… 
all the treaties executed by Turkey and Russia during the following half 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
18
 O. Sander, ‘Siyasi Tarih, Ilkçaglardan 1918’e’, (Ankara: Imge, 1989), p. 360.  
 
19
 Ibid, p. 361 
 
20
 M.S. Anderson, ‘Great Britain and the Russian Fleet, 1769–1770’, The Slavonic Review, vol. 31, no. 76, 
1952), pp. 148-163. 
 
21
For the text of  the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, see Israel (1967), op. cit., pp. 913-929 
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century [1774–1829] were but commentaries on the Kucuk Kainarji [Küçük 
Kaynarca] text”.22  
 
In line with the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire had to accept the 
independence of the Crimean Khanate, which Russia would annex shortly 
after.23 It also gave Russia some rights with regard to the administration 
of the Principalities, which had been autonomous states in the Ottoman 
Empire since the 15th century. However, the most controversial 
arrangements were the two articles that gave Russia the right to build a 
church in Istanbul, and to represent the interests of the church and its 
congregation in front of the Ottoman authorities.24 Russia would later 
argue that those articles not only gave her the right to make 
representations for that specific church and its clergy, but also to protect 
and intervene on behalf of the Orthodox sect and subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire,25 which was rightly perceived as a clear violation of Ottoman 
sovereignty over three-quarters of her non-Muslim subjects, and would be 
the source of many future conflicts. 
 
The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca not only brought significant 
consequences to bilateral Ottoman-Russian relations, but also to 
international politics in Europe. Specifically, two states of the European 
States System, Britain and Austria, were going to be most affected by this 
new situation in Near East.  
 
Firstly, Russia’s access to the Black Sea was firmly secured, and her 
harbours on the north coast of the Black Sea became important Russian 
naval bases. This meant that the Bosporus, which cuts through Istanbul, 
                                                 
22
 L.S. Stavrianos, ‘The Balkans since 1453’ (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), p. 191 
 
23
 M. S Anderson ‘The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-4’  The Slavonic and 
East European Review, Vol. 37, No. 88, 1958, pp. 17-41 
 
24
 R. Davison, ‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered’ Slavic 
Review Vol. 35, No. 3, 1976, p. 463  
 
25
 For the various approaches to this issue by some scholars, see, ibid, p. 468   
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the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, and the adjoining Sea of Marmora 
and the Dardanelles, were the next targets in case of an Ottoman-Russian 
military conflict. Those straits were the last obstacles in front of Russia’s 
access to the Mediterranean. This situation would be a major concern for 
Britain, whose great power status was basically dependent on her 
maritime power in the European States System.26 For this reason, the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca became the milestone for Britain to revise her 
alignment with Russia.  
 
Secondly, Russia’s influence drastically increased over the Orthodox 
and/or Slavic nations in the Balkans after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. 
As the strongest independent Orthodox and Slavic state, she became an 
attraction point for the Orthodox and/or Slavs living under the sovereignty 
of the non-Orthodox states in the Balkans, namely under the Ottoman 
and Habsburg (Austrian) Empires. This was enough for Austria to be 
concerned. Moreover, the rights granted to Russia over the administration 
of the Principalities by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca would mean Russia’s 
political penetration into the Balkans which was to open Austria’s south 
to the Russian pressure too in addition to that in her east. 
  
However, in the beginning, Austria did not consider the rise of 
Russian influence in the Balkans as a threat, and so did not question her 
alliance with Russia against the Ottoman Empire. It seemed that she 
considered the benefit of the alliance with Russia to be much more than a 
mere alignment, if not an alliance, with the Ottoman Empire. What was 
the attraction of the Russian alliance that dissuaded Austria from 
objecting to the rise of Russian influence in the Balkans? The answer was 
a secret partition agreement of the Ottoman Empire between Russia and 
Austria that would later be known as ‘the Greek Project’.  
 
                                                 
26
 Duke of Argyll, ‘Our Responsibilities for Turkey, Facts and Memories of Forty Years’, (London: John 
Murray, Albemarle Street Press, 1896), pp. 3-4. 
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The so-called Greek Project was the most second remarkable event 
of the last half of the 18th century in the Ottoman-Russian relations after 
the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. In addition to its importance in the 
partition of the Ottoman territories, the Greek Project also proved to be of 
significance in three other key areas. Firstly, it served to nullify the 
opposition of Austria to Russia’s expansion in the Black Sea and her 
annexation of Crimea in 1783; secondly, as has already been noted, it 
prevented further objections from Austria over the rise of Russian 
influence in the Balkans; and finally, and possibly of greater significance 
to future relations in the region, it served to inspire the future rulers of 
Russia to develop similar partition schemes across the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The ‘Greek Project’ had been developed originally by Catherine II 
and her close aides, and envisioned the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire 
from the Balkans and Istanbul, to be replaced by a Greek kingdom that 
would include Istanbul. The Project also foresaw the establishment of the 
Dacia Kingdom in the Principalities and the division of the remaining 
Balkan, Black Sea and Caucasus territories between Russia and Austria.27 
The Project was developed and formulated by way of a secret 
correspondence between Catherine II and the Hapsburg Emperor Joseph 
rather than through a formal treaty, being best described as a secret 
treaty in the form of an exchange of letters between the two powers in 
1781.28 
 
 As a consequence of the newly developed alignments, Russia was 
able to annex the independent Crimean territories in 1783 without 
resistance from the other great powers. This, in the words of Anderson, ‘… 
was the most important territorial change in Europe during the two 
                                                 
27 
For an excellent analysis of the Greek Project based on the Russian and Austrian archives, see Hugh 
Ragsdale, ‘Evaluating Traditions of the Russian Aggression: Catherine II and The Greek Project,’ The 
Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 66, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 91–117 
 
28
 I. D. Madariaga, ‘The Secret Austro-Russian Treaty of 1781’, The Slavonic and East European Review, 
vol. 38, no. 90, 1959, pp. 114 and 129-132  
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decades which separated the first and second partitions of Poland’.29 
Without the support of any great power, all the Ottoman Empire could do 
in its weakened state was watch while Russia made its fait accompli.30  
 
By the beginning of the 1800s, Russia had achieved all that had 
been envisioned by Peter the Great.31 Poland and Sweden had been 
reduced to the level of vassal or ineffective states, and the Ottoman 
Empire, although not reduced to such a level, had been removed from the 
list of first-level states in the European State System. In addition, the 
Black Sea had been transformed from a vital Ottoman asset into a 
Russian-dominated sea, protected by the Russian naval arsenals at 
Sebastopol, Kherson and Nikolaev on its northern shores. The Ottoman 
position had thus become more precarious due to the geographical 
location of her capital city, Istanbul, and the threat of a seaborne attack. 
This was the state of affairs between the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
when the 1815 Settlements were forged out in the Congress of Vienna.   
 
In conclusion, the domestic weakness of the Ottoman Empire was 
not the only cause of this dramatic shift in power in Ottoman-Russian 
relations, as the structure of the European States System in the latter half 
of the 18th century effectively excluded the Ottoman Empire from allying 
with larger powers against Russia and the Austro-Russian alliance.  
 
Obviously, Ottoman-Russian relations could not remain unaffected 
by the structural transformation of the European States System following 
the 1815 Settlements 
 
After 1815, the main challenge for Ottoman-Russian relations, and 
in connection, the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System, 
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  Anderson (1958), op. cit., p. 19 
 
30
 Anderson (1958), op. cit., p. 39  
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 For the foreign policy objectives of Peter the Great and its influences on his successors, see  Ansimov 
(1993), op. cit., p. 25  
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was whether Russia would pursue the same line of revisionist policies in 
regard to the Ottoman Empire as she had been doing when assuming the 
role of guardian of the status quo in Central Europe in the 1815 European 
States System. Moreover, would Russia act in concert with the other great 
powers for the maintenance of 1815 Settlements? If not, how would the 
structure of the 1815 European States System work to restrain Russia in 
its pursuance of her relations with the Ottoman Empire? While answering 
each of the above questions, some regular patterns of behaviours among 
the great powers in regard will be identified in the relationship between 
the Ottoman Empire and Russia. It was a relationship that had 
consequences for the wider political map of Europe that are still evident in 
global politics today, and as such is a significant research question for 
this study.  
   
3. Literature Review and Originality of Study 
In order to address the key issues and questions raised in this 
thesis, it is first necessary to make a review of previous literature related 
to the subject. In this way, the originality of the presented thesis, and how 
it will add to furthering the understanding of this complex and interesting 
topic, will be clarified.  
 
The international order in the post-Napoleonic era and 19th century 
Ottoman-Russian relations have attracted the attention of a great number 
of scholars and researchers, and as a result there is a considerable body 
of academic literature pertaining to the period. The previous studies may 
be categorised in accordance with the issues covered by the variables of 
the research question. To this end, first, the research question and the 
main argument of the thesis will be reiterated, and then the issues 
covered in previous literature will be outlined. 
 
The aim of the presented research is to examine how the 
development of the 1815 European States System, which was established 
by the 1815 Settlements, affected the relationship between the Ottoman 
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Empire and Russia between 1815 and 1856. This being the case, the core 
argument of the presented work is that Ottoman-Russian relations in this 
period should not be examined independently of the European States 
System, but rather should be analysed taking into account the dynamics 
and politics of the great powers that emerged out of the 1815 Settlements.  
 
The research question and the main argument of the thesis have 
opened two broad issues for discussion. The first covers the establishment 
of the 1815 European States System and its working throughout the 
1815–1856 period; while the second covers the course of Ottoman-
Russian relations in that same period. Previous scholarly works will be 
grouped on this basis, after which a critical review will be made of each, 
defining the contribution of each group to the understanding of the two 
issues.  
 
The various facets of the foundation and operation of the 1815 
European States System have been covered by many scholars and 
researchers,32 examining specifically the French bid for hegemony and the 
resistance of the other great powers. In this context, the emergence of a 
new pattern in international relations and the Concert of Europe has been 
analysed focusing on the failures of the great powers up until 1812, and 
then the establishment and success of the Quadruple Alliance of Great 
Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia against Napoleonic France. These 
studies can be of much value when assessing the changes that occurred 
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in international relations as a result of the foundation of the 1815 
European States System, and how the era after 1815 differed from the 
previous century. As such, these studies have been immensely useful in 
the analysis of the structural features that drove competition and/or 
cooperation among the great powers. These monographs and articles are 
mandatory background reading when making a structural analysis of the 
foreign policies of the unit states in the 1815 European States System.  
 
The most important scholarly works are those of H. Kissinger and F. 
Hinsley.  
 
Kissinger’s ‘A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the 
Problems of Peace, 1812–1822’ (1957) explains how the peacemakers in 
the 1815 Settlements tried to reconcile the legitimate security needs of the 
great powers with the maintenance of the post-Napoleon order. In this 
respect it is a very useful study, pointing out the significance of the 
structural arrangements for lasting stability. It clearly argues that the 
success of the 1815 Settlements was based on the contentment of Russia 
and the accommodation of France in the new international system 
alongside the existing powers of Austria and Britain. 
 
 Hinsley’s ‘Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the 
History of Relations between States’ (1980) focuses on the development of 
the modern European States System from the 16th century to the 20th 
century, which in this respect is much more comprehensive than 
Kissinger’s work. Hinsley concluded that two different but interrelated 
aspects of the European States System developed: Europe became, on the 
one hand, a kind of political community operating under specific rules and 
principles, while on the other hand remaining as a collection of separate 
states that cooperated on the basis of the political/military and economic 
interactions and processes. The significance of his conclusion for this 
research is that it presents a framework for the analysis of the roles and 
places of the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the European States System.  
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The specific issue of Ottoman-Russian relations in the 19th century 
has also been covered at length in many scholarly works, which can be 
divided into two categories according to their genre. 
 
The first category comprises monographs relating the diplomatic 
history of the 19th century.33 These works focus mainly on the interactions 
and processes of the unit states in the 1815 European States System 
rather than on its underlying systemic and structural characteristics. 
They provide a detailed analysis of how the great powers dealt with each 
other, and explain the alignments and alliances that took place among 
them. However, particular focus is on the relations of the great powers 
rather than the Ottoman Empire, and so they can be considered as more 
general in their outlook regarding the Ottoman-Russian relations, which 
are covered only briefly and in very general terms.  
 
The most significant contributions to this category are those by P. 
Schroeder and A. J. P. Taylor.  
 
Schroeder’s comprehensive study, ‘The Transformation of European 
Politics 1763–1848’, (1990) presents a clear understanding of the new 
dimensions of the post-Napoleonic settlement, showing how international 
politics was transformed from crude balance of power politics into a 
                                                 
33
 Some prominent examples of this genre can be listed as follows: A. R. Marriot ‘The Eastern Question, A 
Study in European Diplomacy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917)  I. H. Uzuncarsili and E.Z. Karal, 
‘Osmanli Tarihi’, 9 Cilt, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); F. Armaoglu, ‘19 uncu Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi’ 
(Ankara, Is Ban. Yay. 1989); O. Sander,‘Siyasi Tarih, Baslangictan 1918’e’(Ankara, Imge, 1989); R. 
Ucarol, Siyasi Tarih’(Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1985); A.N. Kurat ‘Türkiye ve Rusya (XVIII. Yüzyıl 
Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri) 1789-1919’ (Ankara, T. T. K., 2011); A. N.  Kurat 
‘Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar’(Ankara, T.T.K. 2010); M. S. Anderson ‘The Eastern 
Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations’ (London: Macmillan, 1966); B. Jelavich 
‘Russia's Balkan entanglements, 1806–1914’ (USA, Cambridge University Press, 1991); L. S. Stavrianos 
‘The Balkans since 1453’ (London: Hurst, 2000); C. Webster, ‘The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–
1841’(London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951); ‘’The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822’, (London: G. Bell 
& Sons, 1931); J.V. Puryear, ‘International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, 1834–1853,’ 
(USA: Archon Books, 1969) and ‘France and the Levant’(USA, Archon Books, 1969); W.E. Mosse ‘The 
Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855-1871’, (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1963) V.H. Aksan 
‘Ottoman Wars; An Empire Besieged, 1700–1870’ (Harlow: Longman/Pearson, 2007) 
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managed balance of power relations. Regarding the Ottoman Empire 
before 1848, he describes at length how the Greek revolt (1820–1829) and 
the rebellion of the governor of Egypt (1833–1839) were intervened in and 
settled, by the great powers in line with the new understanding in 
international relations. 
 
Taylor’s work, ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Europe in 1848–1914’, 
(1954) starts where Schroeder left off. In contrast to Schroeder’s approach, 
Taylor argues that there was no substantial difference between pre-1815 
and post-1848 international politics in Europe, and that balance of power 
politics prevailed for the entire duration of the 19th century, as the title of 
his book suggests. He provides a detailed account of the military and 
political interactions and processes among the great powers between 1848 
and 1914, detailing also Ottoman-Russian relations.   
 
In addition to the general political history studies of the 19th 
century, there are a large number of works covering particular periods or 
specific issues in Ottoman-Russian relations. By drawing mainly on 
primary sources, they contribute significantly to the understanding of the 
big picture in international politics in the Near East at the time.  
 
‘The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International 
Relations’ (1966) by M.S. Anderson is an authoritative work dealing with 
the specific subject of international politics around the Ottoman Empire. 
Recounting the great powers’ policies concerning the Near East, it begins 
with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 and culminates in 1923. 
Another subject-specific work in this genre is Jelavich’s ‘Russia's Balkan 
Entanglements, 1806–1914’ (1991) which is a very useful study of how 
Russia used her Orthodox and/Slavic connections with the Balkan 
nations under the Ottoman Empire in her efforts to extend influence into 
the southern sphere of Eurasia and the Mediterranean. V. Aksan’s 
‘Ottoman Wars; An Empire Besieged, 1700–1870’ (2007) looks at how the 
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Ottoman Empire resisted the military pressure of Russia and Austria from 
the 18th century until the end of the Crimean System in 1870.  
 
V. Puryear’s ‘International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near 
East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834–1853’; 
(1969) and ‘France and the Levant from the Bourbon Restoration to the 
Peace of Kutiah’ (1968) thoroughly investigate the economic motives 
behind the British and French policies towards the Near East, relying 
primarily on English and French archives. 
 
Russia’s relations with the Ottoman Empire and her policies 
concerning the Near East in 19th century are clearly a subject of great 
interest to Russian scholars. In this respect, ‘Vostochniya Voproc Vo 
Vneshneiye Politike Rossiya, Konets XVIII- Nachalo XX v’ (1978) is a 
concise and compact book by a group academics, V. A. Georgiev, N. S 
Kinyapina, M.T. Panchenkova and B .I Sheremet, about the ‘Eastern 
Question’, viewed from the Russian perspective. It can be considered as 
the Russian equivalent of Anderson’s ‘The Eastern Question, 1774–1923’, 
examining at length Russian foreign policy and its implementation in 
regards to the Ottoman Empire, relying on Russian primary and 
secondary sources.  
 
The starting point of Russian-Ottoman relations in the 1815 
European States System, being the rebellion of the Greeks in the Ottoman 
Empire, is covered in detail in G. L. Arsh’s ‘Eteristskoii Dvenzhenie v 
Russii’ and A. M. Stanislavoskaya’s ‘Rossia i Gretsiya’ (1970). These 
publications go on to analyse Russia’s interest and links with the Greek 
organisation ‘Phelika Heteria’, which stared the Greek rebellion in 1821–
1830. Both studies are very good examples of background readings of the 
Russian-Greek relations before the establishment of an independent 
Greece in 1831.  
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‘Turtsiia i Adrianopolskii Mir 1829g’ (1975) by V. S. Sheremet 
examines the Ottoman-Russian relations in the context of the Greek 
rebellion, with particular emphasis on the 1828–1829 war and the Treaty 
of Adrianople. The main conclusion Sheremet draws is that the Treaty of 
Adrianople was a milestone for Ottoman-Russian relations in the first half 
of the 19th century. With the signing of the Treaty, Ottoman-Russian 
relations were based on Ottoman subservience following the Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833, which had long been Russia’s aim. 
 
  A. Georgiev’s ‘Vneshniyaya Politika Russii na Blizhnem Vostoke v 
Kontse 30- Nachale 40x Godov XIX v’ (1975) continues to narrate Russian 
policies in the Near East, starting where Sheremet’s study left off. The 
book narrates the shift in Russian policy to preserve the existence and 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, 
and examines how Russia dealt with the rebellion of the ruler of Egypt 
against the Ottoman Sultan and the signing of the bilateral defence Treaty 
of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833, followed by the second rebellion of the 
Egyptian governor and Russia’s subsequent cooperation with Britain. 
Finally, it details the replacement of the bilateral Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi 
by the multilateral Convention of the Straits in 1841. He argues that 
Russia’s agreement to replace the bilateral Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi with 
the multilateral Convention of the Straits was a key characteristic of 
Russian policy in the Near East, and claims that by giving its consent, 
Russia lost her monopoly in the regulation of affairs in the Near East, 
which became the subject of the multilateral politics of the great powers. 
 
Relating to the Crimean War, which ended the 1815 European 
States System and was a remarkable event in Ottoman-Russian relations, 
two important books are worthy of mention. A.M. Zayonchkovskiy’s 
‘Vostochnaya Voyna 1853-1856 gg. v Svazi s Sovremennoy ey Politicheskoy 
Obstonovkoy, Prilojeniya’ (1908-1913) and E.B Tarle’s ‘Kirimskaya Voina’ 
(1950) present a detailed account of the events leading up to the Crimean 
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War and the war itself. Both studies are based on a large collection of 
Russian documents.  
 
Ottoman-Russian relations and the great power politics of the 19th 
century have attracted the attention of many Ottoman historians as well. 
A. Cevdet Paşa’s ‘Tarih-i Cevdet’34, M. Nuri Paşa’s ‘Netayicul Vukuat’35, A. 
F. Türkgeldi’s ‘Mesaili Mühimmeyi Siyasiye’36 and M. Celaleddin Paşa’s 
‘Miratul Hakikat’37 are the most well-known among them. These historians 
were high level courtiers in the last half of the 19th century in the Ottoman 
Empire, and therefore their works partly reflect the views of the 
establishment. Nevertheless, these books have become standard sources 
of reference for later historians in the Turkish Republican era. Regarding 
the Turkish studies written after 1923, the most comprehensive record of 
Ottoman History is ‘Osmanli Tarihi’ by I.H. Uzuncarsili and E.Z. Karal. 
This is a detailed chronological account of all external and internal events 
of the period under examination in this study. In addition, ‘19 uncu Yuzyil 
Siyasi Tarihi’ by F. Armaoglu, ‘Siyasi Tarih’ by O. Sander and ‘Siyasi Tarih’ 
by R. Ucarol are three important academic works that touch upon 
Ottoman-Russian relations, alongside other developments in international 
relations in 19th century Europe. H. Inalcik’s studies are also worth 
mentioning here for their contribution to the understanding of the role of 
the Ottoman Empire in the European States System from the 15th century 
onwards, although his studies are not specifically about 19th century 
Ottoman history.  
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 A. Cevdet Paşa, ‘Tarihi-I Cevdet’, (Istanbul: Uçdal Neşriyat, 1984). 
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 M. Celaleddin Pasa, ‘Mirat-i Hakikat’ (Istanbul: Kervan, 1979) 
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Finally, the memoirs of leading statesmen in the 1815–1856 era, 
such as F. Metternich,38 D. Talleyrand,39 and F. Guizot40 constitute the 
second category of works relating to Ottoman-Russian relations.  
 
These studies, in English, Turkish and Russian, have made 
meaningful and substantial contributions to the understanding of the way 
in which the 1815 European States System was founded and operated, 
and the course of Ottoman-Russian relations in the first half of the 19th 
century. That said, the subject cannot be considered closed as there still 
remain some unexplained issues and gaps in the understanding of the 
era.  
 
Firstly, the general and diplomatic history studies address the 
Ottoman-Russian relations only to a limited degree, while the subject-
specific studies do not pay sufficient attention to the systemic differences 
between the pre- and post-1815 Ottoman-Russian relations in terms of 
the structural constraints. That said, both groups of studies serve as the 
basis for the further elaboration of the key international political events 
and developments of the time. 
  
Secondly, most of the studies dealing with Ottoman-Russian 
relations are narrative-based explanations rather than analyses that draw 
upon theoretical assumptions, and so do not clearly identify the 
underlying structural causes of some of the consistent patterns in 
Ottoman-Russian relations between 1815 and 1856. In this regard, the 
operation of the 1815 European States System in those relations has not 
been sufficiently addressed. 
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 Memories of Prince Metternich’ in 5 vols., ed. by R. Metternich and tran. by A. Napier, (London: R. 
Bentley and Son, 1879) 
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 Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand in 5 vols., trans. by A. Hall, (London: Griffith Farran and Co. Ltd. 
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 F. Guizot ‘Memoirs to Illustrate the History of my Time’ in 5 vols., (London, R. Bentley, 1861) 
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Thirdly, there is a need to use some other exploratory tools in 
addition to the balance of power concept for a better understanding of the 
Ottoman-Russian relations. Obviously, the balance of power can explain 
most of the behaviours and tendencies of the unit states in the 1815 
European States System, however focusing solely on this issue results in 
some omissions from the big picture since it does not explain sufficiently 
the differences between the pre- and post-1815 eras, or between the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Accordingly, the specific role and function of the 
Concert of Europe in international European politics in 1815–1856, and 
its subsequent effects on the course of Ottoman-Russian relations in that 
era, have been generally overlooked. 
 
This research aims to fill these gaps by taking 1815 as the start 
point of the new phase in the history of the European States System, 
herein referred to as the ‘1815 European States System’. On this basis the 
structure of the 1815 European States System will be analysed to identify 
its structural characteristics through some theoretical approaches, after 
which an attempt will be made to find consistent patterns in the operation 
of the 1815 European States System and its effects on Ottoman-Russian 
relations based on the findings of the structural analysis.  
 
 
4. Conceptual Framework  
Before proceeding onto the theoretical and analytical tools used in 
the analysis of the relationship between the variables of the ‘Research 
Question’, the key concepts of the ‘Research Question’ will be explained so 
as to justify the use of these particular theories and analytical models. The 
key concept is the ‘European States System’; however, it is necessary to 
speak a little about the general characteristics of international systems 
before going into the particulars of the European States System.   
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International System 
Despite its significance and frequent use, there is no universally 
accepted definition of an international system.41 According to Little this is 
partly the result of the different methodological ways the ‘system’ concept 
has been dealt with in the international relations discipline.42  
 
When there exists a collection of at least two unit states among 
which political/military and economic interactions take place, and 
consequently a kind of dependency is formed among them, we can begin 
to speak of an international system.43 Interactions among the unit states 
must be sustained on a regular basis and over a substantial period of 
time.44  
 
The significance of the international system concept comes from its 
contribution to the understanding of the constraining forces on the states 
that make up that system. The sources of the constraining forces on unit 
states in a systemic relationship can be defined as structure, process and 
interaction,45 which are impersonal in nature, and affect the behaviours of 
unit states. Besides this, there may be other personal or socially 
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constructed elements, such as common rules and principles that affect 
the behaviours of the unit states of a given international system.46 
 
The structure of an international system indicates how the unit 
states in the system stand in relation to each other as a consequence of 
the distribution of military and economic capabilities power among them. 
However, its effects over the unit states can be felt through processes such 
as fighting, arms races, security dilemma, political recognition, alliances 
and alignments, and trade agreements. As for processes, they suggest how 
those unit states work or interact with each other.47 Processes are also 
very important for understanding the effects of structures, and as has 
been noted above, structural effects transmit into the behaviours of states 
through processes.48 Nye uses the metaphor of a poker game to describe 
the linkages between structure and processes in an international 
system.49 The structure is how the cards are distributed among the 
players, while the process is about the rules of the game and how the 
players use the cards they are dealt. 
 
 From these explanations, it can be deduced that processes are 
systemic in nature in the operation of an international system, in that 
they affect behaviour, while not being part of the structure but they 
require a viable structure to take place. 
 
                                                 
46
 Owing to the impersonal forces of the systemic forces of structure and process, structuralists argue that the 
focus of the analyst in international relations should be on the underlying features of the system rather than 
the actors, namely, the states. In this regard, ‘They [structuralists] are sceptical of the influence of 
organisations making much impact outside the structural constraints. They are even more sceptical of the 
influence of individuals’. M. Nicholson ‘ A Concise Theory of International Relations, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), p. 102 
 
47
 J. Nye, ‘Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History’, (Pearson 
Longman, New York, 2006), p. 37 and Buzan and Little (1999), op. cit. pp. 79, 84–85 and 216  
 
48
 G. Snyder, ‘Process Variables in Neorealist Theory’, in Realism: Restatement and Renewal, ed. B. Frankel,  
(Cass, 1997), p. 168 and for the detailed explanation of process and process types, see also Buzan and Little 
(1999), op. cit., pp. 79, 217–227 and 301–329 
 
49
Nye (2006), op. cit., p. 38  
 
 36 
It is important to note that a structure among three impersonal 
sources of the systemic forces is the most static one that makes it much 
more durable. In other words, changes in structure take place at a slower 
rate than they do in processes.50 All of these characteristics make 
structure much more important in the analysis of the effects of 
international systems on its unit states.   
 
Another concept that is closely associated with the concept of 
structure is that of structural modifiers. Snyder defines these as: ‘System 
wide influences that are structural in their inherent nature but not potent 
enough internationally to warrant that description. They modify the effects 
of the more basic structural elements on the interaction process, but they 
are not interaction itself’.51 Military technologies, norms and institutions 
can be put forward as examples of structural modifiers.52  
 
European States System 
The ‘European States System’ is, in short, an international system 
made up of independent states interacting on the basis of the Treaty of 
Westphalia.53 It covers geographically the Western hemisphere of the 
Eurasian landmass since its inception in the 15th century.  
 
Since the 15th century,54 the European States System has evolved in 
two distinct but interrelated directions.55 The first evolution has been the 
expansion of political/military and economic interactions and processes to 
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cover the Balkans, Near East [Ottoman Empire], Caucasus Region, Russia 
and North Africa56 based on the sovereignty of the unit states and multi-
polarity based on a balance of power.57 The great settlements of 
Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1714) and Vienna (1815) were some of the key 
events determining the specific scope of the European States System.  
 
The second evolution of the European States System entailed its 
development as a political community, which paved the way for the birth 
of common norms, rules, public law, diplomatic relations and 
institutions.58 Buzan sees the birth of the European community ‘as a 
historical response to the existence of [a European States] system’59 
covering the Near and Middle East, North Africa and Russia, in which the 
norms, values and institutions of the European International Society 
spread.60  
 
These two simultaneous developments were closely interrelated, 
meaning that both have to be taken into consideration when analysing the 
effects of the European States System. Both effects were systemic in 
nature but had different motivations, with the first arising out of 
impersonal forces [interactions, processes and structure] on the unit 
states, and the second out of consciously formulated rules and 
institutions. 
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5. Theoretical Framework 
This section will discuss theoretical approaches in an attempt to 
determine the relations between the variables of the research question. To 
summarise the variables of the research question, the structure of the 
1815 European States System is an independent variable; the Ottoman-
Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period are a dependent variable; and 
the Concert of Europe is both an independent and intervening variable. 
 
The first theoretical approach to be followed in the analysis is the 
system approach,61 which will make it possible to reduce the complexity 
and confusion displayed by the amalgam of interactions. In this way, the 
cause-effect relationship in the behaviours of the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia and between the other great powers in the 1815 European States 
System may be accurately determined. 
  
The second main theoretical approach used in the analysis is the 
neo-realist or structural realist perspective, which is compatible with the 
system approach. The neo-realist approach, although with some 
modifications, will allow the contributions of the institutional and security 
regime theories to be accommodated, leading to a better understanding of 
the operation of international systems while maintaining the core 
assumptions of the realist tradition.62 
 
 As a systemic theory, Neo-realism treats the internal attributes of 
actors as non-determining and non-explanatory in the behaviours of 
states.63 However, when examining the short- and mid-term operations of 
international systems like the 1815 European States System, some of the 
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unit state attributes, collective norms and principles became important for 
the analysis of systemic imperatives.  Rather than adopting the rigid 
stance that Neo-Realism proposes, additional socially constructed 
elements, such as common international norms, principles, processes and 
structural modifiers will be included in the portfolio of systemic 
components as explanatory variables that rely on the contribution of other 
perspectives as the Neo-Liberal (institutional) approach. The practical 
results of this broad and modified approach will allow functional 
differentiations, or in more concrete terms, the international division of 
labour among states in the 1815 European States System to be taken into 
consideration. Also, it will facilitate an understanding of the ordering 
principle of the 1815 European States System, lying somewhere between 
anarchy and hierarchy, given the existence and operation of the Concert of 
Europe after 1815 in European international politics.  
 
6. Analytical Framework 
This section will very briefly touch on the steps followed in the 
research and specify how the theoretical approach will be employed. 
  
As a first step, the structure of the 1815 European States System 
will be analysed using the analytical model developed by R.J.B. Jones, 
which offers the analytical advantage of providing an ‘intermediate level’ of 
analysis between the system and unit levels in accordance with the 
theoretical approach applied in this thesis.64 Through this ‘intermediate 
level’ of analysis, focus can sway somewhere between the all-inclusive unit 
level and the neo-realist’s highly parsimonious system level.  
 
With the analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States 
System, it will be possible to come up with some hypotheses about its 
working and impact on Ottoman-Russian relations. In the final step the 
bilateral interactions and processes among the Ottoman Empire and 
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Russia and the other great powers in the 1815–1856 period will be 
analysed to test the hypothesis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The following chapters contain an analysis of the working and 
effects of a new phase in the history of the European States System in 
terms of the bilateral relations of two of its peripheral states: the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia.  
 
These two states were unique at the time with regard to their 
positions and relations within the European States System: The Ottoman 
Empire had been a state of the first order within the System since the 14th 
century, while remaining outside of its institutional arrangements; while 
in contrast, Russia was a latecomer to the first order states of the 
European States System owing to her aggrandising policies against the 
neighbouring states of Poland, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.  
 
When the post-Napoleon order was forged in 1815, the Ottoman 
Empire was at the nadir of its power, although her stability remained of 
great importance for the maintenance of the peace that the 1815 
Settlements had brought. In her weakened state, she concentrated all her 
energy on consolidating state authority in the provinces and organising 
her army and state machinations to achieve her primary aim of 
maintaining the international status quo to the greatest extent possible.  
 
In contrast, Russia, one of the main pillars of the 1815 Settlement, 
was at the peak of her military power, and was faced with the dilemma of 
how to deal with the weak Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman territories were 
all that stood in the way of Russia’s access to the Mediterranean, where, 
as a maritime power, she would be able to create a safe and secure 
frontier on her southern frontier to match the one in the west that had 
resulted from the 1815 Settlements. She could continue her pre-1815 
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aggrandisement policies with regard to the Ottoman Empire and to the 
other great powers, however this could potentially expose her to a hostile 
coalition of the other great powers and would result in the disruption of 
the peace and order brought by the 1815 Settlements. As an alternative, 
she could agree to maintain the status quo in the Near East, which would 
likely fall under the sphere of influence of one of the maritime powers of 
the 1815 European States System, being Great Britain and France. 
  
As a result, there was great ambiguity in the level of Ottoman-
Russian relations as the new phase of the European States System started 
to unfold. Could Russia continue to expand further to the south-west at 
the expense of the other great powers and remove the last obstacle in its 
way to the Mediterranean to achieve a secure and stable south-west 
frontier? How could an inward-oriented Ottoman Empire stand against 
such a militarily and politically powerful Russia?  
 
The answers to these questions may be found in the operation of the 
current European States System. A new relationship pattern emerged as a 
result of the Chaumont, First and Second Paris, and Congress of Vienna 
Treaties during 1814 and 1815 after the defeat of the Napoleonic France, 
referred to collectively as the 1815 Settlements. The most distinguishing 
aspect of this new system was the inception of the Concert of Europe, by 
which the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements was entrusted to the 
concerted actions of the great powers.  
 
So, would Russia be restrained, or would she be permitted to follow 
her policies for expansion under the new structure of the European States 
System? And to what extent would she be restrained or allowed to 
continue? The most essential part of the answer to those questions will be 
addressed in a thorough analysis of the structure of the 1815 European 
States System, which will be the subject of the following four chapters of 
this study. The choice of theoretical and analytical tools will be of key 
significance in answering these questions. A systemic approach and a 
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modified version of Neo-realist or Structural realism are considered to be 
the most suitable theoretical tools in this regard, since they will allow the 
identification of the systemic forces at play in the 1815 European States 
System regarding the Ottoman Empire and Russia.  
 
The research will be carried out in two broad steps. The first step 
will entail a detailed analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States 
System in Chapter II; while the second step will be an analysis of the 
interactions and processes among the Ottoman Empire and Russia and 
the other great powers, focusing on the key events of the 1815-1856 
period, and based on the outcomes of the first step. The second step will 
be covered in the third, fourth and fifth chapters.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM 
1815–1854 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will present an analysis of the structure of the 
European States System that prevailed from 1815–1856, with the overall 
aim being to provide an understanding of the external environment of 
Ottoman-Russian relations in that period. To this end, the structure of the 
European States System1 and the way it worked during that period will be 
explained, which will lead to some hypotheses on the effects of the 
European States System on Ottoman-Russian relations from 1815–1856, 
which will be covered in the following chapters. 
 
To this end, answers will be sought to the following questions: First 
of all, (1) how did the new relationship patterns come about; and more 
particularly, what events instigated the change, and on what pillars were 
they grounded? Did the new pattern of relationships amount to a 
completely new international states system; and, if so, what new elements 
distinguished it from the previous system; (2) following the 1815 
Settlements and the formation of a new relationship pattern, what was the 
structure of the new states system? Put differently, what how was the 
power distributed among the great powers, and how were they2 positioned 
in respect of their relationships? To this end, what was the ordering 
                                                 
1
 I will sometimes use the term ‘the Structure’ (with the definite article and a capitalised ‘S’) in place of the 
phrase ‘the structure of the 1815 European States System’. 
 
2
 As to the significance of great powers in the operation of states systems, Levy argues that it was the great 
powers that determined the structure, major processes and the general evolution of the states system, and 
therefore their actions are of primary interest for an analyses of the operation of the states systems. J. S. 
Levy, ‘War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975’, (Lexington:  Kentucky University Press , 
1983), p. 8; Likewise, Waltz says that the ‘structures [of international states systems] are defined not by all of 
the actors that flourish within them, but by the major ones’ K. Waltz, ‘Theory of International Politics’, 
(New York: Random House, New York), p. 93. 
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principle of the structure and did any hierarchy exist? (3) Were there any 
functional differences among the unit states of the new states system that 
emerged from the nature of the ordering principle? If so, what were those 
functional differences? And, finally, (4) how can the changes that took 
place in the relationship pattern in 1815–1856 be categorised?  
  
The first step in the analysis of the structure will be to split it into 
two parts, in accordance with the model presented in the Analytical and 
Theoretical Frameworks in the previous chapter: Capability Structure 
and Relationship Structure. This division is purely analytical and is 
necessary as each requires the use of different methodological tools. 
 
The analysis of the Capability Structure will draw upon some 
economic and military data related to the great powers and will present a 
comparison of their standings within the system so as to reveal the 
underlying forces that determined or constrained the great powers in their 
application of foreign policies. This will facilitate an assessment of whether 
the great powers’ foreign policy objectives were consistent with their 
economic and military capacities. In concrete terms, it will reveal whether 
their economic performances were able to support their foreign policy 
objectives in the 1815–1856 period. 
 
The analysis of the Relationship Structure will include explanations 
of the following elements: (1) The ordering principle that defined the 
nature of the relationships among the unit states under the new states 
system that resulted from the 1815 Settlements;3 while the analysis of the 
ordering principle will include an examination of the Concert of Europe, 
which was the defining body in international politics from 1815 onwards; 
(2) the modal tendencies of the great powers in their foreign policies in the 
1815–1856 period; and, finally, (3) the outcomes of the interplay between 
the ordering principle of the structure and the modal tendencies of the 
                                                 
3
 For a definition of ordering principle and its role in the determination of the nature of structures of 
international states system, see ibid, pp. 81–99. 
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great powers. In this context, the diverging approaches of the great powers 
will be analysed. 
  
The chapter will conclude with some hypotheses about the operation 
and effects of the structure on Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–
1854 period.  
 
To reiterate, through an analysis of the relationship and capability 
structure of the new international states system, the environment and the 
systemic forces that either determined or constrained the Ottoman Empire 
and Russia in their bilateral relations will be defined. At the centre of the 
analysis will be the interactions and policies of the great powers, since 
their interests and capabilities extended beyond their immediate 
neighbours; and more so than any other states, they shaped and 
responded to the structure of the international states system of which 
they were a part.4 
 
A. Foundation of the 1815 European States System 
  
The new pattern of international relationships came into existence 
after the defeat of Napoleonic France and the successful dissolution of the 
so-called ‘Napoleonic Empire’5 by the third coalition of Great Britain, 
Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1815.6 However, the foundation process of 
the states system as ‘a political community’7 with specific norms was not 
                                                 
4
 B. F. Braumoeller, ‘Systemic Politics and the Origin of Great Power Conflict’, American Political Science 
Review’, Vol. 102, No. 1, 2007, p. 77. 
 
5
 For details of the political setting of the Napoleonic Empire, see A. Watson, ‘The Evolution of International 
Society, A Comparative Historical Analysis’ (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 232–234 and Paul Schroeder, 
‘The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 371–395 
 
6
 For a detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars and their political implications on the European States 
System before 1815, see P. Schroeder (1994), op. cit., pp. 100–441. 
 
7
I. L. Claude, Jr. ‘Swords into Plowshares, the Problems and Process of International Organization’, (New 
York: Random House, 1971), p. 26. Regarding the role of cultural and political questions and norms in the 
course of the European States System, see M. Wight, ‘Systems of States’, ed. H. Bull, (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1977), pp. 33–45. More general theoretical information about the analytical division of 
political, military, economic and societal sectors in the analysis of international systems can be found in B. 
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completed until France had been fully admitted into the ranks of the ‘great 
powers club’8 in 1818, which was to assume the task of the governance of 
international relations. The following international agreements formed the 
pillars of the new states system: The Treaty of Chaumont (March 9, 1814), 
the First Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814), the Conventions of the Congress 
of Vienna (1815), the Second Treaty of Paris and the Holy Alliance (15 
September, 1815), the Quadruple Alliance (20 November, 1815) and the 
Protocol of Conference and Declaration of the Five Cabinets (15 November, 
1818) at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.9 For clarity, these will be 
referred to collectively in future references as the 1815 Settlements. 
 
Having outlined the birth of the new international relationship 
pattern, an assessment will now be made as to whether the new patterns 
in international relations could be described as a new international states 
system. According to Stanley Hoffman, if a positive answer is given one of 
the following questions, the existence of a new international states system 
can be assumed: Firstly, what were the system’s basic units? For example, 
were they states, or supranational institutions for global governance? 
Secondly, what were the predominant foreign policy goals that these units 
sought with respect to one another, such as territorial conquest, material 
gain through trade etc.? Thirdly, what level of power was each member 
able to impose over each other members as a result of the military and 
economic capabilities of each state?10 Based on this theoretical 
framework, can the relationship pattern between the states in Europe 
                                                                                                                                                    
Buzan and R. Little, ‘International Systems in World History, Remaking the Study if International Relations’, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 72–77.  
 
8
 Levy lists four criteria for a great power: 1. It possesses a high level of military capability, making it 
invulnerable to military threats from non-powers, and needs fear only other great powers. 2. Its interests and 
objectives are continental or global rather than regional or local. 3. It defends its interests more aggressively, 
including the frequent threat or use of military force, and finally, 4. It is recognised by the formal criteria of 
an international conference, congress, organisation or treaty, or is granted privileges such as veto power or 
permanent membership. For more detailed explanation, see Levy (1983), op. cit., pp.16-19 
 
9
 For the English texts of some of these treaties, see M. Hurst, (ed) ‘Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814-
1914’, vol.1, (London: David& Charles Ltd. 1972,), pp.1-147 
 
10
 S. Hoffman, ‘International Systems and International Law’, in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The 
International System: Theoretical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 215 
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after 1815 be defined as a new states system? And if not, what was it 
exactly? 
 
When the characteristics of the different unit states and the way 
they interacted with each other are taken into account, the new pattern of 
international relations after 1815 cannot be perceived as a new 
international states system. Still, the main units engaging in international 
relations were the independent sovereign states. The conditions under 
which interstate relations took place were anarchic, and states still 
interacted with each other according to the principles established in 
Westphalia in 1648.11 Lastly, and most importantly, the balance of power 
and its subsequent outcome of multi-polarity was still the determining 
principle in the foreign policies of all the major states, as had been the 
case since the 15th century. From this it can be understood that the 1815 
Settlements brought nothing new to those areas, but what they did do was 
introduce a significant new element that distinguished the new pattern of 
international relationships from their ‘predecessors’,12 being the 
oligopolistic governance of international relations under the ‘Concert of 
Europe’. The commonalities between the previous system and the Concert 
of Europe institution prevent the new patterns in international relations 
from being referred to as a completely new states system, as they were 
rather a new phase in the course of the European States System. In future 
references, this will be referred to as the ‘1815 European States System’,13 
which denotes at the same time both the continuity and exclusivity.   
 
                                                 
11
 For the legal and political contribution of the Peace of Westphalia in the development of European States 
System, see Leo Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, The American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 42, no.1, 1948. For an opposing view, see A. Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth’ International Organization, vol. 55, no. 2, 2001    
 
12
 For details of the previous phases of the European States System, see Watson (1997), ob. cit., pp.182–237, 
C. Tilly, ‘Coercion, Capital and, European States, AD 990–1990’, (Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 1992), pp. 163–
191, and F. H. Hinsley, ‘Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Theory and Practice in the History of Relations 
between States’, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), pp. 153–185  
 
13
 I will sometimes, depending on flowing of the text, use ‘the System’ with the definite article and a 
capitalised ‘S’ letter interchangeably with ‘The 1815 European States System’.  
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As a ‘geographical category’, the borders of the 1815 European 
States System and the characteristics of its unit states remained the same 
as they had been between the 1713 Utrecht Settlements and the start of 
the French bid for hegemony after 1789. In this context, the Near East 
(Balkans, Asia Minor, North Mediterranean, Caucasus and Persia), North 
and South America and Japan all fell within the borders of the 1815 
European States System.14    
 
Multi-polarity in the balance of power had been a characteristic of 
the European States System since the 1648 Westphalia Agreements; 
however the imperatives or requirements for multi-polarity in the 1815 
European States System were different from those of the previous era. 
These specific imperatives or requirements, and the way that the 1815 
Settlements attempted to meet them require further analysis, since they 
were the operational indicators of the balance of power in the 1815 
European States System.  
 
(i) Fixing and then Preservation the Territorial and Political 
Balance/Equilibrium among the Great Powers 
In the 1793–1812 period, France had, to a great extent, altered the 
political and territorial map of Europe following her victories under the 
leadership of Napoleon.15 The so-called ‘French Continental System’ saw a 
re-design of the political and territorial map of Central Europe, with 
France at the centre.16 The peacemakers at the Vienna Congress in 1814, 
as a priority task, attempted to undo this political and territorial setting 
and replace it with a new one, with the intention being to reset the 
                                                 
14
 F. S. Northedge, ‘The International Political System’, (Faber and Faber, 1976), pp. 73–76. For a very 
useful discussion of the cultural and chronological borders, as well as the geographical borders of the 
international states system, see Weight (1977), op. cit., pp. 33–45 and 111–152  
 
15
 Watson (1997), op. cit., p. 238; for a detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars and their political 
consequences, see Schroeder (1994), op. cit., p. 371–383 
 
16
 Watson (1997), op .cit.,  p. 232 
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balance of power in Europe among the five great powers (including 
France).  
 
In this regard, firstly, the dynastic regimes that had been replaced 
or removed by Napoleon were restored in France, Spain, Naples, the 
Netherlands, Tuscany and Sardinia,17 after which, a number of 
‘intermediary states’18 were established in central Europe and around 
France. The most remarkable among these was the confederation of 39 
German states in Central Europe and independent Holland to the north-
east of France.19 A second issue was the territorial re-arrangement. To this 
end, France’s borders were pushed back into their 1792 limits; Russia got 
most of Poland in Central Europe and retained Finland in the Baltics and 
Bessarabia to the north-west of the Black Sea; Prussia obtained the 
Rhineland in the west and part of Poland in the east, becoming a bulwark 
for France and Russia in both directions; and Austria gained Salzburg, the 
Adriatic coasts, and Lombardy, Venetia and Galicia,20 extending Austria’s 
influence further south over the remaining Italian states. Moreover, both 
of the Germanic powers were given some rights and privileges in the 
administrative affairs of the German Confederation, which was to serve as 
a stabilising factor between Austria and Prussia and between France and 
the two Germanic states. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 C. K. Webster, ‘The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815’, (London: Bell & Sons Ltd, 1945), pp.36-37; 44-45 
and 122-128.  
  
18
 For the conceptual definition of ‘intermediary states’ and their functions in the 1815 European States 
System, see P. Schroeder, ‘The 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure’, World Politics, vol. 
39, no. 1 1986, pp. 12 and 17-25. 
 
19
For details of the reconstruction of the German Confederation and Italy and the Netherlands, see Schroeder 
(1994), op. cit., pp. 561–570 and Webster (1945), op. cit., p. 44–45 and 115–135. 
 
20
An excellent and concise account of the territorial settlement and its impacts on the number of subjects is 
provided by E. Gulick, ‘Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, A Case History of the Theory and Practice of 
One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft’, (Cornell University Pres, 1967)  
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(ii) Keeping a restricted but effective France 
 France had attempted to achieve hegemony in Europe, and was 
stopped only after great human and material cost. However France was 
deemed necessary, as Metternich pointed out, for achieving the greatest 
possible political equilibrium between the four victorious powers21 and so 
could not be sacrificed. The intention was to reduce her power and to 
apply restrictions that would prevent her from becoming a threat,22 but at 
the same time she would not be a ‘quantite negligeable’ in the affairs of the 
1815 European States System.23  
 
Consequently, France’s territory was downsized to the pre-1792, 
and later pre-1790, levels and was encircled by the independent buffer 
states, as described in the preceding sub-section.24 As to her political and 
military restrictions, the four victorious powers of Great Britain, Russia, 
Austria and Prussia pledged to join forces against France if she attempted 
to disrupt the order. This was the most powerful means of restraint of 
France, forcing her to remain within the limits of the 1815 Settlements.25 
The isolation of France was further increased through the Holy Alliance 
Agreement of the eastern monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia after 
France’s second attempt to dominate Europe under Napoleon was foiled in 
Waterloo in 1815.26  
 
                                                 
21
 F. R. Metternich,  (1879) ‘Memories of Prince Metternich’ in 5 vols. ed. by R. Metternich, tran., by A. 
Napier,(London: R. Bentley and Son, 1879), I, p. 249 
 
22
 N. Rich, ‘Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914’, (McGraw-Hill, Inc.,1992), pp. 32–35 
 
23
 Munster to the Prince Regent, 5 May, 1814, Political Sketches, p. 162, quoted by Webster (1945), op. cit., 
p. 46 
 
24
 Gulick (1964), op. cit., pp. 175–176 
 
25
 The Allies agreed in the first and second Articles of the Second Treaty of Paris to maintain it (the Treaty) 
by force if necessary, and to continue the commitment even after the end of the occupation according to 
Article five. For the text of the said Treaty, see, E. Hertslet, ‘The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the 
Various and Territorial Changes which have taken place since the General Peace of 1814’, (London: 
Butterworths and Harrison, 1875), pp. 372-411  
 
26
 Over the nature of the sanction of the Holy Alliance on France, see Gulick,(1967), op. cit., pp. 285–287 
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(iii) Moderation of Russia 
The entry of Russia into the European States System, in the words 
of Hinsley, was ‘the greatest event, after the discovery of America, in the 
history of modern times … [Russia] had complicated the political relations 
of the states [of the European States System], multiplied wars and 
threatened the balance of power and the law nations …’.27 Russia’s 
flanking position and the size of her impenetrable territories, stretching 
from Poland to the Black Sea, and from Central Asia to the Arctic, made 
her very distinct from any of the other great powers in the European 
States System.28 It was Russia that played the decisive role in the defeat of 
Napoleon, despite being the most recent arrival into the European States 
System. If not restrained, Russia could have used her great advantages to 
secure a lasting dominant position in Central Europe after 1815,29 
potentially taking over the position formerly held by France.30 
 
The moderation of Russia was mainly achieved by the way the Polish 
issue was settled31 – by keeping France as an effective state, but with her 
1790 borders, in the European States System, and finally by the creation 
of the Holy Alliance.32 All of these steps were enough to convince Russia to 
act with moderation in Central Europe, but not in the Near East, which 
                                                 
27
 Hinsley (1967), op. cit., p. 191 
 
28
 Paul Kennedy, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 
to 2000’, (New York: Wintage Books, 1987), p.154  
  
29
M.S. Anderson, ‘The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919’ (UK: Longman Group, 1993), pp. 183–185. 
According to Paul Hayes, Castelreagh knew that a very strong Russia would make it impossible to achieve 
equilibrium. P. Hayes ‘The Nineteenth Century 1814-1880’, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1975), p. 6 
 
30
 Hayes, ibid, p. 3 
  
31
 I. Clark ‘Hierarchy of States, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. 82   
 
32
 According to Kissinger, the Holy Alliance of the Eastern Monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia 
obliged them to act in unison, in effect giving Austria a theoretical veto over the activities of her smothering 
Russian ally. Henry Kissinger, ‘Diplomacy’, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 83; Schroeder also is 
of the opinion that the Holy Alliance functioned as an instrument for the blocking of Russia’s extremities. 
Paul Schroeder, ‘Containment Nineteenth-Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained’, The South Atlantic 
Quarterly, vol. 82, no. 1, 1983, pp. 7–9  
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was also important for the general balance of power after 1815. The 
unchecked expansion of Russia’s land frontiers in the Near East could 
have resulted in her dominance of three continents,33 which was a fact 
that was understood by Metternich more than any other contemporary 
statesmen in Europe. He argued that the Ottoman territories were vital for 
the equilibrium of Europe, and for this reason he and British Foreign 
Minister Castlereagh attempted to bring the Ottoman Empire under the 
guarantee of the 1815 Settlements. To this end, they tried to convince 
Russia to drop some of her claims so as to facilitate the participation of 
the Ottoman Empire in the Vienna Congress;34 however the Ottoman 
Empire’s lack of response to these efforts meant that Metternich’s plan 
could not be realised. This was partly due to the consequences of 
Napoleon’s escape from Elbe, and so the uncertainty of the Russian 
attitude in the Near East would continue to be a source of concern for 
Britain and Austria, and for the stability of the 1815 European States 
System.  
 
Having explained the specific imperatives/requirements or 
preconditions for the balance of power and multi-polarity, what follows is 
a detailed analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States System. 
For a detailed examination of its composition (nature) and operation, the 
System will be split into two interrelated parts, as each part requires 
different analytical tools for analysis. The analysis of the ‘capability 
structure’ will allow an understanding of the distribution of economic and 
military capabilities among the great powers within the System ; while the 
second part, the ‘relationship structure,’ illustrates how the great powers 
stood in relation to each other within the System in terms of their foreign 
policy objectives and policies. The capability structure is comparatively 
                                                 
33
 J. V. Puryear, ‘International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East a Study of British Commercial 
Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853’, (New York: Archon Books, 1969), p. 6 
 
34
 H. Nicolson, ‘The Congress of Vienna’ (London: Constable and Co. Ltd, 1946), p. 245    
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static and undergoes only slow change, since changes in the distribution 
of economic and military capabilities require much more time.  
 
B. Capability Structure of 1815 European States System 
 
An analysis of the capability structure of any given international states 
system entails a division and comparison of the economic and military 
capabilities of its unit states, allowing the relative economic and military 
power of any unit to be identified.35 Within this framework, the analysis 
will draw upon three types of data related to the economic capability of the 
five great powers between 1800–1860, extending 15 years beyond either 
end of the period of this research (1815 and 1856). The aim here is to 
ascertain whether there was a striking change in the balance of power 
among the five states of the 1815 European States System over the 60-
year period. 
 
First, a comparison will be made of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
levels, per capita GDPs, Per Capita Levels of Industrialisation and Total 
Industrial Potentials of the five great powers, followed by the numbers of 
army personnel in each country for the 1815–1860 period.  
 
  In 1830, Russia had the largest share of GDP out of the five great 
powers within the System, accounting for 25 percent of the total, followed 
by France with 21 percent; Great Britain with 19 percent; and the German 
Federation (including Prussia) and Austria, both with 17 percent. (Table 
1) In this case, the total GDP of the two flanking states of the 1815 
European States System, Russia and Britain, had a combined GDP that 
almost equalled the total of the other three.  
                                                 
35
 Nye uses the metaphor of a poker game for the description and distinction of the structure and process. The 
structure of a poker game is in the distribution of power, that is, how many chips the players have and how 
many high cards they are dealt. The process is how the game is played and the types of interactions among 
the players. J. Nye, ‘Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History’, (New 
York: Pearson Longman,  2006), p. 38  
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Table 1: Volume of Total Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices36 
    (in 1960 US dollars and prices) 
 1830 1860 
Britain 
Russia 
France 
8,245 
10,550 
8,582 
16,072 
14,400 
13,326 
Austria 7,210 9,996 
Germany 7,235 12,771 
   
 
However, the situation of per capita GDPs was much different owing 
to Russia’s immense population. As Table 2 illustrates, Russia ranked 
last in the five countries, with Britain leading by a huge margin in this 
respect, while the remaining three had almost the same level of per capita 
GDP, but all were well ahead of Russia. This situation undermined the 
military capacity of Russia in the long term, since investments would be 
low, and would be reflected in the per-capita Level of Industrialisation and 
Total Industrial Potential of the great powers between 1830 and 1860 
(Table 3 and 4.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Adopted from P. Bairoch, ‘Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800-1975, Journal of European Economic 
History’, vol. 5, no. 2, 1976, p. 303-331 
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Table 2: Volume of per-Capita Gross Domestic Product by Country37 
    (in 1960 US dollars and prices) 
 1830 1860 
England 
Russia 
France 
346 
170 
264 
558 
178 
365 
Austria 250 288 
Germany 245 354 
   
 
Tables 3 and 4: Per-Capita Levels of Industrialisation and 
Total Industrial Potential38 
  (Relative to UK in 1900=100) 
  
 1830 1860 
England 
Russia 
France 
25(17.5) 
6(10.3) 
9(9.5) 
64(45) 
8(15.8) 
20(17.9) 
Austria 7(5.8) 11(9.5) 
Germany 8(6.5) 15(11.1) 
   
 
The comparison of GDP levels in Table 1 shows that the rate of 
economic growth, which was an important indicator of the economic and 
military capacity of states in the long term, was not promising for Russia 
or Austria. While Britain’s GDP grew by 52 percent between 1830 and 
1860, Russia’s rise was only 20 percent, well below the German 
                                                 
37
 Adopted from P. Bairoch (1976), op. cit., p. 286 
 
38
 Adopted from P. Bairoch, ‘International Industrialisation Levels from 1750 to 1980’, Journal of European 
Economic History’, vol. 11, no 1-2, 1982, p. 292-294  
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Federation (including Prussia), with 43 percent, and France, with 38 
percent in the same period. The relative economic decline of Russia and 
Austria in contrast to the economic rise of England and Prussia can be 
seen also in a study by A. Maddison, though based on a different method 
of calculation.39 
 
The comparison of the military strength of the five great powers will 
be based only on the number of the land army personnel, since none of 
the great powers possessed significant naval forces, meaning that the 
determining military might was still land armies.  
 
In this respect, Russia ranked highest in terms of the number of 
military personnel (Table 5), and Russia’s superiority in this respect had 
not changed by 1860. However, the relative economic and industrial 
backwardness of Russia prevented the Russian army from becoming the 
decisive military force its number would suggest at first sight. 
 1816 1830 1860 
United Kingdom 255,000 140,000 347,000 
France 132,000 259,000 608,000 
Russia 800,000 826,000 862,000 
Prussia/Germany 130,000 130,000 201,000 
Habsburg Empire 220,000 273,000 306,000 
    
 
Table.5 Military Personnel of Great Powers40 
 
On the basis of these figures, the following arguments can be put 
forward about the Capability Structure of the 1815 European States 
System. Firstly, there were no substantial differences in the GDP levels of 
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 A. Maddison,  ‘Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1995) 
 
 
40
 Kennedy (1988), op. cit, p.197 
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the five great powers during the 1815–1856 period, and so none of the 
great powers were able to exercise hegemonic dominance in the System, 
either militarily or financially. Considering the positions of the flanking 
powers, Russia’s army seemed very impressive in terms of numbers, but 
was held back by its economic incapacity. On the other hand, Britain was 
financially and industrially very strong, but lacked a land army that was 
powerful enough to exercise a determining role in continental affairs. 
Secondly, the trends in GDP growth rates and the levels of 
industrialisation pointed to a steady structural shift in economic and 
industrial strength from Russia and Austria to England and Prussia, while 
France succeed in keeping her relative economic strength. Thirdly, the 
capability structure of the System supported multi-polarity, which became 
the main characteristic of the 1815 European States System.41  
 
This multi-polarity in the System, in effect, a power stalemate, made 
clear the significance of the ‘relationship structure’ in the determination of 
the course of international relations in the 1815–1856 period. From 
another perspective, the equal division of power among the great powers 
forced them to be flexible in forging alliances and ententes to balance any 
future potential challengers, since none of them alone was capable of 
stopping such attempts.42 Therefore, it may be argued that the elements of 
the ‘relationship structure’ were much more visible than those of the 
‘capability structure’ in the attitude and behaviours of the great powers in 
the 1815–1856 period. 
 
C. Relationship Structure of the 1815 European States System 
 
The fulfilment of the specific requirements addressed above was 
necessary for the foundation of the 1815 European States System, but 
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was not sufficient to sustain it. Therefore, the question of how it was to be 
maintained still remained to be addressed by the victorious powers in 
1815, whether by way of cooperation, or by the crude means of balance-
of-power politics, or a combination of both. This may be understood 
through an analysis of the ‘relationship structure’ of the 1815 European 
States System.  
 
As previously stated, ‘Relationship Structure’ refers to the positions 
of unit states in relation to each other in a given international states 
system, and an analysis of relationship structures, which are in fact a 
function of capability structures, will provide some insights into why 
alliances occur among certain states.  
 
The analysis of the relationship structure of an international states 
system entails a detailed examination of the ‘ordering principle’ and 
‘modal tendencies’ of its unit states in their foreign policies, and the 
‘outcomes’ of the interplay of the ordering principles and modal 
tendencies.43  
 
The following specific questions will be addressed in this section: 
Firstly, what was the ordering principle of the unit states in the 1815 
European States System? And in that context, what were the roles and 
functions of the Concert of Europe as the leading constitutive element in 
the ordering principle of the Structure? Secondly, what were the 
differences in the foreign policy objectives of the great powers in that 
period? Thirdly, what were the ‘outcomes’? In simple terms, which issues 
resulted in divergences, and which brought about alliances or ententes 
among the great powers of the 1815 European States System?  
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1. Ordering Principle in 1815 European States System 
 
The ordering principle of the structure of an international system 
indicates how the unit states are organised within that system – in simple 
terms, whether the unit states are anarchically or hierarchically 
organised. The ordering principle of the structure of the 1815 States 
System was basically anarchic as a result of an almost equal division of 
military and economic capabilities among the great powers. In other 
words, there was no predominant or hegemonic power that was able to 
oversee and regulate the interactions and processes among its unit states. 
This non-existence of a predominant state in the 1815 European States 
System meant that it was no different to the previous phases of the 
European States System.  
 
However, the anarchical state of the Structure was different for the 
unit states in the second and third ranks of the 1815 European States 
System, namely for the medium-sized and smaller states. The directors of 
the five great powers could regulate their relations under the Concert of 
Europe when they deemed it necessary, meaning that sometimes the five 
great powers could turn the anarchical scope conditions for the medium-
sized and smaller states into a hierarchical one through cooperation 
within the Concert of Europe. Due to the existence of the Concert of 
Europe institution it may be argued that the ordering principle of the 
structure of the 1815 European States System stood at a central point 
between the anarchical and hierarchical extremes of the ordering principle 
spectrum.44  
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The institution45 of the ‘Concert of Europe’46 allowed the five great 
powers to assume responsibility in governing international politics in the 
1815 European States System rather than leaving it to its own ends, as 
had been the case in the previous phases of the European States 
System.47 The most remarkable mention of the idea of the Concert of 
Europe was made in a letter from British Prime Minister William Pitt to 
Russian Tsar Alexander I on 19 January, 1805 summarising the aims and 
functions of the Concert of Europe, and voicing his concerns regarding the 
insufficiency of the balance of power in politics to maintain peace and 
stability:  
‘This Salutary Work [the proposed work of England for the allies against 
Napoleon] is still imperfect, if the Restoration of Peace were not 
accompanied by the most effectual measures for giving Solidity and 
Permanence to the System which shall thus have been established … It 
[the new international order] should re-establish a general and 
comprehensive system of Public Law in Europe, provide, as far as possible, 
for repressing future attempts to disturb the general Tranquillity, and 
above all, for restraining any projects of Aggrandizement and Ambition 
similar to those which have produced all the Calamities inflicted on 
Europe since the disastrous era of the French Revolution’.48  
 
The date of the demise of the institution of the Concert of Europe is 
not as clear as its date of establishment. While some argued that it ended 
with the Crimean War, which was the first war among the great powers 
after 1815, some historians claim that some of its principles remained in 
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effect until 1914 or even 1938,49 depending on how the actual role and 
functions of the Concert of Europe are defined. The different standpoints 
may be understood by answering the following questions. How did the 
Concert of Europe work? What were its mechanisms, principles and 
norms? How did it function? How did it co-exist with the balance-of-power 
politics? In this regard, whether its principles and norms replaced those of 
balance-of-power politics, or whether they worked together will be 
analysed.   
 
a. Mechanisms, Principles and Norms of the Concert of 
Europe 
 
Krasner describes ‘principles’ as beliefs of fact, causation and 
rectitude, and ‘norm’ as the standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations.50 Principles and norms, to a great extent, describe 
the character of a given regime and establish the procedures through 
which rules and policies are observed in that [security] regime. Principles 
and norms are also structural modifiers,51 operating like a structure in 
affecting the behaviour and actions of states within an international 
system. The principles and norms of the Concert of Europe, in this regard, 
were the socially constructed elements rather than the principles and 
norms of the balance of power politics. They affected the operation of the 
structure of the 1815 European States System, and consequently its 
Ottoman-Russian relations too. With the help of ‘these socially 
constructed elements’, the Concert of Europe, as a security regime, saved 
the 1815 States System from some of the consequences of the pure 
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anarchical conditions and security dilemma processes. But what exactly 
were these principles and norms? 
 
There were two main principles of the Concert of Europe:  
(1) the five great powers, had ‘common responsibility for maintaining 
the Vienna Settlement, and for monitoring, managing, and sanctioning 
any deviations from it’52 in the 1815 European States System. This 
principle emerged out of the experiences of the Napoleonic wars. 
Napoleonic France had been defeated only by the third coalition of Britain, 
Russia, Austria and Prussia, and after the defeat of France, the mission of 
that coalition became, in the words of Kaunitz, the Hapsburg statesman, 
to preserve ‘public peace, the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of 
possessions, and the faith of treaties’.53  The great powers became aware 
that peace and stability could only be maintained in the face of challenges 
to the multi-polarity through cooperation. 
 
(2) the preservation of the dynastic regimes, which entailed an 
outlawing of revolutions and revolutionary movements and their 
underlying ideologies, such as nationalism, liberalism and 
constitutionalism. European statesmen, by 1815, believed that revolutions 
constituted the gravest threat to political and social order in the states, 
and consequently, to the continuation of the 1815 Settlements. They 
explained that the public support and rallying behind Napoleon had been 
based on the attraction of revolution and revolutionary ideas. Taking the 
economic and military capacity of France into account, it can be seen that 
the statesmen were right in their assessments of the power of 
revolutionary movements.  
 
 The mechanisms that made possible or facilitated cooperation 
among the five great powers were consultations, conferences and 
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congresses, for which the legal basis was the 6th article of the Treaty of the 
Quadruple Alliance. The said article reads: 
 ‘… to facilitate and secure the execution of the present treaty to 
consolidate the connections which at present moment so closely unite the four 
sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the high contracting parties have 
agreed to renew their meetings at fixed periods … for the purpose of consulting 
upon their common interests and … for the maintenance of the peace of Europe’.  
 
Under this article, seven congresses and 17 conferences were 
convened between 1815 and 1885 to discuss concerted actions over issues 
that were systemic in nature.54  
 
      These meetings provided transparency and were a platform for the 
exchange of information, making coercive bargaining easier among the 
great powers.55 Similarly, they prevented misconceptions and an 
accumulation of problems, and moreover, increased the likelihood of 
agreement in the event of disputes that could otherwise have escalated 
into conflict. 
 
There had to be also some norms adhered to by the great powers 
when following these principles, which in the 1815 European States 
System were as follows: 
- No change should be made unilaterally. 
- No change should be to the significant disadvantage of any power 
in particular, or to the balance of power in general. 
- Change can come only through consent; unilateral behaviour 
without consultation and implied or explicit consent is evidence of 
aggressive intent. 
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- Consent means consensus, but votes are not to be taken.56 
 
With the help of these norms, the ‘collective outcomes of conferences 
and congresses were regarded as the “the law of Europe”, thus creating 
new benchmarks against which to measure foreign policy claims and 
actions of individual states’,57 and ‘this gave rise to moral and legal 
obligations that limited the unilateral pursuit of selfish interests’.58 In this 
way, as we shall shortly see, the institution of the Concert of Europe 
contributed to the working of the structure of the 1815 European States 
System and differed from the means of balance of power politics.59 
 
 Having covered the mechanisms, principles and norms, the 
following section will analyse how the Concert of Europe functioned and 
how it co-existed with balance of power politics in the 1815 European 
States System?  
 
b. Concert of Europe and its Double Functions 
 
The peacemakers of 1815 were faced with two major problems: (1) 
How to establish equilibrium between the great powers, and (2) how to 
maintain it, and ensure peace and stability.  
 
The first of these was mainly settled at the Congress of Vienna, as 
explained in the ‘Foundation of the 1815 European States System’ section 
of this chapter;60 while the second issue, how to maintain the peace and 
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stability61 brought about by the 1815 Settlements, was much more 
complex, since it involved the future. 
 
There were three obstacles to the sustainability of the 1815 
Settlements in the future, two of which have been explained in the 
‘Foundation of the 1815 European States System’ section, being how to 
ensure the restriction of France and to moderate Russia, specifically in the 
Near East. The third challenge came not from any single state, but from 
the masses across Europe. The rapid industrialisation processes in 
Europe had brought thousands of people from rural areas into the big 
cities;62 and under conditions of severe poverty, the influence of 
revolutionary nationalist views and the successes of the French 
Revolution, these uprooted masses became a serious destabilising force 
among the domestic regimes in Europe.63 With the consequences of the 
French Revolution in mind, the statesmen of 1815 were well aware that 
the impacts of revolutions were unlikely to remain within the borders of 
the state of origin, but could easily attract the different ethnic and 
religious nations living under the multi-national empires, such as Austria 
(Hapsburgs), Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Italy, and could 
well become a systemic problem.  
 
In this respect, the spirit and attraction of revolution had been one 
of the factors behind Napoleon’s successes,64 and the force and effects of 
nationalism can clearly be seen when looking at the economic and military 
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capabilities of France, which were no greater than those of the other great 
powers.65  
 
The solution that the statesmen of the victorious great powers 
developed to cope with these three main challenges was ‘to concert their 
actions’ under the Concert of Europe.  
 
How could the Concert of Europe contribute to the maintenance of 
the 1815 Settlements? How did it co-exist with the balance of power 
politics in the structure of the 1815 European States System? 
 
The Concert of Europe contributed to peace and stability in two 
ways. Firstly, it facilitated cooperation among the five great powers by 
alleviating the anarchical conditions. In this way, self-restraint on the side 
of the great powers became possible through a joining of forces in 
promoting common policies throughout the international system as a 
whole.66 Secondly, it would enable the great powers to exercise collective 
hegemony over the states of the second and third ranks in the 1815 
European States System. This tutelage served for the maintenance of the 
status quo in two ways. First, it enabled the great powers to prevent the 
medium-sized and smaller states from manipulating rivalries between the 
great powers for their own aims; and second, the great powers could act 
as peace brokers for the conflicts among the medium-sized and smaller 
states. These two factors, and the role of balance of power politics, will be 
elaborated with the help of some tables. 
 
(1) The Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, 
having first been established by the Treaty of Chaumont (1814) against 
France, remained in effect even after France was admitted into the ranks 
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of the Concert of Europe in 181867 and was the most effective instrument 
of the balance of power politics. 68 Another example of balance-of-power 
politics involved Russia. It was the strength of an alliance of the great 
powers against Russia, as was the case in the Polish-Saxony crisis in 
1814 during the Vienna Congress, that forced Russia into a moderate 
position at that time, and similar action against Russia remained as a 
possibility. On such grounds, it can be argued that the restriction of 
France and the moderation of Russia were the outcomes of the successful 
operation of the balance-of-power politics between 1815 and 1856. The 
cause-effect relationship between the 1815 Settlements, which were in fact 
the formalisation of those two requirements for the balance of power cited 
above, and the peace and stability69 after 1815 can be understood from 
Table 6.  
 
Table 670 Operation of balance of power politics in the structure of the 1815 
European States System 
     a 
Balance of Power Politics         Peace and Stability      
-Quadruple Alliance (Restriction of France) 
-Moderation of Russia 
 
The first function of the Concert of Europe came into play here, 
mitigating the balance-of-power politics conditions so that the five great 
powers could cooperate in achieving collective peace and stability. In this 
case, the function of the Concert of Europe was to pave the way for the 
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politics of cooperation. The contribution of the Concert of Europe to peace 
and stability by mitigating the security concerns of the great powers and 
facilitating cooperation among them resulted in the situation illustrated in 
Table 7. As can be understood, the politics of cooperation under the 
Concert of Europe did not wholly replace balance-of-power politics, as the 
intention was only to alleviate them.71 Therefore, the great powers behaved 
in ways that sharply diverged from normal ‘power politics’.72 In other 
words, they acted with self-restraint, which also contributed the avoidance 
of war among the states. In this context, the Concert of Europe could be 
described as a kind of security regime that provided a ‘peacekeeping’ 
mission.73 To this end, it enabled them to follow path ‘b’, while also 
observing the alternative path ‘a’ for the same ends, as illustrated in Table 
7.74 Therefore, it can be said that the Concert of Europe played the role of 
an intervening variable, facilitating a process towards the same ends that 
balance of power politics intended to achieve.75  
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Table 7: Operation of the structure of the 1815 European States System 
when the Concert of Europe functioned as an intervening variable 
 
    BoP Politics     b       Concert of Europe           b    Peace and Stability 
                       Principles, norms and mechanisms 
                              (1815 Settlements) 
         a 
        
 
 
(2) The second function of the Concert of Europe was to guard and 
govern the international politics of the 1815 European States System. The 
five great powers considered themselves entitled to develop collectively any 
necessary measures, and then to impose them onto the other member 
states of the 1815 European States System if deemed necessary for the 
maintenance of peace and stability,76 which may be described as the use 
of a collective/shared hegemony by the five great powers.77 The concerted 
actions of the collective hegemony prohibited any of the great powers from 
acting alone to gain extra advantages at the expense of the rest. In this 
capacity, the Concert of Europe functioned as an independent variable, as 
shown in Table 8. Here, in addition to the balance of power politics, path 
a, and the Concert of Europe’s intervening function, path b, was path c, in 
which the Concert of Europe functioned independently to secure peace 
and stability to reach the same ends as path a and b. This was achieved 
by exercising tutelage over the states in the second and third ranks in the 
1815 European States System (Table 8). The tutelage of the Concert of 
Europe, overseeing and managing the interactions and processes among 
the states of the second and third ranks, would also contribute to peace 
and stability (path d), which can be referred to as the ‘peace-making’ 
function of the Concert of Europe. 
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As Miller has indicated, a major distinction should be made between 
a concert, which includes all the great powers in the international system, 
and an alliance of several great powers that are in balance with one 
another.78 Accordingly, b+c+d were concerted actions, while the actions a 
constituted balance of power politics within the 1815 European States 
System. 
 
Table 8: Operation of the structure of the 1815 European States System 
when the Concert of Europe functioned both as an intervening variable in its peace-
keeping capacity and as an independent variable in it its peace-making capacity. 
     
         a 
 
   Balance of Power Politics,,         b        Concert of Europe         b               Peace and Stability 
    (Quad. Alliance, Mod. of Rus.)  Principles and Norms       
     (1815 Settlements)    d 
        
c 
Tutelage over second- and 
third-rank states 
          
a: Balance-of-power politics exercised for the fulfilment of the two special imperatives/requirements for 
peace and stability in the 1815 European States System) 
b: balance of power politics modified and alleviated by the Concert of Great Powers. The norms and 
principles of the Concert of Europe were functioning as intervening variables for peace and stability. 
b+c+d: Operation of the principles and norms of the Concert of Europe. Here the principles and norms 
of the Concert of Europe were functioning as an independent variable for the peace and stability, meaning the 
collective use of hegemony by the five great powers. 79 
 
To summarise, these were the basic roles and functions of the 
Concert of Europe in the operation of the structure of the 1815 European 
States System, being the tutelage of the great powers over the smaller 
                                                 
78
 B. Miller, ‘Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts’ Review of International Studies, vol. 20, 
no. 4, 1994, pp. 328–329 
 
79
 The principles and norms ‘established agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and 
about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy’, and legitimatised the order that the Concert 
of Europe had attempted to bring about. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, ‘The Security Dilemma, Fear, 
Cooperation and Trust in World Politics’, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,  2008), p. 109  
 
 71 
states, and at the same time, the means of preserving peace in Europe by 
preventing wars between the great powers themselves.80 In short, the 
Concert was ‘of the powers, and between the powers’.81  
  
    Having explained the ordering principle of the Structure, the 
following section will address the main foreign policy objectives of the 
great powers, which were under the constraining effects of that mixed 
order principle of the structure of the 1815 European States System. To 
what extent were the foreign policy actions and objectives of the great 
powers consistent with the structural imperatives the 1815 European 
States System? This may be understood from an analysis of the structural 
characteristics and modal tendencies of the great powers in 1815–1856. 
 
2. Structural Characteristics and Modal Tendencies of the Great 
Powers of the 1815 European States System 
 
       The previous section contained an analysis of the ordering principle, 
which was systemic in nature; while the following section will take the 
form of an analysis of some of the unit characteristics of the great powers 
in the 1815 European States System. These unit characteristics were part 
of the system level, in as much as they made a difference in the 
relationships of the great powers.8283 A comparison will be made of the 
‘modal tendencies’ and the underlying structural characteristics of the 
great powers in the 1815 European States System in order to provide an 
understanding of how they differed. 84  
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              Modal tendencies, according to Jones, are the ‘objectives’ and 
‘practices’ or ‘characteristic behaviours pursued and adopted by the 
great powers’.85 From a methodological standpoint, modal tendencies are 
useful in explaining some of the processes of the alliances, ententes, wars, 
embargoes, times of peace etc.86 Unlike the capability structure, which 
saw little change between 1815 and 1856,87 the modal tendencies of the 
great powers become much more significant in the explanations of the 
processes between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and also among the 
great powers themselves.88 
 
Britain and Russia survived as the main pillars of the structure of 
the 1815 States System following the Napoleonic Wars, partly due to their 
exclusive flanking positions.89 Not only did they successfully resist the 
military power of France, but also, in the words of Dehio, ‘they had all 
resisted the wave of revolution and asserted their distinctive identities’,90 
both before and after 1815, and as a result, they became much more 
independent in pursuing their interests in the post-1815 era. 
Paradoxically, this situation of relative independence at opposite 
geographical locations and with differing structural characteristics 
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compelled Britain to engage too little in European affairs, while Russia 
was to be involved too much.91  
 
England had been a staunch defender of the balance of power and 
multi-polarity in the European States Systems since the 15th century, and 
this was reflected in Great Britain’s foreign policy. Being an island and a 
maritime power, Britain harboured no territorial ambition in Europe, 
concentrating rather on her colonial possessions. Her avoidance of 
territories in continental Europe made her the most likely ally in the 
European States System for those fighting against the hegemonic bidders; 
however her absolute adherence to multi-polarity in continental Europe 
compelled her to steer clear of long-term commitments to any state in the 
System.  
 
Unlike the other great powers in the 1815 European States System, 
Britain was a parliamentary monarchy, and so did not regard the shifts 
and changes in the domestic regimes caused by the popular movements 
as a threat to the stability of the 1815 European States System. 
 
In addition to multi-polarity, another factor determining her foreign 
policies was her position as the most industrialised and developed country 
in Europe since the second half of the 18th century. 92 Between 1760 and 
1830, Britain was responsible for around ‘two-thirds of Europe’s industrial 
growth of output’, and its share of world manufacturing production leaped 
from 1.9 to 9.5 percent; increasing further to 19.9 percent over the next 
30 years as a result of industrial expansion.93 This success was based 
upon the free and safe state of international trade and her colonial 
possessions, and for this reason the preservation of maritime supremacy 
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and the control of the maritime trade routes to her colonies became her 
primary objectives in the 1815 European States System. These objectives 
became much more vital after the arrival of steam power into land and 
maritime transport technologies. 
  
All of these factors explain why England became such a staunch 
defender of the status quo94 that existed under the 1815 Settlements, 
which were in essence the promotion of equilibrium and multi-polarity in 
the European States System. To this end, she regarded the Holy Alliance 
of the Eastern Monarchies to a certain extent as the threat to multi-
polarity in Europe, so that dividing it became one of her main foreign 
policy objectives after 1822.95 Unlike Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, 
and Alexander I, the Russian Tsar, British statesmen at the time had little 
to fear from the liberal and constitutional movements abroad, and hoped 
in fact to make competitive gains from the condition of international 
flux.96  
 
The modal tendencies of Great Britain in the 1815 European States 
System can be summarised as: (1) the preservation of the balance of 
power; (2) the avoidance of long term alliance commitments in order to 
remain flexible for a better realisation of the balance of power;97 and (3) 
the maintenance of her maritime supremacy and the safety and security of 
the sea and land routes to her colonies.  
 
Britain’s naval and economic power was not sufficient to ensure 
alone the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, as had been observed in 
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the Napoleonic wars; and so the role of the other flanking power, Russia, 
became significant in the preservation of the status quo.98 
 
Russia was the largest continental great power in the 1815 
European States System. With an immense land army and enormous 
territories in Asia, Russia was a formidable nation. She was situated at 
the other end of Europe, and what was more, she had the advantages 
being a neighbour to both Central Europe and the Balkans, which Britain 
was not. These characteristics allowed Russia to make up for Britain’s 
shortfalls in ensuring the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements,99 which 
the other two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, could not 
fulfil, as had been clearly illustrated during the Napoleonic wars.  
 
Russia, like Britain, was also a staunch defender of the 1815 
Settlements, but for different reasons. The 1815 Settlements provided 
great security for Russia at her western extreme, which was an unknown 
situation in Russian history, and was able to deploy its troops to within 
100 kilometres of the capitals of both Austria and Prussia after gaining 
two-thirds of Poland with the settlements. Russia became a key player in 
European affairs, in spite of her peripheral position, as a consequence of 
the structural dependency of Austria and Prussia. In a bid to consolidate 
that status quo, Russia initiated the establishment of the Holy Alliance of 
the Eastern Monarchies in 1815, through which she was able to secure 
permanent involvement in the affairs of Central Europe and check any 
development that may constitute a threat to the status quo. For example, 
Russia would be very willing to intervene in the suppression of 
nationalist/liberal revolutionary movements at source by considering 
them as European [systemic] matters, rather than treating them as 
domestic issues; and this willingness won her the title of ‘the Guardian of 
the Order’ (of the 1815 Settlements) in Europe between 1815 and 1856. 
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However, in the Near East, Russia was implementing revisionist 
policies that were in sharp contrast to her attitude in the west.100 There 
are two plausible explanations for this apparent contradiction, the first of 
which was related to Russia’s unique geographical location. Russia had no 
secure frontiers in the Near East to match those in the west after 1815, 
meaning that Russia’s security concerns were both defensive and offensive 
in the 1815 European States System. Since the Ottoman Empire was not 
a threat, and an overland invasion was unlikely as long as Russia 
maintained its alliance with Austria and Prussia,101 the only sources of 
insecurity for Russia were the naval powers of the maritime states. From a 
defensive angle, her main concern was that the Ottoman Empire may fall 
under the control of the great maritime powers. The dissatisfaction and 
historical grievances of the coastal people of the Caucasus region and the 
Ottoman Empire towards Russia could have been a lever in the 
establishment of such an influence of a maritime power,102 and such a 
situation would mean also the control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus 
Straits, and partly the Black Sea, which were strategic not only for her 
security, but also for her flourishing southern economy.103 For this 
reason, Russia adopted a policy with regard to the Straits and the Black 
Sea, in the words of Jelavich, ‘… to establish a system that would ensure 
that the British and French fleets would be excluded from the Black Sea, 
either by an agreement with the Ottoman Empire, an international treaty, 
or possession of the Bosporus’.104  
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From an offensive angle, Russia could become a maritime power if 
she secured an outlet in the Mediterranean. Since such a possibility was 
impossible in Central Europe, the Ottoman territories in the Balkans or 
the Straits remained the only alternatives. 
 
The second driver of the Russian revisionist scheme in the Near 
East was a result of the nature of her bilateral relations with the Ottoman 
Empire. Russia had acquired some significant treaty rights in the 
administration of the autonomous principalities and Serbia in the 
Balkans. More importantly, she had consolidated her position in the eyes 
of the Orthodox and/or Slav subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who began 
to see Russia rather than their sovereign state, the Ottoman Empire, as 
the guardian of their existences and freedoms.105 All of these issues put 
her in a unique and advantageous position in terms of her relationship 
with the Ottoman Empire, which was something she did not want to 
concede. Apart from her bilateral advantages, France was also restricted; 
Austria and Prussia were structurally dependent on Russian support; and 
the Ottoman Empire was going through her weakest period.  
 
 However, Russia’s economic capacity and industrial base would not 
allow her to pursue a policy of guardianship of the status quo in Europe 
and a revisionist policy in the Near East at the same time. The Russian 
economy was largely based on agriculture, so the overall GNP and 
industrialisation level never looked impressive.106 It was, as Kennedy 
pointed out, far less likely to lead to surplus wealth and develop a decisive 
military strike power in the 1815 European States System.107  
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In the light of these explanations, the modal tendencies of Russia 
can be summarised as follows: (1) Strict maintenance of the status quo 
brought about by the 1815 Settlements in Central Europe to the greatest 
extent possible; and (2) a continuation of the flexible revisionist policies in 
its relationship with the Ottoman Empire without endangering her 
position in the Quadruple Alliance and inducing a hostile coalition of the 
great powers. 
 
As touched upon in the preceding section, France was kept 
undivided and an effective member of the 1815 European States System, 
despite being the root cause of the upheavals of the last 20 years, however 
she remained restricted and isolated. To reiterate, Prussia’s borders were 
extended into the Rhineland, Austria was strengthened in Northern Italy 
and British influence was expanded in the Iberian Peninsula. Additionally, 
the Holy Alliance was founded among Russia, Austria and Prussia. All of 
these measures and precautionary steps were not groundless. In the 
words of Kennedy, ‘France’s national income was much larger, and capital 
was more readily available; its population was far bigger than Prussia’s 
and more homogenous than the Hapsburg Empire. It could more easily 
afford a large army and could pay for a considerable navy as well’.108  
 
The primary aim of these arrangements was not to punish France, 
but rather to keep her in check while she remained an unavoidable part of 
the multi-polar structure of the 1815 European States System. However, 
the perception of both the general public and the government in France 
was that the coalition of the victorious powers, which had been originally 
established to bring down the Napoleonic Empire, had been transformed 
into a perpetual league to keep France restricted. For this reason, 
overthrowing the 1815 Settlements became the primary objective of her 
foreign policies after 1815. As Bullen pointed out, ‘an attack on the [1815] 
treaty was a necessary credential for patriotism’ in French domestic 
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politics.109 The scope of France’s revisionist policies ranged from the 
recovery of France, to the territorial revision of the 1815 settlements.110  
 
Being aware of the fact that the 1815 Settlements were to be the 
basis of the foreign policy objectives of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and 
Prussia, France also concentrated on finding new areas for expansion and 
influence, and the North Mediterranean and Egypt were the most likely 
candidates. This new search by France inevitably brought the Ottoman 
Empire into focus, since these areas were under the formal sovereignty of 
the Ottoman Empire.111 The close engagement of France in the Levant 
region would have consequences in Ottoman-Russian relations, and in the 
cooperation of Britain and Russia in the Near East. 
 
In summary, the modal tendencies of France after 1815 were as 
follows: (1) Revision of the 1815 Settlements by all possible means, 
including support of liberal and revolutionary movements in order to get 
rid of the restrictions and isolation imposed upon it; and (2) a search for 
new political and economic areas for influence in order to increase its 
political and economic significance in the 1815 European States System. 
  
The other two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, were 
squeezed between a staunch defender of the status quo (Russia) and a 
complete revisionist state (France) after 1815, playing a significant role in 
contributing to peace as stabilising and/or absorbing agents of the effects 
coming from both sides in the 1815 European States System. They 
blocked the effects of the nationalist movements in Italy and the 
confederation of German states, and thereby protected the stability of 
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Central Europe, which was the backbone of the 1815 Settlements. 
Likewise, while serving as an effective buffer zone for Russia, blocking the 
infiltration of nationalist views, they were also serving as a barrier in the 
way of Russia, preventing her from penetrating into Central Europe.112 
 
The challenges that Austria had to tackle were much harder than 
those of Prussia in the 1815 European States System. Geographically, 
Austria sprawled across Europe from the Northern Italian plain to Galicia, 
and from Central Europe to the Balkans. Thus, Austria had to undertake 
a ‘five-sided checkmate’113 mission in the 1815 European States System114 
that included checking Russian penetrations into Galicia and the Balkans; 
French revisionist schemes in Central Europe and Italy; and Prussia’s 
ambitions over the Germanic states. In sharp contrast to Prussia, Austria 
was a multi-national empire. Although Germanic, she was populated by 
twice as many Slavs of one sort or another (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, 
Ruthenians, Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) than Germans, in addition to 5 
million Hungarians, 5 million Italians and 2 million Romanians,’115 and 
had to maintain this complex multi-national structure against the impacts 
of nationalist views and movements.  
 
With such demographic and geographical characteristics, Austria 
was the ‘central fulcrum’ in the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, and 
‘None of the other great powers – even when engaged in hostilities with 
Hapsburgs – knew what to put in its place’.116 In this context, Austria and 
the Ottoman Empire can be said to have had similar functions within the 
1815 European States System.  
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Another specific challenge for Austria worthy of mention here that 
was also important to Ottoman-Russian relations was the steady rise of 
Russian control and influence in the Balkans.117 As noted in the first 
chapter, Russia’s advance in the Balkans and in the Black Sea region 
became possible with help of Austrian support. However, by 1815 Russia’s 
plans and ambitions over the territories of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans had begun to endanger the security of Austria in two ways. 
Russia became the de facto ruler of the Principalities and Serbia, which 
were under the formal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire,118 meaning that 
Russia would be adjacent to Austria’s southern territories. Moreover, the 
Russian policy to promote Slav and Orthodox bonds and solidarity among 
the Slavic and Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire was to affect also 
Austria’s Orthodox and Slav subjects.119 
 
The greatest burden on Austria was her relative economic 
backwardness and military inadequacies, which were not consistent with 
the task she faced in keeping Central Europe free from the revolutionary 
and nationalist movements and from the French revisionism and Russian 
ambitions, both in Central Europe and in the Balkans. Austria ranked last 
among the five great powers in the ‘Relative Shares of World Manufacturing 
Output’ and ‘Per Capita Levels of Industrialisation’ with its shares of 3.2 
and 3.2; and 7 and 8 percent respectively in 1800 and 1830.120 ‘The 
empire as whole fell behind Britain, France and Russia in terms of per 
capita industrialisation, iron and steel production, steam power 
capacities, and so on’.121 Obviously, the situation of the army reflected 
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these figures. The heavy public debt and hugely depreciated currency 
compelled the government to keep military spending to a minimum, 
resulting in Austria becoming militarily dependent on Russia.122  
 
     The strategy applied by Chancellor Metternich was, firstly, to define 
Austria’s problems according to systemic parameters so as to attract the 
involvement of the other states in sharing the burden of the solution.123 
His formula, in the words of Sked, was ‘… what was good for the 
(Hapsburg) Empire was good for the rest of Europe’.124 Secondly, if 
concerted action by the great powers was not possible or feasible, then she 
would attempt to enter into various alliances and ententes.125 For 
example, she retained her alliance with the conservative Eastern 
monarchies against French resurgence and nationalist revolutions;126 
however she also had to check Russian influence by working with Great 
Britain, Prussia and the Ottoman Empire. 127  
 
In summary, Austria’s modal tendencies were: (1) The preservation 
of the 1815 Settlements; (2) keeping Central Europe free from Russian 
influence, while relying on her political and military help; (3) the 
eradication of all the revolutionary nationalist and liberal movements; and 
finally, (4) blocking the physical and influential expansion of Russia in the 
Balkans.  
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The other great power lying between Russia and France was 
Prussia, which was supposed to be the guardian of the Rhineland against 
France in the 1815 Settlements. Her other roles in the 1815 European 
States System have been touched upon in the discussion of Austria’s 
modal tendencies, however Prussia’s function of containing France was 
much more acute than that of Russia, as the French moves towards the 
Rhineland in the 1830 [Belgian] and 1840 [Egypt] crises indicated.  
 
On the other hand, Prussia, as the alternative Germanic great power 
to Austria, was competing for dominance over the Germanic states, 
however Prussia did not succumb to the nationalists regarding the 
situation of the German Confederation. Being aware of the precarious 
balance of the 1815 European States System, Prussia always preferred to 
act in line with Austria in her foreign policies; however this did not 
preclude her overall goal of achieving a union of the German states under 
her leadership. 
 
The modal tendencies of Prussia in the 1815 European States 
System can be summarised as: (1) The preservation of the 1815 
Settlements in line with Austria’s preferences, and (2) the integration of 
the German states through the consolidation of economic and political 
relations. 
 
 After this explanation of the modal tendencies of the great powers, 
the following section will focus on the outcomes of the interplay of these 
modal tendencies. 
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3. Outcomes of the Mixed Ordering Principle and Modal 
Tendencies of the Great Powers for the Operation of the 
1815 European System and their Likely Effects on the 
Ottoman-Russian Relations in 1815-1856 
 
This section will deal with the outcomes of the interplay of the mixed 
ordering principle and modal tendencies of the great powers of the 1815 
European States System. These outcomes were the functional 
differentiations of the unit states, the categories of changes and the 
diverging issues among the great powers.  
 
a) Functional Differentiations among Unit States in 1815 
European States System 
The first ‘outcome’ to be addressed is the functional differentiations128 
among the unit states of the 1815 European States System resulting from 
the Concert of Europe, which brought a hierarchy to the order. If the pure 
anarchical conditions had prevailed in the 1815 European States System, 
the unit states had to be functionally the same in consequence of the self-
help mechanism, as argued by Waltz.129 The oligarchic principles and 
norms of the Concert of Europe intervened and changed the normal 
operation of the anarchical structure of the ordering principle. This 
situation of intervention, consequently, led to the emergence of some 
functional differences within the 1815 European States System that were 
to affect the course of Ottoman-Russian relations.  
 
The privileged role and governing function of the unit states of the great 
powers have already been discussed in depth, and so shall only be covered 
in brief here. After this, the roles and functions of the unit states of the 
second and third order will be discussed. 
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The first functional differentiation in the 1815 European States System 
was between the members of the oligopoly of the five great powers and the 
medium-sized and smaller states.130 
 
The second differentiation emerged in the roles and functions of the 
states of the second order, which Schroeder referred to as intermediary 
within the 1815 European States System.131 According to him, they 
became specialised in certain functions that were essential for the smooth 
operation of the Structure and for the maintenance of the 1815 
Settlements. He argues that the German Federation served the purpose of 
preventing war over the territories of the Germanic states between Austria 
and Prussia; the Ottoman Empire blocked any hegemony of any of the 
great powers over the Straits; Denmark and Sweden guarded the exit to 
the Baltic Sea etc. These states indirectly contributed to maintaining the 
balance of power, as the relative cost of their partition or annexation by 
the great powers would have been too high.132 This meant that it was 
better from the perspectives of the great powers, particularly regarding 
their neighbours, to let them prevail. 133 
 
b) Categories of Changes in the 1815 European States 
System 
 
The second element to be analysed in the ‘Outcome’ component of the 
Relationship Structure are the categories of changes in the 1815 
European States System. These emerged as a result of the way the 1815 
                                                 
130
  Holbraad (1968), op. cit., p. 1 
 
131
 P. Schroeder. ‘Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, pp. 
125-129 and ‘The 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure’, World Politics, vol. 39, no. 1, 
1986, pp. 12 and 17–25 
 
132
 Ibid. 
 
133
 For the analysis of the interrelation between history and international relations disciplines, see T. Smith, 
‘History and International Relations’, (Routledge, London, 1999) 
 
 86 
European State System had been founded and were in line with its 
ordering principle [the Concert of Europe]. A definition of these changes 
will help clarify the cause-effect relationships between the variables of the 
research question. 
 
The changes concerning the 1815 European States System may be 
categorised under two headings, being: ‘significant changes’ and ‘non-
significant changes’.134 
 
Significant changes comprise changes in the elements of the Capability 
and Relationship Structures, which have been thoroughly analysed in the 
preceding sections, and are categorised as ‘structural changes’. On the 
other hand, non-significant changes in the 1815 European States System 
were related to the non-systemic unit level changes; for example, changes 
in the characteristics of the unit states, state regimes or of the head of 
states etc., and as such may be classified as non-structural changes.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the ‘significant [structural] changes’ will 
be further divided into two categories: ‘structural changes with 
transformational implications’ (SC with TI) and ‘structural changes 
without transformational implications’ (SC without TI) according to their 
implications in the operation of the 1815 European States System. 
 
SC with TI were changes in the specific imperatives/requirements of 
the 1815 European States System that ensured multi-polarity, or 
prevented any hegemonic ambitions of the revisionist states. In simple 
words, SC with TI transformed the structure, and consequently the 1815 
European States System. On the other hand, changes involving the 
principles and norms and the decision-making procedures of the Concert 
of Europe in its security regime and modal tendencies, and in the 
divergent issues of the great powers, were structural changes, but they did 
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not have the capacity to transform the structure of the 1815 European 
States System. For this reason they are considered to be SC without TI. 
 
All of the changes conceptualised in the preceding paragraphs were 
‘changes within the system’. In other words, they were not ‘system 
changes’, which denotes a complete new system with a new structure, and 
with its own constitutive and definitive elements.  
 
c) Divergent Issues among the Great Powers in the 1815 
European States System 
(1) The first issue of divergence among the great powers after 1815 was 
in how to deal with the revolutionary movements that were drawing on 
nationalist/liberal and constitutionalist ideologies.135  
 
In fact, there was consensus among the great powers about the danger 
that revolutions posed to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements; but 
when it came to under what conditions they constituted threat, 
disagreements surfaced.  
 
When the political disturbances in Naples, Sicily and Spain turned into 
demands for constitutional reforms and similar rights, Metternich, the 
Austrian Chancellor, suggested the development of a ‘doctrine of 
intervention on a European scale to prevent changes in the system of 
government of any state’.136 He was of the opinion that the 1815 
Settlements established the legal and rational base for such an initiation. 
Russia and Prussia shared the view of Metternich that the directory of the 
great powers [Concert of Europe] could intervene in the domestic affairs of 
states if their regimes were under the threat of revolution. However, Great 
Britain and France opposed such a scheme, but for different reasons.  
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Britain argued that ‘none of these three [Chaumont, First and Second 
Paris Treaties] treaties contain any express guarantee, general or special, 
by which their observance to be enforced …’,137 claiming that the mission 
of the Quadruple Alliance was to create ‘a union for the re-conquest and 
liberation of a great proportion of the continent of Europe from the 
military dominion of France … It never was however intended as a union 
for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal 
affairs of other states’.138 Making a broader interpretation of the treaty 
articles, it asserted that Britain ‘can not and will not act upon abstract 
and speculative principles of precaution’,139 and that she could only act 
collectively ‘when the territorial balance of Europe is disturbed, [in which 
case] she can interfere with effect …’.140  
 
Leaving the legal dimension of the dispute aside, the main concern of 
Britain and France was that Russia was gradually taking on a general 
policing role in central Europe, using the elimination of revolutionary 
threats as an excuse. Such an approach could bring total control of 
Central Europe into Russian hands, considering the relative insufficiency 
of the military capacity of Austria. Aside from this, Britain was not against 
the intervention by a neighbouring great power to assist a dynastic regime 
in its fight against the revolutionary movements on behalf of the Concert, 
which was clear from her lack of protest during Austria’s intervention in 
Naples in 1820 and France’s intervention in Spain in 1821. What Britain 
was against was the intervention by Russia in those places, since none of 
her interests were threatened by the revolutionary developments there. In 
fact Austria was also against a Russian presence in Central Europe, but 
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her weakness and structural dependency on Russia prevented her from 
taking the hard line followed by Britain.141  
 
(2) The second significant issue of divergence among the great powers 
in the 1815 European States System was about how to deal with the 
Ottoman Empire. In the words of Metternich, the Ottoman Empire was 
‘one of most essential counterweights in the general equilibrium of 
Europe’.142  
 
As touched upon in the analysis of the modal tendencies of Russia in 
the previous section, Russia had revisionist goals in regard to the 
Ottoman Empire, with the overall aim being to secure a safe frontier to her 
south-east to match the one in the west. This would be possible by 
reducing the Ottoman Empire to the level of a vassal state, like Poland, so 
as not to induce a hostile great power coalition against her. For this 
reason, Russia was not very receptive to the proposal put forward at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814 that the Ottoman Empire should be included 
in the European guarantee.143  
 
Accordingly, Russia put a two-pronged policy strategy into effect: 
The partition of the Ottoman Empire in agreement with the other great 
powers; and supporting the establishment of the satellite kin states in the 
Ottoman territories by promoting Orthodox and Slav nationalism and 
solidarity among the Slavic and Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
in the Balkans.  
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Partition Proposals for the Ottoman territories in agreement with Great 
Britain and Austria 
The Russian policy of partition of the Ottoman territories was not 
new, actually dating back to the reign of Catherine II in the 18th century. It 
was again revived after the 1830s, however there was a great difference 
between the motivations. The main motivation behind the partition 
schemes of the 18th century had been the aggrandisement and 
subjugation of a powerful rival; while in the 19th century the intention was 
to achieve a pre-agreement out of concern of exclusion or confrontation by 
the other great powers over the territories of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
In his first attempt to get Austria on board in 1833, the Russian 
Tsar proposed ‘to recreate a Greek empire’ in place of the Ottoman Empire 
‘if the Turkish empire destroys itself through its own incapacity’. At the 
same time, he tried to alleviate the concerns in Austria that he was in 
favour of maintaining the Ottoman Empire.144 In his second attempt in 
1843, the Tsar went one step further, offering ‘everything between this 
river [Danube] and the Adriatic’ to Austria in its partition proposal.145 In 
1844, amid concerns in Austria over a Greek Empire in Istanbul, the Tsar 
excluded the possibility of reconstituting a Greek Empire and proposed 
giving Istanbul to Austria as well.146 However, Austria did not consider the 
proposals as genuine. According to the Austrian Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, ‘the Tsar was anxious to find some means for acting when the 
time seemed ripe, which would leave him free to declare that he was 
acting for a friendly and allied power and not for Russia … when the deed 
had been done and the time came for discussing … he would put forward 
the idea of setting up a state united to Russia by interests, principles, and 
                                                 
144
 WSA, Berichte aus Russland. Ficquelmont a` Metternich, 13/25 fev./ 33, no: 234 A. cited by Bolsover 
‘Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey’ The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 27, No. 68, 1948, p. 
117, fn. 7 
 
145
 WSA, Berichte aus Russland. Ficquelmont a` Metternich, 4 oct./ 43, sec. Vienne, cited by Bolsover 
(1948), ibid. p. 127, fn. 32 
 
146
 Bolsover (1948), ibid. pp. 131 and 133–134 
 
 91 
religion, governed by a Russian prince, and a better guardian of the 
Straits for Russia than Turkey could be’. 147 
 
Russia did not limit its attempts at persuasion to Austria. Being 
aware that the second great power with interests at stake in the Near East 
was Britain, and that without her consent Russia could not realise any 
serious territorial re-arrangement in the Near East, in 1844, the same year 
in which the Tsar had approached Austria for the second time, he raised 
the issue of a pre-agreement over the partition of the Ottoman territories 
with Britain during a state visit to the country. However, Britain did not 
share the same pessimism of the Tsar regarding the imminent fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. The caution of the British government led the Tsar to 
believe that Britain would not object to his plans when the conditions were 
right. As the events on the eve of the Crimean War were to prove, Britain 
did not see eye-to-eye with Russia, being wary of her intentions. While the 
focus of Russia was on the need for a pre-agreement of what to do after 
the Ottoman collapse, Britain’s pre-occupation was with how the Ottoman 
Empire could be maintained so as to avert a clash of interests in the Near 
East. As Stockmar said in his memoirs, Britain was not at all responsive 
to the Tsar’s tentative efforts in 1844 to express his views about the 
possible shape of the new order in case of the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire.148 Likewise, Britain’s reaction was no different in 1853 
when Nicholas I made his famous remark about ‘ the sick man of Europe’, 
referring to the Ottoman Empire.149   
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Support of the Establishment of Kin Satellite States in the Balkan Ottoman 
Territories  
The second track of the revisionist policy of Russia in the Near East 
was the establishment of satellite states in the Ottoman territories in the 
Balkans, which were populated by Slavic and/or Orthodox subjects.150 
This second-track policy served as an alternative and was complementary 
to the partition policies should the partition scheme not work, and 
entailed promoting and supporting the Slavic and/or Orthodox nationalist 
movements among the Ottoman subjects in the Balkans.  
 
By following such a policy, Russia was able remain behind the 
scenes and avoid the open reaction of the other great powers, as would 
otherwise have been the case. The rights and privileges that Russia had 
gained from bilateral treaties151 since 1774 over the administration of 
Serbia and the Principalities established a legal and convenient 
environment for her to follow such policy. Also, the establishment of small 
Slavic and/or Orthodox states in the Ottoman territories could have been 
a central ground between the conflicting goals of the great powers in the 
region.  
 
Implications of Russian Revisionist Policies for the Ottoman Empire in 
the 1815 European States System  
Russia’s revisionist policies would bring about changes in the 
territorial and political balances of the 1815 European States System, 
although Russia was careful not to raise the suspicions of the other great 
powers, which were not comfortable with the Russian promise of restraint, 
bearing in mind the aggrandisements of Russia in the second half of the 
18th century. In their eyes, as Puryear pointed out, the unchecked 
expansion of the Russian frontiers in the Near East could have resulted in 
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its dominance of three continents.152 Obviously, the other great powers 
differed in their specific concerns of the Russian revisionist policies in the 
Near East, apart from in their general concern regarding the balance of 
power, with Great Britain and Austria in particular concerned about 
Russian policies with regard to the Ottoman Empire.  
 
From a political/military perspective, Russian access to the 
Mediterranean over Ottoman territories would aid her in becoming a sea 
power, and would upset the balance between the maritime and 
continental powers in the 1815 European States System. Apart from this 
general effect, a powerful Russian navy presence in the Mediterranean 
would put the maritime supremacy of Britain at risk. The roots of the 
British concern in this respect dated back to the last quarter of the 18th 
century, when a Russian naval build-up in the Baltics became visible.153 
The reaction of Pitt, the British Premier during the Orchakov crisis, 
provides testament to the British concerns regarding the maritime 
aspirations of Russia.154 
 
Secondly, the Ottoman territories spanned the land and sea routes 
to India, which was ‘the jewel of the [British] Empire’.155 The loss of that 
jewel would be intolerable for Britain after losing North America, and in 
this regard the Ottoman territories were the advance defences of India, 
and so needed to be protected from Russian influence. 
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Maintaining the Ottoman Empire was deemed a worthy cause by 
Britain, in that it served for the economic interests of the expanding 
British industry and commerce. The rise in industrial production between 
1760 and 1830156 was pushing Britain to pursue a free trade policy and to 
find new markets. Bailey argues that Italy, France, Russia and Austria 
were all less significant than the Ottoman Empire in the two decades after 
1830.157 For example, in contrast with the high-tariff handicaps and 
mercantile competition of Russia,158 the Ottoman Empire was much more 
liberal, and therefore valuable to British commercial interests. These 
interests had led inevitably to a close political relationship between Britain 
and the Ottoman Empire after 1835,159 the first outcome of which was the 
signature of the 1837 Free Trade Agreement between the two states. 
 
The second state to be affected by the Russian revisionist policies in 
Near East was Austria.160 In contrast to Britain, Austria was a neighbour 
of Russia, and had both Slav and Orthodox subjects. The Ottoman 
territories in the Balkans were serving as the buffer zone between Austria 
and Russia, meaning that the impacts of the Russian promotion of Slavic 
and Orthodox nationalist programmes and the establishment of Slavic 
and/or Orthodox satellite states would be much more direct and 
immediate on Austria than on Britain. Russia was already within 100 
kilometres of Vienna after taking control of Poland, and so any Russian 
advance in the Balkans would amount to her encirclement. However, 
Austria’s weakness and structural dependency on Russia prevented her 
from taking as rigid a stance as Britain in 1815–1856.  
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From an economic point of view, the Danube River, through the 
Black Sea, was the second largest maritime outlet for Austria after the 
Adriatic Sea.161 Accordingly, the mouth of the Danube in the Black Sea 
and its surrounding areas was of great importance for Austrian trade with 
the Ottoman Empire and the Levant region, and so any type of unilateral 
control of those areas by Russia would be against Austria’s economic and 
commercial interests.  
 
As for France and Prussia, none of their specific interests came 
under the direct and immediate impact of the Russian revisionism for the 
Near East, in contrast to those of England and Austria. Their concern was 
much more related to their impacts on the general balance of power of the 
1815 European States System. France’s special situation, however, placed 
her in direct opposition with Russia in the Near East. As previously stated, 
France was herself a revisionist state after 1815, but her revisionism 
rather involved Central Europe, where Russia paradoxically was in favour 
of the strict preservation of the status quo. Therefore, the Near East 
emerged as the only area where France could challenge Russia for the 
realisation of France’s revisionist objectives in Central Europe.  
 
D. Hypothesis and Arguments 
 
Out of the analyses of the Structure, which has revealed the nature of 
the ordering principle, the modal tendencies and structural characteristics 
of the great powers, the outcomes of the interplay of the impacts of the 
Concert of Europe, and the modal tendencies and structural 
characteristics of the five great powers, the followings hypotheses are 
proposed regarding the operation and effects of the Structure on Ottoman-
Russian relations in 1815–1856 
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H1. For the successful maintenance of the 1815 Settlements,  the 
Ottoman Empire had to be independent and free of any dependencies 
or alliance commitments to any great power. Any substantial 
deviation from that principle by a great power would invite balance-
of-power politics against that great power by the remaining great 
powers.  
 
The 1815 Settlements brought about a territorial and political 
equilibrium among the great powers, while also meeting their security 
needs. This was a very precarious balance-of-power arrangement. 
Schroeder argues that one reason for the relative success of the 1815 
Settlements was its establishment of intermediary bodies,162 which 
contributed to the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System 
through their functions as a buffer between the great powers. Each 
specialised in one specific area, meaning that their removal would cause 
significant systemic turbulence. In this respect, the function of the 
Ottoman Empire, for example, was as a buffer zone between Russia and 
Austria in the Balkans; and as the controller of the Straits she was able to 
block the further expansion of Russian power into the Mediterranean, as 
well as the expansion of the other maritime powers into the Black Sea.  
 
On the basis of this argument, any changes or shifts in the 
intermediary position of the Ottoman Empire in the 1815 European States 
System would result in the launch of balance-of-power politics as 
illustrated in figure 2, without cancelling the operation of the Concert of 
Europe.  
 
H2. The Concert of Europe affected Ottoman-Russian relations both 
in its intervening (peacekeeping) and independent (peacemaking) 
variable capacities in 1815–1854, as indicated in figure 3, so long as 
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Russia remained within the limits of the foundation 
principles/requirements of the 1815 Settlement.  
 
The foundation of the 1815 European States System was built on 
three pillars, being territorial and political equilibrium among the great 
powers; the restriction of France; and the moderation of Russia. Any 
attempt to change them involved balance-of -power politics rather than 
the Concert of Europe, as any change in those pillars would result in a 
structural change with the transformational implications in the 1815 
European States System, as has been explained in the ‘Outcomes’ 
section.163 
 
H3. The key state in the determination of the course of the Ottoman-
Russian relations in the 1815 European States System was France. 
 
The Capability Structure of the System almost remained the same 
throughout the 1815–1856 period, although the economic and military 
capabilities of Russia and Austria were in gradual decline. However, the 
shift in the balance of power was not so substantial as to cause any 
abrupt political shift in the Relationship Structure; and this situation in 
the Capability Structure led the elements of the Relationship Structure to 
become the determining factors in shaping Ottoman-Russian relations in 
the 1815–1856 period.  
 
When the Relationship Structure took centre stage, it was France’s 
policies and behaviours that would affect the course and shape of 
Ottoman-Russian relations in 1815–1856.  
 
Of the five powers in the System, only three of them, Britain, Austria 
and Prussia, were in favour of the status quo. France and Russia were 
both revisionist powers although their goals differed. An alliance of the 
status quo powers would be ineffective against the Russian revisionist 
                                                 
163
 See p. 84-96 
 98 
goals in the Near East due to the strategic weaknesses of Austria and 
Prussia, which were squeezed between the two revisionist powers of 
France and Russia. This situation was a great obstacle in front of Britain, 
which was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the status quo in the 
Near East. In this case, her alliance with France, as the two leading 
maritime powers, would be much more effective in preventing the 
revisionist goals of Russia in the Near East, and thus affecting Ottoman-
Russian relations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The French bid for hegemony in the European States System and 
the resistance by the alliance of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia 
in the 1792–1815 period led to the emergence of a new international 
system in 1815. The victorious powers decomposed the ‘French 
Continental System’ and replaced it with a new pattern of international 
relationships, realised through a set of international agreements that are 
referred to as the 1815 Settlements. 
 
The new international system, or new pattern of international 
relationships, was not a completely new system, since it retained the 
essential characteristics of the European States System as a ‘political 
community’, formulated by the Westphalia Agreements and in effect since 
1648, taking the form of a multi-polar structure based on independent 
sovereign states. Geographically, the borders of the new international 
system were no different from those under the previous system, however 
there were some new elements in its ‘political community’ aspect, which 
justify it being referred to as a new phase in the history of the European 
States System.  
 
 These new elements can be classified under two headings: The 
founding and governing/maintaining elements. 
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The founding elements of the new phase were: (1) The political and 
territorial equilibrium between the great powers, (2) the restriction of 
France, and (3) the moderation of Russia. These were the specific 
imperatives or founding conditions of the new international system. In 
other words, they were consequences of the division of the military and 
economic capabilities of the great powers in the 1792–1815 period.  
 
The maintaining element of the new relationship pattern was the 
undertaking of the governance of international politics by the great powers 
through combined policies and actions. In this context, the Concert of 
Europe had been the most significant development in the history of the 
European States System since the 15th century, creating a hierarchical 
system within the new phase of the European States System. 
 
Due to the new founding and governing/maintaining elements in the 
structure of the new phase of the international system, in addition to the 
essential principles of the Westphalia, this will be referred to as the ‘1815 
European States System’ in future references. 
 
An analysis of this relationship structure reveals that the ordering 
principle of the System was much broader and more complex than the 
Waltzian conception of ‘anarchy’ suggested164 owing to the institution of 
the Concert of Europe. It was broader because the principles and norms of 
the Concert of Europe, as structural modifiers, shaped the attitudes and 
behaviours of the unit states in the 1815 European States System too. The 
existence of the Concert of Europe was a kind of hierarchical element 
within the general anarchical conditions of international relations after 
1815, since it led to the division of the ‘manager’ and ‘managed’ among the 
unit states in broad terms.  
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The ‘manager’ was the directorship of the five great powers, while 
the ‘managed’ were the states of the second order. In this way, the Concert 
of Europe enabled the great powers of the 1815 European States System 
to employ a collective/shared hegemony over the rest of the member 
states, and thus maintain peace and order after 1815. The division of the 
economic and military capabilities of the great powers also compelled 
them to act together, since none of them had the necessary capacity to 
take on the task of the 1815 Settlement alone. To that end, the Concert of 
Europe was also a body facilitating cooperation between the great powers 
in ensuring security and preventing conflicts among them; and if not 
possible, then at least preventing escalation into all-out war. In this 
capacity, the Concert of Europe served to block the mechanical or 
predatory balance of power politics of the pre-1815 Settlements and to 
curb and regulate the intentions of the revisionist states of France and 
Russia.  
 
The consequences of the deviation from the pure anarchical 
conditions in international relations led to some functional differences 
among the member states of the 1815 European States System. The major 
differentiation was between the members of the directorship, being the 
great powers, and the other unit states. The states of the secondary rank 
differed in their intermediary functions in the maintaining of the 1815 
Settlements – they were separating buffer zones and occupied strategic 
locations for the balance of power or territorial/political equilibrium 
among the great powers. The function of the Ottoman Empire, for 
example, was as a buffer zone between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, 
and as the controller of the Straits, blocked the further expansion of 
Russian power to the Mediterranean and the further expansion of other 
maritime powers into the Black Sea.  
 
All of this meant that Ottoman-Russian relations after 1815 would 
be shaped by a new phenomenon in international relations, in addition to 
the anarchical conditions.  
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In addition, the division of economic and military capabilities under 
the 1815 European States System would not allow the predominance of 
any of the great powers. Although there were differences in their economic 
and military capacities, none held enough power to produce a significant 
shift in the political structure, and rather supported multi-polarity in the 
1815 European States System in the mid- and short-term. This situation 
signified the importance of the relationship structure of the 1815 
European States System in Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 
period.  
 
This meant that it was the modal tendencies of the great powers 
that played the leading role in dictating the course of international 
politics. Despite an agreement among the great powers to use collective 
hegemony, there were substantial differences in the modal tendencies of 
their foreign policies. These differences constituted an important part of 
the relationship structure of the 1815 European States System since they 
formed the basis of any alliances and alignments between the great 
powers. Like the ordering principle, they affected the course and nature of 
the interactions and processes among the great powers in the short- and 
mid-term; and in that context, have been valuable in providing insight into 
the processes concerning Ottoman-Russian relations.  
 
Great Britain, Austria and Prussia were in favour of maintaining the 
status quo in Central Europe and the Near East; while France was 
understandably a revisionist state since she had been reduced and 
restricted. Russia’s position was somewhat different, in that she was 
following policies promoting the strict preservation of the status quo 
achieved through the 1815 Settlements in Central Europe. On the other 
side, Russia had flexible revisionist targets in the Near East, namely for 
the Ottoman Empire, whose territories were of great significance in 
sustaining of the political and territorial equilibrium of the 1815 
Settlements.  
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These modal tendencies led to various alliances or alignments. 
Russia was adamant in its fight against all revolutionary movements, 
irrespective of the source, since they were considered to threaten the 
status quo in Central Europe. In this context, Russia aligned with Austria 
and Prussia under the Holy Alliance; while Britain and France seemed to 
constitute an opposing block against the intervention and suppression of 
the liberal and constitutionalist movements. However Austria and Britain 
were in favour of maintaining the status quo, namely the 1815 European 
States System, in the Near East, and so were aligned in their opposition to 
Russia in her revisionist aims concerning the Ottoman Empire. In this 
case, the key states in Britain’s stance with regard to Ottoman-Russian 
relations were France, and to a lesser degree, Austria. That said, France’s 
primary objective was revision in Central Europe of the 1815 Settlements, 
and therefore would support either path, being the status quo or revision 
in the Near East, depending on the realisation of her aims in Central 
Europe. Put differently, France could support Russia or Britain in the 
Near East, depending on their policies in Central Europe.  
  
To conclude, the capability structure of the 1815 European States 
System on the whole remained unchanged in that no great power was able 
to dominate in the international relations of the member states, although 
it clearly indicated a power shift from Russia and Austria to Britain and 
Prussia (the German Confederation). This situation of constant multi-
polarity in the capability structure was the basis of the constraint in the 
relationship structure and bilateral relations in the 1815 European States 
System. In this context, the existence of the Concert of Europe as the 
ordering principle; the functional differentiations of the unit states; and 
lastly, the alliances between Russia, Austria and Prussia (Holy Alliance), 
and between Britain and France (Cordial Entente) and the consensus 
between Britain and Austria for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire 
were the factors that determined and/or constrained the processes among 
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the unit states, including those located between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia in the 1815–1856 period.165 
  
Within this structural framework of the 1815 European States 
System, the Ottoman-Russian relations that developed around three key 
events, being the Greek Rebellion and the establishment of Greece in 
1822–1830; the Rebellion of the Governor of Egypt and the settlement of 
the Egypt issue in 1832–1842; and the Holy Places Dispute and the 
Crimean War in 1852–1856, will be analysed. The processes among the 
great powers and between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in those 
periods will be the core focus of the following chapter, since they served as 
the conveyor belts of the effects of the structure of the existing 
international states system.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ASCENDANCY OF RUSSIA IN THE NEAR-EAST: THE 
GREEK REBELLION IN 1820–1828 AND THE OTTOMAN-
RUSSIAN WAR OF 1828–1829  
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter concluded that the capability structure of the 
1815 European States System did not change to any great extent in the 
1815-1856 period.  Therefore the elements of the relationship structure 
have to be to a great extent referred for the explanation of the operation 
and effects of the structure of the 1815 European States System in this 
period.1 To recall, these elements were the institution of Concert of 
Europe, the modal tendencies and structural characteristics of the great 
powers and the outcomes of the interplay of the mixed ordering principle 
of the 1815 European States System such as the functional 
differentiations. 
 
In the relationship structure, Russia faced a dilemma regarding the 
preservation of the status quo in the 1815 European States System that 
had resulted from the 1815 Settlements. Russia desired to preserve the 
status quo in Europe, but was keen to discuss the partitioning of the 
Ottoman Empire; an act that Britain, Austria and France all considered 
would disrupt the balance of power and upset the status quo. For reasons 
of security and strategy Russia did not give up entirely her revisionist 
policies concerning the Ottoman Empire, but rather adopted a flexible 
approach that could be tailored to the requirements of the conditions.  
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At the top of Russia’s security agenda, as a great power2, was her 
desire to consolidate her south-western frontiers against any seaborne 
threats from the Black Sea through the Straits and the Mediterranean. 
While the weak Ottoman Empire itself did not pose a threat, the great 
powers with strong navies, namely Britain and France, could in theory sail 
through the Straits and use the Ottoman territories adjacent to the Black 
Sea as a launch pad for an attack; and Russia’s very close historical 
relations with the Ottoman Empire did not preclude such possibility. Her 
recent increasing dependency on the Straits for the economy of southern 
Russia, specifically for the export of grain and the other agricultural 
products to Europe and the Levant region, was one of the factors in that 
strategic consideration.3 All these were her short term defensive security 
considerations. However, Russia was also fostering some offensive security 
objectives as well concerning the Straits. These objectives were connected 
with her power projection of achieving sea power capacity.   
 
However, it was the structural constraints of the 1815 European 
States System that stood in Russia’s way in this regard. The moderation of 
Russia, that is, the abandonment of her revisionist aims in the Near East, 
was one of the structural requirements of the 1815 European States 
System; and any insistence on revisionism in the Near East could result in 
her coming head-to-head with Great Britain and Austria. As Temperley 
highlighted, the defence of Istanbul for Britain, specifically the Straits, was 
of high strategic importance, as her interests to preserve her monopoly of 
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being dominant sea power in the 1815 European States System and to 
safeguard the sea and land route to India.4  
 
As to Austria, she could not tolerate being encircled by Russia from 
the south-east in the Balkans following Russia’s penetration into Central 
Europe after annexing two-thirds of Poland under the 1815 Settlements.  
 
  For this reason, Russia changed her policy of aggrandisement and 
annexation of the pre-Napoleonic Wars towards the Ottoman Empire so as 
to be able to realise her objectives in the Near East. She adopted a flexible 
policy of two tracks:5 (1) The annexation and/or partition of the Ottoman 
territories between the Danube River and Istanbul and the Aegean Sea 
with the other great powers, specifically in agreement with England and 
Austria; or (2) the establishment of satellite Slavic and/or Orthodox states 
in those territories in the belief that they would be dependent upon 
Russia. These two policies were alternatives to each other, but both were 
complementary to Russia’s strategic goals in the Near East.  
 
The second track policies seemed much more feasible under the 
structural constraints of the 1815 European States System. The first of 
these were the treaty rights that Russia had obtained regarding the 
administration of Serbia and the Principalities and the rights of the 
Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which had come at the end of 
the several wars and the concluding treaties.6 The treaty rights secured 
her involvement with the Principalities (Moldavia and Walachia) and 
Serbia, undermining the authority of the suzerain Ottoman Sultan, and 
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thus consolidated her position.7 Likewise, her constant intervention in 
issues concerning the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
reinforced her position as the protector of the Orthodox subjects, who 
constituted 65 percent8 of the population of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans. Secondly, in the event of satellite independent states being 
established, it was assumed that they would have to seek the protection of 
Russia for their security as the biggest and neighbouring Slavic and 
Orthodox kin power in the region. This policy had been tested and 
successfully implemented by Russia in the case of Serbia in 1806–1816.9  
 
When the Greek revolt broke out in 1820 the Ottoman Empire was 
preoccupied with ensuring the authority of the central government over 
the powerful local governors as a part of her state reform, and so her 
military and economic conditions prevented her from following any specific 
goals in her foreign policies, aside from retaining her territories. Her 
survival was in this regard dependent upon the Anglo-Russian strategic 
rivalry and the Austrian quest for stability, as would be her fundamental 
principle for the remainder of the 19th century.10  
 
Prior to the Greek insurgence, which had succeeded due to great 
diplomatic efforts and military intervention, Central Europe had been 
shaken by revolutions in Naples, Sardinia and Spain, all of which were 
crushed. It was the structure of the 1815 European States System that 
was the defining factor in the success of the Greek revolt.  
 
                                                 
7
 F. Armaoglu, 19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1789–1914), (Ankara: Alkım Yayınevi, 2007), p. 157  
 
8
 E. Akarli, Ottoman Population in Europe in the 19
th
 Century; its Territorial, Racial and Religious 
Composition, Unpublished Master Thesis in Madison Unv, Wisconsin, cited by K. Karpat, Osmanlidan 
Gunumuze Etnik Yapilanma ve Gocler, trns by B. Tirnakci, (Istanbul: Timas, 2010) 
   
9
 E.Z. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi  (1789-1856), ( Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), p. 58 
  
10
 S.Hanioglu,  A Brief History of The Late Ottoman Empire, ( New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2008) 
p. 4 
  
108 
The intention in this chapter is to seek answers to the central 
question of how the structure of the 1815 European States System worked 
and affected the Ottoman-Russian relations in 1821-1830 which 
developed around the Greek revolt.  
 
To begin with, the issues which distinguished the Greek revolt from 
the other revolts taking place in Europe and the Ottoman Empire will be 
identified. To this end, firstly, an overview of the place and functions of the 
Greek subjects in the Ottoman state and society will be presented, 
followed by an analysis of how they became influential in Russia and in 
the Russian court. The second part of the chapter will look at how the 
Greek revolt started, and an assessment will be made of how, and to what 
extent, the Russian authorities were involved. The next section will look at 
how Russia tried to turn the Greek revolt into a Russian issue, and 
consequently a systemic or a European one, in order to involve the other 
great powers under the auspices of the Concert of Europe. This will be 
followed by a review of the reactions of the other great powers to Russia’s 
involvement in the Greek revolt, specifically those of Austria and Great 
Britain. Finally, an explanation will be made of the chain of events 
surrounding the Greek issue that led to the Ottoman-Russian War of 
1828–1829 and the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. To conclude 
the chapter, an analysis will be made of the new international state of 
affairs after the Ottoman-Russian War and the Treaty of Adrianople within 
the context of the 1815 European States System.  
  
1. Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
The status and roles of the Greek subjects in the economic and 
political life of the Ottoman Empire and Russia by the 1800s were very 
much different from those of the other Orthodox and/or Slavic nations 
under the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, a thorough analysis of these 
differences would provide a good indication of why the course of the Greek 
insurrection took a different path in terms of the Ottoman and Russian 
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behaviours and reactions, and subsequently of the involvement of the 
great powers.  
  
a. Greek subjects in the Ottoman Empire 
 The Ottoman Empire organised her non-Muslim subjects according 
to their religions,11 which was to be known as the ‘millet system’.1213 
Under this system, the Greeks in 1454, Armenians in 1461 and Jews at 
the end of the 15th century after their expulsion from Spain, were formally 
organised as ‘millets’ within the Ottoman Empire.14 According to Ottoman 
law, ‘millets’ had the right to self-administration in civil and religious 
matters among their religious co-patriots; and in this way the non-Muslim 
communities managed to retain and carry forward their identities under 
the Ottoman Empire. When it came to their relations with the state, their 
religious functionaries, both in the localities and in the capital, were also 
representing their communities in the state organs, and the religious 
leaders were bestowed with official powers and titles within the state 
organisation.15 
 
The Orthodox millet covered all of the Orthodox subjects of the 
different ethnic nations of the Ottoman Empire; however the Patriarchs, 
who were the highest religious and state figures in the Orthodox millet, 
were elected from the Greek community. This situation inevitably gave 
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some advantages to the Greeks over the other Orthodox subjects in the 
religious and administrative affairs of the state.16 
   
Two other developments enhanced even further the role of the 
Greeks in the political life of the Empire, in addition to their privileged 
status in the Orthodox Church. First, the influence of the Slavs or the 
Muslims of Slavic origin in the Ottoman court decreased after they 
‘discredited themselves by supporting the Hapsburg armies whenever they 
crossed the Danube’,17 and their places were filled by Greeks.18 Second, 
the Ottoman court needed to consolidate her control over the Principalities 
as a bulwark against the expansion of Russia from the beginning of the 
18th century. Until that time, the rulers of the Principalities had been 
selected from among the local rulers by the Ottoman sultans, but from 
1711 onward the rulers of the principalities were appointed from among 
the Greek notables, which continued until the Greek revolt in 1821.19 
 
The result of these two developments was an increase in the 
visibility and employment of Greek subjects in the Ottoman court,20 and 
in this way the Greek subjects, in the words of Arnold Toynbee, gradually 
became ‘the senior partner in the Ottoman firm’21 and the Ottoman 
Empire became the ‘Tourkokratia’22 from the Greek perspective.  
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Socially, the Greek subjects were the most numerous among the 
non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, living mainly in the coastal cities 
and in the capital city of Istanbul, in contrast to the other Orthodox 
subjects of the Empire.23 In Istanbul, the Greek notables and clergy 
settled around the district of Phanar24 where the Patriarchy was situated, 
and in time the merchant and clergy families came to be known as 
‘Phanariots’ in reference to the name of the district. 
 
The situation was similar in the economic domain. Their positions 
on either side of the Aegean Sea and the scarcity of natural resources on 
the Greek mainland led them to engage in commerce and shipping.25 With 
the decline of the role of Venice in the economy of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, partly due to the rise of the Atlantic economy, Greek 
traders in the Ottoman Empire took their places and soon become the 
main traders between the Levant and major European ports.26  
 
These combined domestic political, economic and social privileges 
and advantages, which were unique among the other millets, facilitated 
the emergence of a secular Greek power centre in the capital city of the 
Ottoman Empire alongside the religious and official power of the 
Patriarchy.  
 
From the second half of the 18th century, another factor that was 
international rather than domestic in nature reinforced the political and 
economic development of the Greek subjects, being the rise of Russian 
power in the Black Sea. The impacts of that development on the Ottoman 
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Greeks and on how Russia utilised the Greek factor in her foreign policy 
objectives concerning the Ottoman Empire will be covered in the next 
section. 
  
b. Greeks and Russia 
Although the religious and cultural bonds between the Greeks and 
Russia dated back as far as the Byzantium period, the political and 
economic ties between two nations started only after the second half of the 
18th century, with the 1868–1774 Ottoman-Russian War being the 
milestone in these relations.27 During the war, Russia had sent a fleet via 
the Baltic Sea to the East Mediterranean with the technical help of 
Britain28 and landed a number of troops in the Peloponnesus in 1769 
where the goal was to trigger a local revolt against the Ottoman Empire. 
The ensuing uprising was easily suppressed by the Ottoman military, but 
the event remained as an example in the minds of the Greek nationalists 
for similar actions in the future.29The interests of Russia in the Greeks did 
not end with the culmination of the war, as two different but interrelated 
developments further increased the interactions between Russia and the 
Greeks as a consequence of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca.30  
 
When Russia became a coastal state of the Black Sea and obtained 
rights for its trade ships to pass through the Straits, Greek ships and their 
crews, sailing under the Russian flag, carried out the majority of sea 
transportation between the Russian Black Sea ports and those of major 
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European cities.31 As a consequence, the port cities of Odessa, Marseille 
and Trieste became home to significant Greek trade colonies.32 
 
The second development was political. Greeks were the most 
suitable instrument for Russia’s attainment of its goals in geographical 
and religious terms, and so became the central focus of Russia’s foreign 
policies when she settled on the Black Sea’s northern shores.33 With the 
Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty, Russia took on the role of protector of the 
Orthodox Church and its followers as an important part of her foreign 
policy concerning the Near East. She based her claims on the 7th and 14th 
articles of the Treaty,34 which were never accepted by the Ottoman Empire 
or the great powers to the extent that Russia argued and interpreted those 
articles. For the consolidation of her argument and the securing of 
influence over the Orthodox world, Russia had to cultivate close relations 
with the Greeks because of their leading role in the Patriarchy.  
 
Russia needed the Greeks not only for their role in the Orthodox 
Church, but also for the strategic position of their mainland in the 
Mediterranean, which could enable Russia to realise her goals concerning 
the Straits and the Mediterranean. The most concrete step taken by 
Russia associated with Greeks in this regard was the so called Greek 
Project in the last quarter of the 18th century. The Greek Project, which is 
covered in depth in Chapter I, targeted the partition of the Balkan 
territories of the Ottoman Empire between Russia and Austria, and the 
revival of the Byzantium (Greek) Empire in Istanbul. 35   
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As a result of the economic interactions and political efforts, Russia 
became an attractive destination for the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire. Many talented Greeks sought opportunities in trade and 
education in Russia, and gradually became the most influential Orthodox 
non-Russian figures. Two such Greek subjects were Count John 
Capodistrias, (1776–1831), a native of Corfu, who entered Russian service 
and rose to the position of foreign minister and was a close confidant of 
the Tsar.36 He led the pro-Greek circles in Russia and was an ardent 
supporter of the Russian military intervention in the Greek insurrection 
during 1810–1822. The other was Alexander Ipsilantis, who was from a 
well-known Phanariote family in Istanbul and became a major general in 
the Russian army and aide-de-camp of Tsar Alexander I.37 He would go on 
to lead the small army of the rebels who started the revolt in the 
Principalities in 1821.38 
 
The foundation of Philike Hetairia (Society of Friends), which would 
organise the Greek revolt in Russia, was not unusual under those 
circumstances.39 As has been earlier noted, the port city of Odessa had 
become a thriving centre for Greek traders and merchants by the 19th 
century. Philike Hetairia was set up by two Greek and one Bulgarian 
merchant in 1814,40 who chose the name to disguise its true aim, which 
was to plan the Greek insurgency.41 The chair of the organisation was first 
offered to Capodistratis, who declined the position, and so the leadership 
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went to Alexander Ipsilanti.42 The Philike Hetairia was organised in all 
major settlements of the Ottoman Empire under the pretence of providing 
education and charity to the Greek subjects. A number of Russian officials 
were actively involved in the activities of the Philike Hetairia and provided 
an adequate environment for it to carry out its activities, such as 
collecting money and assembling men and arms for the revolt.43  
 
Having summarised the economic, political and social conditions of 
the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire outside the Greek mainland and 
in Russia, a specific analysis about the conditions of the Greeks living in 
the peninsula of Mora will be made, where the insurgency achieved its 
goals.  
 
c. Greeks in Mora 
The political and economic levels of development of the Greeks living 
on the mainland of the Mora Peninsula were in sharp contrast with those 
living in the coastal and capital cities of the Ottoman Empire, who were 
not as politically or economically advanced as those in Istanbul or Russia. 
In the words of Schroeder, ‘they were mostly peasants and were too 
ignorant and downtrodden and too riddled with factions’.44 The social and 
economic imbalances on the peninsula made it ripe for insurgency. 
According to Karpat, while 40,000 Turks possessed 3 million acres of 
agricultural lands on the peninsula, the 360,000 Greeks held only 1–1.5 
million acres.45 The oppressive methods of the Albanian creditors over the 
Greek peasants were another factor driving discontent among the Greeks 
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of Mora.46 47 These appalling conditions provided the necessary human 
base for the nationalist programs formulated by the progressed elite, as 
was the case in most of the nationalist movements of the 19th century. 
 
2. Start of the Greek Revolt and the First Phase of Great Powers 
Diplomacy: 1821–1824 
The analysis in the preceding section underlined the two reasons 
why the Greek insurgency took a different course to previous uprisings, 
although it was not the first non-Muslim insurgency against the Ottoman 
rulers.48 First of all, the level of economic and political development and 
the status of the Greek subjects in the Ottoman Empire were different 
from those of the other non-Muslim nations in the Empire. Secondly, the 
Greeks were very influential in Russia as result of their increased 
commercial and societal interactions during the last four or five decades; 
and finally, the Greek insurgency was internationalised, meaning that the 
great powers were also involved. There were three reasons which helped 
internationalise the Greek insurgency, being the Russian diplomatic 
initiatives; the strategic location of the Greek mainland for the 1815 
European States System; and the sentimental and material supports of 
the European public. These issues will be covered as part of the analysis 
of the development of the insurgency and the great power diplomacy from 
1821 onwards.  
 
a. Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the Greek Rebellion 
On the eve the Greek riot, the Ottoman Empire was being shaken by 
internal clashes. Everybody understood the need for reform in both the 
state and the army, but the content and scope of the reforms was still the 
subject of a power struggle. Reform-minded Sultan Selim III was 
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dethroned in 1808 and killed later by his successor Sultan Mustafa IV, 
who would later share the same fate, but this time at the hands of the 
pro-reform forces. The capital would witness the power struggle between 
pro- and anti-reformers for the entire period of Sultan Mahmud’s rule 
(1809–1839).  
 
The reforms resumed under Sultan Mahmud after a long interval 
following the overthrow of reform-minded Selim III in 1808, and his 
priority was to consolidate the central government and to reform the 
army.49 The consolidation of the central government was achieved by 
removing much of the authority from the local notables in the provinces.50 
In this regard, his struggle against the local ruler of Mora, Tepedelenli Ali, 
who was holding the Greeks under a firm grip, paradoxically facilitated the 
success of the Greek rebels.51 The clash between the Sultan and 
Tepedelenli Ali prevented any close scrutiny or control of the rebels of the 
latter, and more importantly, diverted the Ottoman army away from the 
rebellion, thus allowing the rebels to take control of the whole of Mora in 
1821 without any state intervention.52 
 
b. State of Affairs in the Ottoman Empire, Russia and 
Europe Prior to the Greek Insurgency 
The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was not 
far from tension before the Greek insurgency, as the Treaty of Bucharest 
in 1812 had been hastily accepted by Russia due to the approach of 
Napoleon’s Grand Army.53 Russia pledged to return all of the territories in 
the Balkans and Caucasus, except for Bessarabia, while the Ottoman 
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Empire was to settle the Serbian issue by giving her autonomy and 
recognising some of the rights of the autonomous Principalities. However, 
the Serbian leaders were not content with what they had been given under 
the Treaty, and so the problem remained unresolved.54  
 
As long as Russia remained at war with France, the unresolved 
Serbian question was not a cause for concern for the Ottoman Empire; 
however a more controversial issue was the return of the territories in the 
Caucasus. Russia did not interpret its promise as covering some of the 
territories in the Caucasus, which were of great importance for the control 
of the Black Sea’s eastern coastline.55 G. A. Stroganov, the new Russian 
ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, arrived in Istanbul in 1816 to secure 
the full implementation of the Bucharest Treaty according to the Russian 
terms.56 It was clear with the appointment of Stroganov that Russia was 
committed to gaining in 1816 what she could not get in Bucharest in 1812 
after she had quashed the Napoleonic threat.57 
 
An Ottoman-Russian war was the last thing that the great powers 
could afford so soon after the devastations of the Napoleonic Wars and the 
1815 Settlements. The outcomes of such a war were hard to predict for 
the future of the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently for the territorial and 
political equilibrium in Europe the 1815 Settlements had brought about. 
In particular, Austria and Great Britain would lose out in case of such a 
war, since France had already been restricted; and for this reason, 
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Castelreagh, the British Foreign Minister, instructed the British 
ambassador in Istanbul to advise the Ottoman government to conduct her 
negotiations with Russia so as to avoid any excuse for war, and to be more 
solicitous so as to secure a clear and early settlement with Russia.58  
 
At the same time, the revolutionary movements in Spain, Portugal, 
Naples and Piedmont threatened to undermine the dynastic regimes that 
were considered to be the base of the political stability of the 1815 
European States System, and the great powers were preoccupied with 
tackling those movements through congresses and conferences. This has 
been labelled consequently as the Congresses and Conferences System era 
due to the efforts exerted to find a collective solution to the maintenance 
of the 1815 Settlement, in which Russia played a leading role. News of the 
Greek insurgency broke while the Tsar was at one such congress in 
Laibach in 1821.  
 
c. Start of Greek Insurgency and Russian Initial Reactions 
The Greek insurgency started when the head of Philike Heteria, 
Alexander Ypsilanti, crossed the Prut River into Moldavia with a small 
band of irregulars on 4 March, 182159. He was relying on the support of 
the locals and more importantly of Russia, and proclaimed to the locals 
that the mighty empire would defend their rights.60 However, that mighty 
empire did not come to help because, in the words of Jelavich, his ‘was the 
wrong rebellion at the wrong time in the wrong place’.61  
 
It was indeed the wrong time to expect the backing of Russia. Tsar 
Alexander I and the emperors of Austria and Prussia, as the Holy Alliance, 
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had already agreed to refuse any changes in the domestic regimes brought 
about by the revolutionary movements in the Conference of Troppau in 
1820 when they met to deal with the revolutions in Spain, Portugal and 
Nepal. More importantly, in the event that the changes endangered 
neighbouring countries, they would attempt to bring the offending country 
back into line ‘first by friendly pressure, and secondly by coercive force’,62 
principles that they would reaffirm in Laibach in May 1821. Under these 
circumstances, the reaction of Alexander I was not unexpected. He 
condemned the action of Ypsilanti with the following words, ‘He could not 
count on any aid, nor even on any mark interest on our part, as long as he 
misguided his compatriots and led them to inevitable misfortune’.63   
 
The place that the head of the Philike Hetaerae chose for the revolt, 
strangely enough, was not the Greek mainland but the Danube 
Principalities, which in hindsight was the wrong choice. The locals saw 
their rulers of Greek origin to be responsible for the misrule, if that was 
indeed the case,64 and so the invitation from Ypsilanti to take part in the 
insurgency did not attract the masses he had hoped. Once the local 
Romanian rebel leader Tudor Vladimirescu had decided to act on his own, 
the revolt of Ypsilanti was doomed to failure.65 The Ottoman forces entered 
the Principalities and suppressed the revolt without difficulty, while 
Ypsilanti fled to Austria where he remained imprisoned until 1827. 
 
The Greek revolt did not end with the suppression of the Ypsilanti 
irregulars in Moldavia, as it would spread to the Mora Peninsula and the 
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surrounding islands by early April of the same year.66 The rebels 
‘massacred every Turk on whom they could lay their hands’67 in Mora, and 
by the summer of 1822, the Greek rebels had taken control of the north of 
the Isthmus of Corinth, Missolonghi, Athens and Thebes.68 The 
subsequent measures taken by the Ottoman government, the Russian 
reactions and the involvement of the great powers will be the focus of the 
next section. 
  
d. Development of the Revolt in Mora and the Counter-
Measures of the Ottoman Government 
While the actions of Ypsilanti were considered to be a plot staged by 
Russia, the revolt in Mora changed the whole attitude and reaction of the 
Ottoman government69 who dispatched the army and the navy to supress 
the revolt. The army had already been preoccupied with the rebellious Ali 
Pasha in Ionia before being diverted to the harsher geographical 
conditions of the Mora Peninsula, which made it difficult to restore order. 
Moreover, the rebels in Mora were receiving strong support from the 
inhabitants and the church, in contrast to the situation in the 
Principalities.  
 
As previously touched upon, the Greeks had been heavily engaged 
in maritime trade and shipping between the Levant, Europe and Russia, 
and it was the same ships that were then armed and used against the 
Ottoman Navy to prevent any effective operations from the sea against the 
rebels. The converted ships were able to effectively disrupt supply lines to 
the Ottoman cities and Istanbul, leading the Ottoman authorities to stop 
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and search all Russian cargo ships passing through Straits under the 
suspicion that they were being operated by the Greeks under the Russian 
flag to carry supplies to the rebels.70 The longer the revolt lasted, the more 
coercive means were put into practice.  
 
As again specified out in the previous section, the Greeks were living 
not only on the Greek mainland, but also in Istanbul and Asia Minor. 
News of the atrocities committed by the rebels against the local Muslims 
and the disruption of supply lines to Istanbul resulted in great public 
uproar against the Greeks living in Istanbul and in the other parts of the 
Empire.  
 
In the meantime, the Ottoman government was beginning to 
understand the scope of the events and the activities of Philikia Hetaerae, 
as well as the involvement of the Greek priests and other leading notables. 
A harsh wave of measures and punishments against the priests and 
leading Greeks ensued. Most of those found to be involved in the activities 
of Philikia Hetaerae were executed, the most notable event being the 
execution of the Patriarch Gregory V, even though he had issued an 
encyclical condemning the rebellion.71  
 
Russia’s reaction to the execution of the Patriarch and other leading 
bishops in the major cities and the confiscation of cargoes from Russian 
ships sailing through the Straits was swift, considering them as the final 
blow to Russia’s self-appointed mission as protector of the Orthodox faith 
and her great power status. The war party, which had been already in 
motion in St. Petersburg to quash disputes arising from the 
implementation of the Treaty of Bucharest (1912), took this as an 
opportunity ‘for an attack on Turkey [the Ottoman Empire]’.72 
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e. Internationalisation of Greek Insurgency  
After the outbreak of the rebellion, Russia’s Tsar warned the 
Ottoman Empire to act with restraint73 He did not hide its sympathy for 
the rebels, hailing them as ‘the victims of events’, and stating that they 
would find in the Russian missions ‘the assistance always owed to 
misfortune and even more natural yet when this misfortune falls upon a 
nation which is united to us by the sacred ties of a common faith’.74 The 
Russian Embassy staff in Istanbul had already ‘openly but not officially 
favoured the Greek cause’,75 however the execution of the Patriarch and 
the other leading bishops and the confiscation of Russian cargoes had 
hardened Russian attitudes. 
 
Stroganov, the Russian ambassador, delivered a strongly-worded 
letter of protest to the Ottoman government on 28 June76 demanding they 
halt the violence against the Greeks, terminate their occupation of the 
Principalities, and cease the stop and search of Russian cargo ships 
sailing through the Straits in pursuance of the Ottoman-Russian treaties 
of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774) and Yassy (1782).77 The Porte replied that the 
Patriarch and the other bishops had been justly condemned and executed 
according to law for their involvement in a conspiracy against their lawful 
sovereign and the Ottoman Empire would follow her bilateral 
commitments after she restored the order in the Principalities and Mora 
(Greek Mainland).78   However, Russia was not satisfied with this reply, 
and on 18 July, 1821 Stragonov delivered an ultimatum, but this time on 
the order from his capital, condemning the hanging of the Patriarch and 
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the leading Greeks in the strongest terms, and asserting Russia’s role as 
representative of the Christendom. The Ottoman government was strongly 
requested to (1) restore the destroyed Greek churches; (2) provide a 
guarantee of protection of the Ottoman Christians; and finally (3) the 
return to the status quo in the Principalities within eight days 79 When he 
did not receive a reply in time, according to his calculations, he broke off 
diplomatic relations and left Istanbul for Russia in August.80 
 
With the breaking of diplomatic ties, Ottoman-Russian relations 
took a different path in their approach to the Greek insurgency within the 
1815 European States System that was to a great extent shaped by the 
mediation of the great powers in the absence of direct contacts between 
the two states.  
 
f. Restraint of Russia in 1821–1826  
 Despite her firm stance in Istanbul, Russia was following a 
conciliatory policy in the European courts, being aware of the strategic 
importance of the Mora Peninsula and its surrounding islands in the 
power structure of the 1815 European States System. The islands could 
not be overlooked by either the continental or maritime great powers; 
however it was Great Britain and Austria that played the leading role 
rather than France and Prussia. 
 
For Britain there had been permanent anxiety about Russia’s 
designs on the Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean since Pitt’s time.81 
In this regard, her interest was not only commercial, but also naval. ‘In 
the Black Sea lay the Russian Navy, formidable in itself; dangerous if 
joined to that of any maritime power [France] in the Mediterranean other 
                                                 
79
 The Russian ultimatum is in A.F. V. Prokesh-Osten, Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen, (Vienna: 1867),   
III. Volume, p. 95  
 
80
 Georgiev et. al,(1978), op. cit, p. 80 
 
81Duke of Argyll ‘Our Responsibilities for Turkey, Facts and Memories of Forty Years’, (London: John 
Murray, 1896), pp. 3-4    
 
  
125 
than Britain.82 Therefore, an Ottoman-Russian war over the Greeks would 
be tantamount to the realisation of the Russian goals in the 
Mediterranean from the British perspective.  
 
Austria, on the other hand, was very much concerned about 
Russia’s self-assumed role of protector of the Orthodox and/or Slavs in 
the Balkans, since the Austrian Empire had many Orthodox and Slavic 
subjects. The Russian decision to provide for the protection of the Greeks 
meant that Greece would be the next state to fall under Russian influence 
after Serbia and the Principalities. This was unacceptable for Austria 
under the 1815 European States System, unlike in the last quarter of the 
18th century with regard to the Principalities, and in the first decade of the 
19th century with regard to Serbia. Moreover, supporting Russia would 
mean backing the Greek rebels, which would consequently mean the 
reversal of the agreements reached in Troppau to block the revolutionary 
movements in Naples, Spain and Portugal by the three conservative 
monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia.83  
 
The attitudes of the British and Austrian ambassadors in Istanbul 
toward the actions of Ambassador Stragonov were an indication of the 
policies of both powers towards the Greek issue in 1821–1826. This 
concerted policy was based on the separation of the Russian Treaty rights, 
Russian concerns about the well-being of the Orthodox Greeks and the 
unjust actions of the Ottoman authorities. This line of policy was also an 
indication that the remaining members of the Concert of Europe would 
not recognise the Russian claims within the Treaty regarding the 
protection of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The 
following section will address how Russia, Great Britain and Austria 
implemented their policies regarding the Greek issue in 1821–1826. 
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Russia did not appear to want to break away from her allies in the 
Quadruple Coalition because of the Greeks, which meant that she would 
continue to uphold the 1815 Settlements and try to seek a solution to the 
Greek question within the limits of the 1815 European States System.84 In 
this case, the Ottoman Empire would play the key role in the settlement of 
the Greek issue, since neither Great Britain nor Austria desired any 
dramatic change in the status quo that existed between the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia; and more importantly, Russia herself had a strong 
desire to remain within the 1815 Settlements. 
 
 After breaking her relations with the Ottoman Empire, Russia 
concentrated her efforts to reassure the great powers of her desire to 
adhere to her commitments in the 1815 Settlements, pledging not to act 
alone in the Greek issue.85 Even before the break up, the Tsar told the 
British ambassador that he believed that Paris liberals were responsible 
for the disturbances in Spain, Italy, Spain and the Near East, claiming 
that the objective of those in the Principalities was to distract ‘the 
attention of Russia from the affairs of the rest of Europe’.86 A similar 
attitude was reiterated in the dispatch sent to the European courts on 4 
July from Russia87, expressing that Russia ‘will never act either on the 
basis of its exclusive interests or without cooperating with the powers with 
which the transactions which constitute the guarantee of general peace 
unite it’. On the other side, the dispatch also inquired what the partners 
would think should Russia act to restore peace and strengthen the 
equilibrium of Europe.88 In other words, she was expecting the same role 
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to be recognised for her in the Near East within the Concert of Europe as 
it was for Austria in Italy and France in Spain. 
 
The members of the Concert of Europe declined the Russian offer to 
act on their behalf in the Near East, as the implications of such a move by 
Russia would be very different from those of Austria in Italy, and France 
in Spain. While in Italy and Spain the intention had been to restore the 
authority of the legitimate rulers against the revolutionaries, the aim of 
Russia was just the opposite, being to protect the rebels against their 
legitimate sovereign. Secondly, the interventions of neither France nor 
Austria would result in a shift in the balance of power in the 1815 
European States System, unlike the involvement of Russia in the Near 
East.89 
 
However, both Britain and Austria voiced their opposition to the 
Russian demand to act on behalf the Concert, reminding her of the 
principles of the 1815 Settlements. In this context, Castlereagh, the 
English Foreign Minister, in a direct appeal to Alexander I, underlined that 
‘the Greek insurrection was the same as those in the West, and was the 
work of the same organised spirit of the same international power which 
was revealing itself in places where the governing power was enfeebled’.90 
Therefore, he expected that a ‘Russia which can adhere to its peculiar 
habit of action would nevertheless remain unalterably true to the 
fundamental obligations of the alliance and the present European States 
System’.91  
  
                                                 
89
 According to Clayton, ‘By 1821, however, containment of Russia was considered [by Britain] a major 
need. The loss of Greece might not in itself seriously weaken Turkey; but Russian intervention on the Greek 
side almost certainly would’, G.D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli, 
(London, TBS, 1975), p. 43  
 
90
 Kissinger (1957), op. cit., p. 294 
 
91
Ibid. 
 
  
128 
Austria followed Britain in her refusal to grant Russia the assent 
she sought for collective action, or indeed individual action by Russia on 
behalf the alliance, in the Near East. 
 
The similar attitude of Britain and Austria towards Russia with 
regard to the Greek revolt paved the way for further cooperation between 
Castlereagh and Metternich. This was the exact wish of Metternich, who 
was aware that the most effective way to strengthen Austria’s hand in 
restraining Russia was through cooperation between Austria and Britain, 
even though the two states’ perceptions of how Russia could be restrained 
were different. An opportunity to forge a definite and precise 
understanding between Britain and Austria with regard to Russia’s 
position in the Near East emerged when the British King visited Hanover, 
accompanied by Castlereagh.  
 
The most significant result of the meeting between Castlereagh and 
Metternich was an agreement to implement policies that would keep 
Russia within the parameters of the 1815 Settlements.92 The two states 
pledged to prevent Russian recourse to coercive means, including war, to 
settle the Greek issue, being aware that the Tsar, who was the ultimate 
decision-maker in foreign policy issues, was under heavy pressure from 
the powerful pro-Greek and pro-war lobby. Although Castlereagh and 
Metternich differed in their ideas of how to relieve the pressure on the 
Tsar; their approaches were targeting the same end; that is, to restrain 
Russia in the Greek issue. Castlereagh was much bolder than Metternich. 
In his letter to the Tsar he asserted that the Greek crisis had the potential 
to disrupt ‘not only the stability of the present European Situation but the 
moral character and harmony of the alliance’.93 Targeting the pro-Greek 
lobby around the Tsar, he reminded that ‘it is impossible not to feel the 
appeal; and if a statesman were permitted to regulate his conduct by the 
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counsels of his heart instead of the dictates of his understanding, I see 
really no limits to the impulse…’.94 On the basis of those views, he refused 
to discuss the Russian inquiries regarding the possible consequences of a 
Russian attempt to settle the Greek issue.95 
 
As for Austria, Metternich was most careful in his response to 
Russia in recognition of the precarious domestic situation of the Tsar 
explained in the last paragraph. His response was not limited to the 
rejection of Russia’s demands, in that it also included some proposals for 
the handling of the Greek issue and the establishment of a base for the 
collective action of the great powers in the future. To that end, he 
formulated Russia’s grievances that had arisen from the Greek revolts and 
the conduct of the Ottoman Empire to quell them in the following ways:96 
(1) Restoration of the protection of the Ottoman Christians; (2) 
maintenance of a distinction in the treatment of the guilty and the 
innocent in the Greek rebellion; and (3) withdrawal of the Ottoman army 
from the Principalities and restoration of the previous administrative 
system. Metternich then suggested that Russia should distinguish her 
violated treaty rights from her grievances about the misconduct of the 
Ottoman government in the suppression of the revolt.97 With regard to 
those covered by bilateral treaties, Russia maintained the right to deal 
with them unilaterally; but for those not covered by the bilateral treaties, 
they should not be dealt with unilaterally by Russia. Since the issues that 
resulted from the Greek revolt were apparently not stipulated by bilateral 
treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, they were of interest 
also to the other great powers. In other words, they were European issues, 
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and so should be dealt with through the concerted actions of the great 
powers.  
 
In this way, Metternich was attempting to invalidate the Russian 
argument that it had to intervene in the Greek issue on the basis of its 
special status with regard to the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire. On the other hand, Metternich was indicating that Russia could 
get the help of the great powers for its legitimate rights, so long as it gave 
up its self-appointed role of protector of the eastern Christians. It should 
be noted that the offered help did not include a military option, but rather 
put pressure on the Ottoman Empire from Britain and Austria to ensure 
the legitimate rights of Russia, such as in the evacuation of the 
principalities and the commercial rights for the passage of Russian cargo 
ships through the Straits. 
 
In contrast to the categorical refusal of Britain, Austria was more 
flexible in its reply to Russia’s request to intervene in the Greek issue on 
behalf of the alliance. In the end, Austria was indirectly saying no to 
Russia on the ground that her grievances against the Ottoman Empire did 
not originate from her treaties with the Ottoman Empire 
 
The refusal of Britain and Austria to endorse or cooperate in the 
issue persuaded the already-reluctant Tsar not to go ahead with an 
intervention into Greek affairs. The first step to that end was his decision 
to accept Austria’s offer during a meeting in Vienna.   
 
The Tsar chose to send Tatishchev as his special envoy to the 
meeting in Vienna rather than Stragonov, who was the former ambassador 
in Istanbul and a hardliner in St. Petersburg, going against the advice of 
the Foreign Ministry.98 This choice could be considered as another signal 
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that Russia was ready to align her policies towards the Greek issue with 
those of Austria and Britain. 
 
The negotiations between Austria and Russia started in Vienna in 
March 1822. Although there were no changes in the Russian demands,99 
the negotiations bought Metternich time in which to forge an agreement 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, or at least keep Russia within 
the limits of the alliance. At the end of the negotiations, Metternich agreed 
to some concessions, that Austria would break ties with the Ottoman 
Empire in the event of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
resulting from Ottoman attitudes to the treaty rights of Russia. This 
concession was not without conditions, as it depended on Britain also 
breaking its ties with the Ottoman Empire in the event of such a war. 
Metternich knew that Britain would never make such a move, and so he 
was not actually committing to anything substantial.100  
 
The second mission of Tatishchev to Vienna in May 1822 continued 
on the basis and limits of the agreements achieved during the first 
mission.101  
 
The Ottoman government, from the outset until the end of the Greek 
issue, objected strongly to any mediation by any great power in the 
settlement of the problem, on the grounds that it was a domestic issue;102 
but on the other hand, she was very conciliatory in the settlement of the 
disputes regarding the implementation of her bilateral treaties with 
Russia. The main difficulty in the settlement of those disputes was the 
open Russian support for the rebels and the complicities of the Russian 
officials. Nevertheless, as a result of the efforts of the British ambassador 
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in Istanbul some progress was made in meeting the Russian demands 
with regard to the affairs of the Principalities.103 
  
When the great powers, with the exception of Britain, convened in 
November in Verona, their positions regarding the Greek issue had already 
been determined, with the separation of the implementation of the 
Russian treaty rights and the Greek issue being the basis of their 
agreement. Accordingly, the participants were mainly preoccupied with 
the Spanish issue, with the Greek issue being dealt with in only one day, 
as Russia reiterated its already well-known demands while strongly 
denying complicity in the rebellion.104 Austria, Prussia and France insisted 
Russia resume diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, for which 
Tatishchev listed three conditions: ‘The complete evacuation of the 
Principalities by the Ottoman Empire; the Pacification of Greece by a 
series of acts showing that the Ottoman Government respects the 
Orthodox religion under the protection of Russia; and finally, a repeal of 
the measures that hindered commerce and free navigation in the Black 
Sea’.105 
  
Progress regarding the treaty rights of Russia in Istanbul, which 
have already been dealt with above, facilitated the job of the Tsar in 
endorsing the Metternich formulation, and Russia resumed its diplomatic 
relations with the Ottoman Empire at the level of attaché in 1824.106 So 
ended the first phase in the internationalisation of the great powers’ 
involvement in the Greek issue. The Russian decision not to act 
unilaterally, but rather according to the concerted policies of the great 
powers set out by Austria, would last until April 1826 when Britain 
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changed her policy, and agreed with Russia over the settlement of the 
Greek issue. From April 1826, when the Petersburg Convention was 
signed, to the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in April 1828, 
Russia would again act under the concerted policies of the great powers, 
but this time framed and led by Britain instead of Austria.  
 
As a result, the restraint of Russia in the Greek issue was the 
marking factor in the international domain from 1821–1828; however 
developments between 1824–1826, both in the Ottoman’s handling of the 
Greek revolt and in the handling of the great power diplomacy, prevented 
any breakthrough in the settlement of the problem. These interim 
developments are covered in the following section. 
  
3. Interim Great Power Diplomacy in the Greek Issue: 1824–
1826 
A key event in the 1824–1826 period was the first indications that 
Great Britain would soften on Castlereagh’s rigid stance against Russia on 
the Greek issue. This was also a sign of Britain’s new overall policy 
against the Congress System, which was the convention among the great 
powers for the overseeing and regulating of international politics within 
the 1815 European States System. 
 
After the Congress of Verona in 1822, relations between the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia saw a slight improvement as a result of 
positive steps taken by the Ottoman Empire with regard to the 
Principalities and commerce.107 This resulted in the Tsar appointing 
Minciacky to head an economic mission in Istanbul,108 and by the end of 
1824, ‘tranquillity had been restored to the Principalities and the bulk of 
the Turkish occupation force had been withdrawn’.109 This cleared the way 
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for Russia to send a new ambassador, Ribeaupierre, to Istanbul, which 
meant a full restoration of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire; 
however the departure of the new ambassador was postponed.110  
 
Russia, the main protagonist in the Greek issue from the European 
States System, did not stop its efforts to settle the issue after the 1822 
Verona Congress, preparing a memo in March 1824 for the pacification of 
the Greek issue.111 Her plan envisioned three autonomous Greek 
principalities under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire with a status 
similar to that of the Principalities under the guarantee of the allied 
courts. If the belligerents chose not to agree to the terms, the allies would 
take coercive measures.112 Russia’s motivation in preparing such proposal 
was obvious; it was not happy with the demand for independence from the 
Greek rebels, as a Greek state, in contrast to the Principalities, would not 
be adjacent to Russia. Moreover, Russia did not possess the naval 
capacity in the Mediterranean to be able exercise influence over such a 
state, meaning that an independent Greece would more likely fall under 
the influence of a maritime power, namely, Britain. An autonomous 
Greece, like Serbia, would be much more preferable for Russia than an 
independent Greece, since she would be predisposed to Russia if she was 
formally placed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
On the basis of that plan, Russia invited the great powers to St. 
Petersburg to negotiate the Greek situation,113 however before the meeting 
the Russian plan for the pacification of Greece was leaked in a French 
newspaper. This was a big disappointment for the Greek nationalists, 
since the proposal did not envision independence and union for Greece, 
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but was regarded rather as ‘the Hospidarisation of Greece’, echoing the 
status of the Principalities. For this reason, the Greeks turned to Great 
Britain for protection,114 heralding a new internationalisation process 
within the Greek issue in which Britain would take the lead.  
  
Austria and France received the Russian proposals with some 
concern. The establishment of three autonomous Greek states was 
considered to be an extension of Russian influence into Greece, as had 
already been the case for the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
and Serbia in the Balkans. With the addition of three new divisions in 
Greece, a total of six ‘meagre and divided Balkan Principalities would 
revolve as satellites round the Russian sun’.115 Moreover, they were 
concerned that the Russian proposal would bring the strong refusal of the 
Porte, and that subsequently coercive measures and finally war would be 
unavoidable.116 However, they did not oppose Russia outright, and took 
part in the opening session of the St. Petersburg conference in June 1824. 
The meeting could not produce any concrete decisions with regard to the 
Greek issue117 as, according to Schroeder, the participants lacked clear 
instructions from their governments. For this reason, Nesselrode, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, suspended the first meeting.118 
 
As for Great Britain, Canning, the new Foreign Minister, announced 
that Britain would not agree to a proposal unless it was accepted by the 
Greeks, and announced some conditions for Britain’s participation in the 
second St. Petersburg conference, scheduled for March 1825.119 These 
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included the full restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire and a renunciation of the use of force by the warring 
parties. In fact, Britain had already begun the process of designing a new 
policy regarding the Greek issue in line with her overall policy to divide the 
Holy Alliance, and so could be seen to be deliberately isolating herself. 
 
In Britain’s first attempt to that end, Canning sent his cousin, 
Strafford Canning, to St. Petersburg as the newly appointed ambassador 
to the Ottoman Empire, with an offer ‘to have Britain mediate between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire separately from Austria and France’,120 
which was tabled before the second opening of the St. Petersburg 
Conference in February 1825. Lane-Pool argued that his preliminary 
discussions with the Tsar and Nesselrode had cleared the way for the 
much later agreement, the Protocol of 4 April, 1826, between Britain and 
Russia in the settlement of the Greek issue.121 Moreover, Britain 
recognised the Greek rebels as belligerents122 in March 1823, and did not 
interfere when their representatives raised a loan in London. 
 
The second St. Petersburg conference between the great continental 
powers again failed to bring an end to the problem.123 Although the 
participants adopted a protocol in April 1825 offering mediation between 
the Ottoman Empire and Greeks, given the attitude of the two parties, the 
effects of the protocol on the settlement of the issue would be very much 
limited.124 It seemed that none of the great powers wanted Russia to 
reinforce her position in the Near East, and Russia was understandably 
disappointed. Nesselrode wrote to the Russian representatives on 18 
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August claiming that there was little point in continuing the negotiations 
regarding the Greek issue with Austria, Prussia and France.125  
 
This was not a declaration of the end of Russian endeavours in the 
Near East, but was rather an admission of the impracticability of the Holy 
Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia in the region. This was the first 
occasion in the 1815 European States System, as Taylor pointed out, that 
the Holy Alliance could function in Central Europe, but was unacceptable 
for Russia when it came to the Near East. Russia’s position as a flanking 
power in the 1815 European States System meant that she could act 
independently of the continental powers. An alternative opportunity was 
already looming on the horizon in the shape of the increasing interest of 
Britain in the Greek issue and Canning’s desire to reduce Britain’s 
involvement in continental affairs. In this respect, informal consultations 
took place between Canning and the Russian ambassador in London, and 
at the end of 1825 the Russian ambassador informed St. Petersburg that 
Britain was shifting to the side of Russia.126 This can be considered as the 
end of the first phase and the start of the second phase in the 
internationalisation of the Greek issue.  
 
4. Development of the Greek Revolt and the Second Phase of 
the Great Powers Diplomacy: 1826–1828 
 
Despite the time gained through the international restraint of 
Russia, things did not go well for the Ottoman Empire in the field. Her 
military commanders were unsuccessful in suppressing the rebellion and 
bringing stability back to the Mora Peninsula. This was partly due to 
internal political clashes among the senior officials, and partly due to the 
lack of sufficiently disciplined, equipped and trained troops.127 As 
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explained earlier in the chapter, the diversion of the Tepedelenli Ali 
Pasha’s rebellion in Ionia was one of the reasons behind the failure of the 
Ottoman forces to quell the Greek revolt, however his elimination in 
November 1822 did not bring any sweeping success for the Ottoman 
forces, contrary to the expectations in Istanbul.128 
 
By 1825, the Ottoman forces and Greek rebels had reached a 
military stalemate. The ‘Liberated Peloponnesus was unable to carry the 
revolution further, but the Turks likewise were unable to re-conquer the 
Peloponnesus’.129 
 
This stalemate was broken when Sultan Mahmud commissioned the 
governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali, and his son Ibrahim to quell the revolt, 
with the promise of the governorships of Girit (Kiriti) and Mora in return 
for their services.130 The Egyptian army under Mehmed Ali had already 
proven its abilities against the rebellious factions in Egypt and Arabia. 
According to Armaoglu, it was Metternich who recommended Mehmed Ali 
for the task.131  
 
Ibrahim landed in Mora in February 1825 with a well-equipped 
army and started pushing from the south-west of Mora while another 
Ottoman army advanced from the north-west. They quickly re-captured 
territory from the Greek rebels, and finally stormed their stronghold in 
Missolonghi in 1826.132 Athens followed in June 1827, after which, in the 
words of Stavrianos, ‘The revolution appeared to be doomed, the situation 
changed overnight with the intervention of the European powers’.133  
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So what happened in the internationalisation of the Greek issue to 
bring about the collective intervention of the great powers? This question 
may be answered by outlining the international developments from 1823 
onwards. 
 
a. The Shift in Britain’s Position and the Britain-Russia 
Accord over the Greek Issue: From Mediation to 
Intervention  
The general international situation by 1823 had changed from the 
preceding 1820–1822 period in two specific areas. Firstly, the congress 
system, which facilitated the regulation and governance of international 
politics under the directorship of the great powers through formal and 
regular conferences and congresses, ended in 1822; and secondly, the 
reluctance of Britain to take part in the continental affairs of the 1815 
European States System was strengthened with the arrival of George 
Canning to the office of the Foreign Ministry after the death of Castlereagh 
in 1822. A third but no less significant factor was the disappointment of 
Russia in her efforts to reach a concerted but effective conclusion to the 
Greek problem.  
   
Initial contacts regarding the settlement of the problem started 
between Britain and Russia at the end of 1825.134 Using the pretext of the 
death of Alexander I and the coronation of the new Tsar, Nicholas I, 
Canning sent Wellington to St. Petersburg on a special mission at the 
beginning of 1826 to find a common position between Britain and Russia 
regarding the settlement of the Greek issue.  
 
What factors brought about such a shift on the side of Britain? 
Before going into the outcomes of the Wellington mission, these 
considerations will be briefly touched upon.   
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Firstly, Britain had always desired to destroy the Holy Alliance, 
considering it as a barrier to international competitiveness from which she 
stood to benefit a great deal.135 The disappointment of Russia in its allies 
of the Holly Alliance with regard to the Greek issue presented a good 
opportunity for Britain to achieve that aim, and the appeal of the 
provisional Greek government to Britain for protection against the military 
advance of the Egyptian forces strengthened Britain’s hand in that regard.  
 
Secondly, Britain came to the conclusion that Russia could no 
longer be prevented from going war with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, 
Canning recognised that ‘it might be desirable to take some vigorous step 
to prevent Russia from going to war with Turkey’.136 That ‘vigorous step’, 
according to Canning, could take the form of a separate entente with 
Russia as the best way of resolving the Greek conflict, while averting 
individual action by Russia, and would comply well enough with his idea 
of ‘every nation for itself’.137 It should be noted that that Canning’s policy 
was the least plausible one. 
 
Thirdly, Britain was becoming more and more concerned with the 
rising influence of Russia over the Greeks as a consequence of Russia’s 
actions in the preparation of the revolt to its continued claim as the 
protector of Orthodox Christians. Being a maritime power, Britain would 
not be comfortable with a Russian satellite state in the middle of the 
Mediterranean.138 Besides, the acute failure of the Ottoman army in 
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suppressing the revolt had increased Britain’s anxiety over the likely birth 
of a Greek state under Russian protection.139 
 
Finally, a strong Egyptian presence on the Mora Peninsula with the 
backing of continental Egypt would not consistent with British political 
and economic interests and projections; and therefore an autonomous 
Greek entity under the Ottoman Empire was much more in line with its 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.140  
 
From the Russian perspective, a Russian-British accord could 
nullify the resistance of the continental powers to Russia’s plans in the 
Near East.141 Russia desired at the very least the neutrality of Britain in 
the event of a Russo-Ottoman war, and such an accord would provide just 
that.142 
 
The outcome of the Anglo-Russian negotiations was the Protocol of 4 
April between Britain and Russia, signed in St. Petersburg in 1826, and 
was a milestone and remarkable shift in the great power diplomacy of the 
1815 European States System.143  
 
Both states agreed that Britain should offer to mediate between the 
Porte and the Greeks with the objective of turning Greece into an 
autonomous vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.144 More significantly, the 
Protocol provided for possible intervention by the two powers, ‘jointly or 
separately’ if necessary. The drawing up of the borders of that 
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‘autonomous Greek state’ would be decided later. Finally, the protocol 
invited the other great powers to join Britain and Russia for the realisation 
of its arrangements. 
 
Was the Protocol the end of the British policy to defend the existence 
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which had been the case since the 
era of Pitt the Younger in 1793? Clayton argues that although Britain 
wanted some degree of freedom for the Greeks, it was not to be at the 
expense of the unity of the Ottoman Empire.145 Given the efforts of the 
new ambassador, Stratford Canning, in Istanbul, it seemed that Britain 
believed the Ottoman government would prefer the British carrot and the 
Russian stick policy rather than a change of policy for the defence of 
Ottoman integrity. However, as events would later demonstrate, it was to 
be a daring and complex carrot and stick policy.  
 
As to Russia, she had succeeded in removing the Austrian and 
Prussian obstacles that stood in the way of her achieving her goals in the 
context of the settlement of the Greek issue and in pulling Britain to its 
side.146 To what extent Russia could use that advantageous position to 
realise all her goals in the Near East would depend on the attitude of the 
Ottoman Empire towards the British efforts to strike a deal between the 
Porte and the Greeks. The first signals indicated that it was Russia not 
Britain that would benefit most from the new situation under the Anglo-
Russian accord. In this regard, the new Tsar, Nicolas II, had taken the 
first step even before the signing of the Protocol by delivering an 
ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire about the fulfilment of the Treaty of 
Bucharest.147 
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b. Russian Ultimatum and the Ackermann Convention 
The ultimatum contained the following points: (1) The return of the 
Principalities to pre-1822 Greek revolt conditions; (2) the observation of 
the administrative concessions with regard to Serbia; and finally (3) the 
dispatch of a fully authorised delegation to the Russian city of Ackermann 
on the Black Sea coast to negotiate the remaining disputes in the 
implementation of the Bucharest Treaty. If this were not done within six 
weeks, war would ensue. There was no mention of the Greek issue in the 
ultimatum.  
 
The last thing that the Ottoman Empire could afford was a war with 
Russia, since she had just disbanded the Janissary army (1826) and was 
in the middle of organising a new military force.148 Consequently, she 
accepted the terms and sent her delegation to Ackermann, and the 
negotiations were concluded with the signature of the Ackermann 
Convention on 7 October, 1826. The Ottoman Empire had no choice other 
than to accept all the Russian conditions,149 and Russia, thus, managed 
to make the Porte concede to all the points that she could not do in the 
hastily concluded Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 just a month before 
Napoleon advanced upon Russia. 
 
The Ottoman Empire agreed to the following points: The rulers of 
the Principalities would be selected by the respective local assemblies for 
seven years with the joint assent of the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and 
could not be dismissed unilaterally by the Ottoman Empire; the autonomy 
of Serbia would be reinstated and the Ottoman army would have no troops 
stationed in Serbia aside from in three designated castles; and finally, 
Russian traders would be allowed to trade freely in all Ottoman seas and 
ports, and would be allowed to sail unhindered in the Straits and Black 
Sea. 
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With the arrangements of the Ackermann Convention the already 
weak links between the Principalities and Serbia and the Ottoman Empire 
were further weakened. On the other side, Russia further consolidated her 
position over the Principalities and Serbia, thus changing the balance of 
power in the Balkans and in the 1815 European States System. As a 
consequence, by the end of 1826 Russia had become unquestionably the 
leading state in the Near East; had secured the support of Britain in the 
Greek issue; and had succeeded in having all her bilateral demands 
accepted by the Ottoman Empire. 
 
As for the Protocol, the British policy of mediation backed by the 
threat of the Russian stick did not work. The Ottoman Empire 
categorically rejected the proposals of the 4 April Protocol for the 
pacification of Greece when the protocol was officially delivered in April 
1827, on the grounds that it was a domestic matter in which nobody had 
the right to intervene.150 The Empire did not budge an inch from the 
position that had been put to the British ambassador in 1824. I will take it 
here because it was a good example of the complaints of a state of the 
second order in the 1815 European States System against the self-
proclaimed right of governance of international politics by the great 
powers: ‘it [the pressure of the great powers] is not to be endured … that the 
Christian Powers of Europe should, without any right but which their collective 
strength gives them, prepare and proclaim to the world a scheme for the 
dismemberment of an [Ottoman] empire which has uniformly endeavoured to be 
at peace with them and to avoid giving the smallest cause of offence. In what 
treaty is it specified that the Sovereigns of Europe are to assemble, and quietly to 
carve out the Turkish dominions at their pleasure, because the Christian 
subjects of his highness choose to rebel against him’.151 In fact, the Ottoman 
Empire was facing the dilemma of being a multi-national empire in an age 
of nationalism in the context of the Greek issue, as explained by Pertev 
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Effendi Reis-ul Kuttab (Foreign Minister): ‘If the secession of the Greeks were 
agreed without war, it [the event of secession] would establish an example for 
other nationalities. Therefore, if we choose to agree to its cessation after we have 
used all available means to stop it, then our enemies would not be in a position 
to easily come up with such demands in the future in the case of similar 
events’.152 
 
Austria and Prussia rejected the invitation to sign the 4 April 
Protocol,153 while France reacted positively, seeing an opportunity to break 
the isolation imposed upon her during the 1815 Settlements. Moreover, 
she saw in the protocol a potentially open the path for future Anglo-
French or Russo-French alliances.154 However, France requested that the 
Protocol be turned into a treaty;155 and as the resistance of the Porte 
necessitated the coercive arrangements of the Protocol being put into 
effect, the allies decided to do just that, signing the Treaty of London on 7 
July, 1827. 
 
c. London Treaty and the Annihilation of the Ottoman 
Fleet in Navarino  
By signing the Treaty of London,156 which was drawn up based on 
the April 4 Protocol, Great Britain, Russia and France pledged to engage in 
combined efforts to bring armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Greeks and to establish an autonomous Greece under the suzerainty of 
the Ottoman Empire. The signatories also agreed not to seek any 
territorial extensions, exclusive influence or commercial advantage. Up to 
this point, the essence of the Treaty had been the same as that of the 4 
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April Protocol, however the most significant arrangements were in its 
secret articles: ‘If, within a month, the Porte does not accept the armistice 
or if the Greeks refuse to execute it’ the signatory states would exert all 
means necessary to obtain the immediate effects of the armistice ‘without, 
however, taking any part in the hostilities between them’.157 The second 
secret arrangement was related to the establishment of consular and 
commercial relations between the signatory states and the provisional 
Greek government.158  
 
By signing the Treaty of London, Russia accepted not to act on her 
own, which would have been possible under the terms of the Protocol. 
Through coercive means, the allies considered the sea blockade of the 
Ottoman and Egyptian supplies and reinforcements from Egypt and the 
Ottoman mainland ports to Mora. As long as the British navy constituted 
the main bulk of maritime force, the political and military control of events 
in the region would seemingly have been in the hands of the British.159   
 
The Ottoman government officially received the London Treaty on 16 
August.160 However, the government declared that she would not allow 
any interference between her and her subjects in the Greek issue.161 
Consequently, the allies, Britain, Russia and France, sent a joint naval 
force to the East Mediterranean at the beginning of September to block 
Ottoman supplies, deciding that the joint navy should operate under the 
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instruction of their embassies in Istanbul. To this end, the three 
ambassadors in Istanbul agreed to instruct the navies to apply blockade 
measures against the belligerents in Mora, namely, to the Ottoman forces 
under Ibrahim and the Greek rebel forces.162 
 
Meantime, Metternich took the initiative when the Ottoman 
government had accepted his advice to find a middle way acceptable to 
both sides, but his initiative remained unfinished because of the 
destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Navarino Bay.163 The Navarino event 
happened as follows. Upon the arrival of the allied navy in Navarino Bay, 
where the Ottoman and Egyptian navies were anchored, Admiral 
Codrington, the commander of the British navy, convinced Ibrahim to 
suspend hostilities.164 Both sides agreed to wait until Ibrahim received 
instruction from Istanbul. 165 However a dispute among the crews of the 
opposing navies led to the total annihilation of the Ottoman-Egyptian navy 
by the allied forces on 20 November, 1827.166  
 
The destruction of the Ottoman fleet took everybody by surprise; 
and who instigated the opening of hostilities would be a subject of debate 
among statesmen and scholars for a long time.167 Some pointed at 
individual mistakes, and Stratford Canning argued in his memoirs that it 
was ‘the fiery and enterprising spirit’ of Codrington that had been the 
main reason.168 In this regard, he confessed that if he had received the 
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slightest intimation of the admiral’s attitude, he would have avoided use of 
the term ‘cannon-shot’ in his instructions.169 Schroeder had an opposing 
view, laying the blame to a great extent on the political decision makers in 
London and their failure to define the political objectives and give clear-
cut instructions.170 Metternich commented that ‘the [Navarino] event of 
October 20 begins a new era for Europe’ and ‘the Ottoman empire ceased 
for the moment to belong itself.’171  
 
Understandably, the reaction of the Ottoman Empire was severe, 
demanding both an apology and reparation from the allies responsible for 
the attack on the navy of a state that was at peace with them.172 The allies 
refused to accept responsibility for the attack, claiming that it was the 
Ottoman navy that had initiated the hostilities.173 In the meantime, the 
Ottoman government tried to drive a wedge between Britain and her allies, 
relying on the deep distrust between Britain and Russia, and offering to 
Britain a new and close alliance if she pulled out of the London Treaty.174 
In this context, the Porte proposed that the Greeks should have a mild 
governor appointed by the Sultan and that their grievances be remedied; 
but they must first submit, and the powers must abandon the Treaty.175 
This proposal was rejected by the allies’ ambassadors because it was ‘too 
shadowy to promise the slightest advantage’.176 Upon the categorical 
refusal of the Porte to enter into negotiation with the Allies on the base of 
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the Treaty of London, the ambassadors of the allies made a collective 
decision to leave Istanbul.177  
 
With the departure of the British, Russian and French 
ambassadors, Ottoman-Russian relations entered a new phase. Until that 
time, their relations had revolved around the Greek revolt and Russia’s 
part in the alliance of the three powers; however in the aftermath of the 
Navarino Bay event the key point of focus became strictly Ottoman-
Russian relations. 
  
5. Declaration of War between the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
Despite of the indifferent attitude of the Ottoman Empire to the 
allies regarding the Navarino event, the Ottoman ruling elite always 
considered Russia to be the main protagonist of the hostilities and 
thought, quite wrongly, that the Russian demands had been met by the 
Ackermann Convention and that a likely Ottoman-Russian war had been 
avoided.178 It was this belief that led them to agree to the Russian 
ultimatum and the unfair arrangements of the Ackermann Convention. 
 
Greece was a lost cause for the Ottoman Empire, as now the most 
pressing problem was whether to continue to adhere to her policy 
regarding the Greeks or to give in to the demands of the allies. She chose 
the first alternative, as she believed that submission on the Greek issue 
would be conceived as acceptance of Russia’s revisionist policies and 
would set an example among the other Orthodox subjects, who 
constituted the bulk of her non-Muslim population. Worse still, if the 
Greeks in Mora were given autonomy, there was no guarantee that the 
Greeks in Asia Minor and the Balkans, which were also home to a large 
Muslim population, would not demand the same rights.  
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To that end, Sultan Mahmud, summoned the Council of War to 
decide on a course of action. Public unrest was already at a peak as a 
result of the abolition of the Janissary army and the introduction of new 
reforms, and the situation was exacerbated by the destruction of the 
Ottoman navy and their failure to suppress the Greek revolt. Any 
concessions in the Greek issue after the eight-year struggle and the 
exhaustion of the Empire’s resources after the acceptance of the 
Ackermann Convention could invoke widespread civil unrest.179 The 
Ottoman Empire, it seemed, had no other choice but to go to war. In the 
Imperial rescript of 18 December, the Sultan announced the abrogation of 
the Ackerman Treaty and the closing of the Straits to all foreign ships, and 
issued a call to arms to all Muslims to resist the Russians and Greeks.180  
 
Among the allies, Britain was the only state that was indecisive on 
which path to follow. Canning had died in August 1827, just before the 
Battle of Navarino, and the King had ‘deeply lamented’ the destruction of 
the Ottoman Navy, describing it as an ‘untoward event’. Wellington, who 
replaced Canning, asserted that the Ottoman Empire was an ancient ally 
of Britain and that the changes in Eastern Europe ‘rendered its existence 
as an independent and powerful state, necessary for the well-being of this 
country’.181 On the other hand, Britain was paralysed between the two 
revisionist states of Russia and France without the effective alliance and 
support of Austria which had been isolated by the Treaty of London.182  
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Under these circumstances, Wellington decided that the only 
effective way of reining in Russia was to limit its war objectives, rather 
than confronting her under the prevailing situation. 
 
As for France, she was also wavering between Russia and Britain; 
and suggested that in order to prevent the war there should be a 
European sanction against the Russian occupation of the Principalities 
and a British-French occupation of Mora;183 however both Britain and 
Austria opposed the proposal. Austria’s objection was based on the belief 
that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia would amount to a 
strategic threat to her own sovereignty.184 This was an indication that it 
would be France rather than Britain that would be the leading power 
during the Ottoman-Russian War in the pacification of Mora.  
 
In contrast to Britain and France, Russia knew what she would do 
and she was much firmer than Britain in her actions as Metternich had 
predicted after the signing of the Treaty of London in 1827.185 The 
international situation seemed very convenient for Russia, being 
reminiscent of the conditions before the 1768–1774 Ottoman-Russian 
War. Britain was caught up between her London Treaty commitments and 
her interest in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, while Austria was 
isolated and disabled. Moreover, the revival of France’s revisionist 
intention regarding Greek affairs was putting further constraints on 
Austria and Prussia.186 The Ottoman Empire was violating her treaty 
obligations in regard to Russia, and so Russia requested support from its 
allies in taking coercive steps against the Ottoman Empire on 26 
February, citing the violation of the Ackerman Convention. ‘If support was 
denied, it would absolve itself from the treaty restrictions and would act 
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according to its own interests’.187 Later, fearing the reaction of Britain and 
a hostile coalition of the great powers, Russia quickly withdrew its 
demand for support, and declared war on the Ottoman Empire at the end 
of April 1828.  
 
6. Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–1829 and the Treaty of 
Adrianople 
The Ottoman-Russian War was the first to involve a great power 
since the 1815 Settlements, and so it was certain that it would bring some 
significant structural changes to the 1815 European States System. What 
was important from the angle of the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements 
was whether or not these significant structural changes would have 
transformational implications for the 1815 European States System. 
  
Being aware of the significance of the impacts of her war against the 
Ottoman Empire on the 1815 Settlements and the maintenance of the 
status quo in the west, Russia stated that her intention was not to 
overthrow the Ottoman Empire and that she ‘was far from indulging in 
sentiments of hatred against the Ottoman Power’, listing her objectives as: 
the observance and efficacy of bilateral treaties; the security of the liberty 
of commercial navigation in the Straits and the Black Sea; the acceptance 
of the London Treaty with regard to the Greek issue; and finally, the 
payment of indemnity to Russia by the Ottoman Empire.188 She attempted 
to assuage the fears of her allies concerning the Greek issue, declaring 
that they ‘will find her [Russia] always ready to act in concert with them in 
the execution of the Treaty of London … and to make any changes in their 
[the articles of the London Treaty] nature and effects,’ and it was not 
Russia’s intention to seek any territorial gain or additional privileges. That 
said, she was very careful to avoid mention of the rights of the Balkan 
Orthodox Christians, which would have caused alarm in Austria and 
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Britain. This, however, did not mean that she gave up her claims as the 
protector of the Orthodox Christians, as her inner communications quite 
clearly demonstrated.189 
 
Russia’s declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire put her in a 
very awkward position with her allies in regards to the settlement of the 
Greek issue, as she had been one of the signatories of the London Treaty 
that pledged neutrality in the issue of the belligerents, that is, the 
Ottoman Empire and the Greeks, in Mora. With the declaration of war, 
Russia abandoned her neutral position, which would potentially endanger 
the application of coercive measures for the settlement of the Greek 
problem. Britain and France were against any war with the Ottoman 
Empire over the Greek issue, but if they left the problem unresolved the 
settlement of the problem would have been left in the hands of Russia, 
which was already at war with the Ottoman Empire. This would lead to 
the establishment of a Russian satellite state, which the allies had been 
trying very hard to resist since 1821.  
 
The problem was settled with the signing of the 15 July Protocol by 
the allies, under which ‘Russia agreed to relinquish her belligerent 
character in the Mediterranean, there acting as a neutral along with 
Britain and France and continuing her hostility towards the Ottoman 
Empire at all other points’.190 In this way the relationship founded by the 
Treaty of London between the three allies regarding the Greek issue was 
maintained. This suited Britain as well, in that the upholding of the 
London Treaty would provide a restraining hand over Russia.191  
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Another protocol, signed on July 19, between the three allies, 
authorised France to land troops on Mora on behalf of Britain and Russia 
to execute the stipulations of the London Treaty.192 A joint memo informed 
the Ottoman Empire that ‘the landing of allied forces on the Greek 
peninsula is not operated in hostile views towards him’.193 According to 
the 19 July protocol the French troops would leave Mora as soon as the 
Egyptian forces evacuated. In the meantime, an agreement was made 
between Codrington, the commander of the British Navy, and Mehmed Ali, 
the Governor of Egypt, on 9 August regarding the evacuation of Egyptian 
forces from Mora, who would be escorted to Alexandria by British and 
French ships.194  
 
After the signing of the protocols, Russia was given a free hand in 
her war against the Ottoman Empire, without fear of obstruction from her 
allies. The war took place on two fronts, the Balkans and the Caucasus. 
The Ottoman Empire had been in the progress of putting together a new 
army after the Janissary Army had been disbanded in 1826, while a 
significant part of its navy had been destroyed at Navarino. What made 
the Ottoman’s plight worse was that some local notables and a significant 
proportion of Ottoman subjects were reluctant to contribute to the army in 
reaction to the disbanding of the Janissaries and the introduction of new 
reforms.195 As a result, Sultan Mahmud had to maintain a considerable 
military presence also in the capital.196  
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The Russian army was also not without its problems, although it 
was in a much better state than its opponent.197 The war lasted almost 
two years, from 1828 to 1829, and was not the swift Russian victory that 
was widely expected. 
 
There was stalemate on the Balkan front in the campaign of 1828, 
despite some slight advances of the Russians in the east;198 however, the 
situation changed drastically towards to the end of the 1829 campaign, 
both in the Balkans and on the eastern front. A small part of the Russian 
army ended up in Edirne after passing the Balkan Mountains, which was 
the second capital city of the Ottoman Empire and was only 100 miles 
away from Istanbul.  
 
This sweeping victory in the Balkans left some weaknesses that 
could have spelt disaster for the Russians. Diebitch, the commander-in-
chief of the Russian armies, with an army of 20,000199 in Adrianople ‘was 
still facing the reserve army 30,000 strong in Constantinople [Istanbul], 
whereas portions of Bulgaria were still occupied by a force of 30,000 
Albanians and the fortresses on the Danube … were still in Turkish 
hands’.200 To the east, Russia made some considerable advances, reaching 
as far as Erzurum, which became a bridgehead for further advances into 
the Basra Gulf along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. 
 
The Sultan, after a two-year war against a great power without any 
ally following an exhaustive decade-long war against the rebels on Mora, 
did not want to push his luck any further. He asked for an armistice via 
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the Prussian King, and Russia accepted201. Russia did not want to raise 
concerns among the other great powers at that time, and was also 
reluctant to risk operating her army so far from its supply centres and 
being squeezed between the Ottoman troops in Bulgaria and Istanbul. 
 
 The Treaty of Adrianople following the armistice was concluded 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1829,202 and included the 
following agreements: 
 
 Russia was to keep the small islands in the Western Black Sea, 
which were strategically useful for the control of the Danube River 
delta. The rest of the captured territories were to be returned to the 
Ottoman Empire. The Pruth River would again form the border 
between two states in the west; while in the east a small strip of the 
Black Sea coast, and the towns of Poti, Anapa and Ahiska were to be 
kept by Russia. In this way, Russia cut off the Ottoman connections 
with the rebellious Muslim Circassians to Russians in the Caucasus.   
 Ottoman military fortifications would be demolished in the 
Principalities, and no Ottoman troops would be stationed there. The 
rulers of the Principalities were from then on to be selected according 
to the previous agreements, but now for a lifetime. 
 The Ottoman Empire was to recognise the Treaty of London, thus 
accepting the agreements of the great powers under the Concert of 
Europe regarding the settlement of the Greek issue, which was to 
end with the establishment of an independent Greek state. Both 
states reconfirmed the administrative concessions given previously to 
the Principality of Serbia. 
 The free passage of Russian ships in the Black Sea, the Straits and 
all Ottoman ports in the Levant was secured. The Porte pledged not 
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to interfere with Russian trade in those places and to protect 
Russian traders against any violence. 
 Finally, the Ottoman Empire had to pay a war indemnity to Russia. 
 
 As can be seen, Russia made only moderate territorial gains under 
the Treaty of Adrianople, meaning that the territorial balance within the 
1815 European States System was not disrupted. However, when it came 
to the political equilibrium, her influence rose tremendously over the 
Ottoman Empire,203 who committed to providing ‘prompt and full 
satisfaction’ to the Russian representative in the event of infractions of 
any of the Russian treaty rights. More importantly, Russia was recognised 
as having the right ‘in advance … to consider such an infraction as a 
hostile act; and to launch immediate reprisals against the Ottoman 
Empire’.204 Given the self-proclaimed rights of Russia regarding the 
guardianship of the Orthodox Christians and her treaty rights relating to 
the administration of the Principalities and Serbia, the scope and nature 
of Russia’s upper hand in the Ottoman-Russian relations can be easily 
conceived. The breadth of Russia’s gains from the Treaty can be even 
better understood from the fact that the majority of the Ottoman 
population in the Balkans were Orthodox or Slavs, including the 
Bulgarians, Serbians, Montenegrins, etc. With the new arrangements of 
the Treaty of Adrianople, the loose suzerain power of the Ottoman Empire 
over the Principalities and Serbia was further weakened so that they 
became virtual extensions of Russia in the Balkans.   
  
With the signing of the Treaty of Edirne, the Greek problem of the 
great powers was settled. The triple alliance agreed that Greece would be a 
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monarchy, and that the new monarch would not be from any of the 
dynasties of Britain, France of Russia so as to ensure its impartiality. 
However, this impartiality would not work, since the external dimension, 
from its inception to its independence phases, was a decisive element in 
the birth of the new state, as later events would manifest in the coming 
years. 
 
Conclusion 
As argued in the previous chapter, the capability structure of the 
1815 European States System, which was based on the distribution of 
economic and military capabilities, remained unchanged in the 1815–
1856 period. Therefore, for a structural analysis of the Ottoman-Russian 
relations from 1820–1830, which revolved around the Greek insurgency, 
one has to take into account the interplay of elements within the 
Relationship Structure, being the ordering principle, the modal tendencies 
of the great powers, and the outcomes, such as the functional differences 
and the types of structural changes.205 
 
These processes require a viable structure if they are to succeed, 
and the effects of the structure in a given international states system can 
be understood through an analysis of the processes taking place among 
its unit states.206 Consequently, processes can be said to be closely linked 
with the modal tendencies of the states in their foreign policies.  
 
On the basis of this methodological framework, an analysis has 
been made of these processes to determine the workings and effects of the 
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structure of the 1815 European States System on Ottoman-Russian 
relations and on the other great powers regarding the Greek issue between 
1821 and 1830. 
 
It is argued that Russia faced a dilemma when attempting to secure 
her south-western frontier through the obtaining of concessions in the 
Straits, while at the same time preserving the status quo in the West after 
1815. Therefore, Russia pursued a two-tracked policy in her relations with 
the Ottoman Empire, being the partitioning of the Balkan territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, and supporting the Orthodox and/or Slavic nations 
under the Ottoman Empire ‘to destabilise the frontier and facilitate the 
Russian advance’.207 Her rights under the bilateral treaties of Kucuk 
Kaynarca (1774), Yassy (1792) and Bucharest (1812) facilitated her efforts 
in regards to the Orthodox nations of the Ottoman Empire, and allowed 
her to exercise influence on the Principalities and Serbia. However Russia 
also tried to extend her influence over all the remaining Orthodox subjects 
of the Empire, including those living outside the Principalities and Serbia, 
by citing Articles 7 and 17 of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, assigning her 
as the protector of the Orthodox faith in the Ottoman Empire. This policy 
brought 65 percent of the total population of the Ottoman Empire in her 
Balkan territories under the control of Russia.208  
 
The Greek revolt in 1821 provided Russia with the first opportunity 
to test her arguments regarding her protector status of the Ottoman 
Orthodoxies and realise her strategic goals in the Near East under the 
1815 European States System. The Greek subjects, who were Orthodox 
but not Slavs, were very influential both in the official circles and the 
economy of the southern part of Russia, which was an important factor in 
Russia’s interest in the Greek revolt. 
                                                 
207
 Donne (1997), op. cit, p.120  
 
208
 For a breakdown of the Ottoman Population in her Balkan Territories in the 1820s, see Engin Akarli’s 
‘Ottoman Population in the 19th Century, its Territorial, Racial and religious Composition’, Unpublished 
Master Thesis, Wisconsin University, Madison, 1970, cited by  Karpat (2010) op. cit p. 177  
  
  
160 
 
It is hereby suggested that Ottoman-Russian relations should be 
analysed in two distinct stages, respectively 1821–1826 and 1826–1830, 
in terms of the operation and effects of the structure of the 1815 
European States System. In both stages, the founding/governing 
principles constrained Russia, compelling her to remain moderate in the 
1815 European States System throughout the whole Greek affair. Put 
differently, Russia did not openly challenge the founding principles of the 
1815 European States System so as to remain within the limits of the 
principles of the Concert of Europe.   
 
The first stage of the Greek revolt in 1821–1826 overlapped with 
changes in the decision-making procedures of the Concert of Europe. The 
era of the Congress System, which was marked by regular congresses and 
conferences to deal with the revolutionary movements in various locations, 
ended in 1823; a noteworthy consequence of which was a drop in 
Austria’s leading role in the decision-making bodies in the Concert of 
Europe. However, the effectiveness and lead role of Austria still prevailed 
during the first stages of the Greek revolt.  
  
In the first stage of the Greek revolt, an Anglo-Austrian accord led 
the great powers to convince Russia not to act on her own, but to remain 
within the limits of the concerted European policy with regard to the 
Greek issue. Since Russia was not challenging the founding principles of 
the 1815 European States System it became possible for her to address 
her demands and concerns over both her treaty rights and the Greek 
issue. In this context, the great powers under the leadership of Austria 
compelled Russia to separate her treaty rights from the common European 
right so as to maintain the peace and order that had been disrupted by 
the Greek Rebellion. This meant that Russia had the right to ask for the 
implementation of her treaty rights, and to this end, also to apply coercive 
measures, including war, if the Ottoman Empire failed to comply with her 
treaty obligations. However, intervention in the Greek issue in the name of 
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maintaining general peace and order in Europe was outside of her treaty 
rights, and therefore necessitated a collective response, while also 
pressing the Ottoman Empire to address the Russian grievances about her 
treaty rights. 
 
 This was the essence of the approach of the great powers when 
Russia asked for their endorsement for her unilateral intervention, which 
lasted until 1826. When the great powers, including Russia, convened in 
Verona, they agreed that the revolutionary movements in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and the Ottoman Empire were the main threat to peace and order 
in Europe, and that they had to be dealt with through concerted action by 
the great powers. Austria and France had been allowed to eliminate the 
revolutions in Naples, Sicily and Spain on behalf of the Concert of Europe, 
the same permission was not given Russia. The reason for such a 
discriminatory approach was that the interventions of Austria in Italy and 
France in Spain would not have resulted in a structural change with 
transformational implications for the 1815 European States System. 
Additionally, the Russia desire seemed to be intervention for the sake of 
the revolutionaries rather than to restore the order of the dynastic regime, 
which was a result of her affiliation with the Greek cause.  
 
While Russia was prevented from taking unilateral action, she 
succeeded in getting her treaty rights accepted by the other great powers. 
Consequently, Russia was acting alone when she issued an ultimatum to 
the Ottoman Empire to stop violating her treaty rights and sent a 
delegation to Ackermann to ensure the implementation of the disputed 
articles of the previous treaties. In this way, the Ackermann Treaty (1825) 
brought to Russia exactly what she sought in terms of her treaty rights.   
 
In the second stage, 1826–1830, the Greek issue was marked by 
changes in the operation of the Concert of Europe, with a breakdown of 
the Austrian-British accord and the establishment of an Anglo-Russian 
alliance. Despite this shift, the principle of the maintenance of political 
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and territorial equilibrium in the Concert of Europe prevailed. This shift in 
the decision-making procedure of the Concert of Europe was in fact a 
structural change without transformational implications, since it did not 
question the founding principles of the 1815 European States System. The 
change also meant the end of the effectiveness of Austria, which was a 
staunch defender of the status quo not only in Central Europe, but also in 
the Near East within the operation of the Concert of Europe. 
 
Another noteworthy characteristic of this second stage was its 
accommodation of the possibility of coercive measures against the 
belligerents, unlike in the first stage. In technical terms, the peace-making 
function of the Concert of Europe was going to replace the peace-keeping 
function of the first stage. To this end, the great powers, with the 
exception of Austria and Prussia, formulated coercive measures through 
the Petersburg Protocol (1826) and the Treaty of London (1827) under the 
auspices of the Concert of Europe. However, the subsequent refusal of the 
allies’ proposal regarding the settlement of the Greek issue by the 
Ottoman Empire; the death of the British Premier who had been the 
architect of the Anglo-Russian accord; the controversial annihilation of the 
Ottoman Navy at Navarino; the hesitations in France and Britain in 
deciding upon the next step after Navarino; and finally, the strong reaction 
of the Ottoman government all led to the outbreak of the Ottoman-
Russian War in 1828.  
 
The war lasted two years and ended with the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire; and the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople (1829) paved the way for 
the establishment of an independent Greece and the ascendancy of Russia 
in the Near East.  
 
All the efforts by the great powers under the Concert of Europe had 
aimed at preventing an Ottoman-Russian war so as not to allow the 
disruption of the equilibrium in the 1815 European States System. To that 
end, they limited the war objectives of Russia, and Russia’s subsequent 
  
163 
territorial gains were very modest, despite her tremendous human and 
material losses. Moreover, the great powers ensured that the sovereign of 
the independent Greece should not be appointed from the members of the 
royal families of Britain, Russia or France so as to avoid any outside 
influence on the new state. Moreover, it was the Concert of Europe that 
was going to be the guarantor of Greece’s independence rather than 
Russia; meaning that the new Greek state, which owed its independence 
to Russia’s two-year war against the Ottoman Empire and its tremendous 
human and economic costs, would not be a satellite state of Russia in the 
Mediterranean. 
 
Despite all the limitations imposed on Russia, she did manage to 
gain ascendancy in her bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire, 
which did not bode well for the smooth operation of the 1815 European 
States System. Russia had managed to consolidate her position for the 
realisation of her long-term strategic objectives in the Near East having 
retained the controversial right of protection over the Ottoman Orthodox 
population, and more importantly, she had demonstrated that she was 
prepared to go to war to maintain her guardianship of the Orthodox 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was a very significant development 
both for the Ottoman Empire and for the political equilibrium of the 1815 
European States System, as 65 percent of her subjects in the Balkans 
were Orthodox Christians. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire’s power over the 
rulers of the Principalities and Serbia was substantially diminished and 
the Tsar and his representatives became the de facto sovereigns in those 
places.  
 
All of these changes were the significant steps on the way for a 
structural change with transformational implications for the 1815 
European States System. Russia’s new-found influence over the Ottoman 
Empire was to the detriment of all the other great powers. As will be 
explained in the next chapter, this advantage would compel her to adjust 
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her policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire for some time to come while 
keeping her strategic goal unchanged.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FROM WEAKNESS TO DEPENDENCY OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE ON 
RUSSIA: REBELLION OF MEHMED ALİ, THE 1833 TREATY OF 
HUNKAR ISKELESI 
 
Introduction 
It was not the rights of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire, nor the disputes arising from the implementation of the bilateral 
treaties that shaped Ottoman-Russian relations in 1831–1841, but the 
rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt, Mehmed Ali.  
 
The rebellious state of affairs that focused around Mehmed Ali would 
last almost 10 years, with a temporary settlement in 1833 and a final 
settlement in 1840. During that period, his Egyptian armies won several 
victories against the imperial armies of the Ottoman Empire and twice, in 
1833 and 1839, came close to occupying Istanbul and bringing down the 
Ottoman government.  
 
On both occasions, Mehmed Ali was stopped by the diplomacy and 
military might of the great powers. The intervention of the great powers 
came as no surprise, since the structural implications of the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire would be too great to bear for the maintenance of the 
1815 Settlements.1 To this end, it was Russia that came to the rescue of 
the Ottoman government when Mehmed Ali threatened the capital city in 
1833, and would continue to play a determining role in the final 
settlement of the issue in 1840 in line with her new policy to keep a weak 
Ottoman Empire.    
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It was argued in the third chapter that the influence of Russia over 
the Ottoman Empire witnessed a steep escalation after the 1828–1829 war 
and the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople. For this reason, Russia followed 
policies that would keep the Ottoman Empire weak since that would suit 
her interests under the power parameters of the 1815 European States 
System.  
 
Mehmed Ali led two rebellions, the first in 1831, which he initiated; 
and the second, which started as a consequence of the Ottoman military 
operation in 1839 to bring him under control. The first rebellion ended 
with a temporary settlement in 1833; however the international 
consequences of the first rebellion were unprecedented in the 1815 
European States System. When a plea for help from Sultan Mahmud was 
declined by Britain he had to seek the help of Russia, which dispatched 
troops and warships to Istanbul to protect the Ottoman capital from the 
possible advances of the rebellious Egyptian army. After the temporary 
settlement of the rebellion, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed a 
bilateral defence treaty, known as the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833. 
 
The Ottoman Empire virtually became the protectorate of Russia 
with the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi.2 This was to be the peak of Russia’s 
predominance over the Ottoman Empire, and the ensuing situation was 
tantamount to a complete reversal of the balance of power in the Near 
East for the 1815 European States System when the Treaty was 
interpreted in its strictest terms. Obviously, this situation was a cause for 
alarm for the other great powers and led them to take some extraordinary 
measures in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
 
However, Russia chose not to strictly interpret the articles of the 
Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi when a similar situation arose in 1839, choosing 
rather not to act unilaterally, but rather in concert, thus giving up the 
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bilateral rights granted to her in the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi and 
consenting to the Convention of the Straits in 1841. 
 
From the Ottoman Empire perspective, the signing of the Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi indicated that the Ottoman Empire was not going to 
absolutely rely on the support of the western great powers, specifically 
that of England and France, in her relations with Russia. This adjustment 
of the policy was the consequence of the policies of both great powers in 
the Greek rebellions before and after Mehmed Ali’s rebellion in 1833.   
 
This chapter will present an analysis of the interactions and 
processes that took place between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and 
also among the great powers, in the context of the rebellion of Mehmed Ali, 
with the conclusions based upon the relationship structure of the 1815 
European States System. To recall, the capability structure of the 1815 
European States System had remained virtually unchanged between 1815 
and 1854, and the effects of the structure in that period could only be 
perceived in the processes taking place among the unit states. This 
necessarily takes the elements of the Relationship Structure to the very 
centre of the analysis.  
 
Using this methodological approach, how Russia’s dominance 
happened in 1833 and the subsequent reactions of the great powers will 
be explained; and why and how Russia stepped back from its ascendancy 
over the Ottoman Empire, bringing the Ottoman-Russian relationship 
back in its pre-1833 level. 
 
The following sections will analyse why and how the two rebellions 
erupted and how they became internationalised. To that end, firstly the 
domestic situation will be examined to establish the root causes of the 
rebellions, followed by Mehmed Ali’s reforms in Egypt and how they were 
received in the Ottoman Empire.  
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This will be followed by an analysis of the international situation, 
including the change in policy in Russia after the Treaty of Adrianople and 
the recommendations of the Kochubey Committee over the handling of 
Ottoman-Russian relations. The international developments, that is, the 
1830 revolution in France and its impacts on the Russian-French 
relations, will then be addressed, along with the initiatives of the new 
monarchy of France in Egypt and their use of Mehmed Ali as leverage in 
raising France’s status in the Levant.  
 
1. International Situation and the Ottoman Empire by 1830 
 
The great powers, after the end of the Ottoman-Russian war in 1829, 
were preoccupied with the establishment of the Greek state, for which 
choosing the new dynasty and defining the borders were the key items on 
the agenda. The new independent Greece was eventually placed under the 
rule of a member of the Bavarian dynasty, and its borders were drawn 
between the gulfs of Volos and Arta in 1832.3 In this way the neutrality of 
the new state was secured. The influence of Russia over Greece as a 
powerful kin Orthodox state was blocked given that she was not adjacent 
to Greece and was not a maritime power in the Mediterranean, thus 
ensuring the equilibrium of the 1815 European States System. 
 
Further disruptions to the international order at the time came in the 
form of revolutions in France (1830), Poland (1830) and Belgium (1833)4 
and, most notably, the uprising in France led to a change of dynasty, with 
the Bourbon dynasty being replaced by the Orleans dynasty. All of these 
revolutions played a part in the revival of the Holy Alliance in 1834, which 
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had been damaged by the Anglo-Russian accord over the Greek issue in 
1826.5  
 
Within the scope of this thesis, the most remarkable developments in 
30’s and 40’s of the 19th Century were the changes in policies of Britain 
and Russia concerning the Near East.  
 
The 1829 Treaty of Adrianople between Ottoman Empire and Russia 
was a breaking point for Britain to reverse her conciliatory policy which 
had been forged during the alliance against Napoleon. However, it took 
some time for this policy to take effect. The signing of the Treaty of Hunkar 
Iskelesi became the starting point of this new assertive policy against 
Russia and conciliatory policy toward France.6 
 
The second remarkable development for the Ottoman-Russian relations 
in this era was the shift in Russian policy regarding the Ottoman Empire. 
The implications of that shift for Ottoman-Russian relations between 1830 
and 1841 were more significant than any other issue. 
a. New Policy of Russia after the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople 
Before the signing the Treaty of Adrianople, the Tsar set a 
Committee lead by Kochubey ‘to deliberate on the political complications 
which the events of the present war [the 1828–1829 war] might bring 
about in the Ottoman Empire and of which the result might be its collapse 
in Europe’.7 The Committee, after much discussion, came up with three 
likely scenarios with regard to the future of the Ottoman Empire and its 
consequences for Russia.  
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These scenarios were: (1) acquisition, or (2) partitioning of the 
Ottoman Empire among the great powers, or (3) division of her territories 
into independent states.  
 
The Committee noted that acquisition would cause a general war 
among the great powers; while both partition and division were not 
without their own difficulties. Firstly, both would entail the expulsion of 
the Muslim population into Asia Minor, which would lead to a Turkish 
revival and put Russia’s possessions in the Caucasus and Trans-
Caucasus territories at risk. Secondly, neither alternative would preclude 
the involvement of the other great powers. ‘Thanks to their geographic 
positions; [the other great powers] could make more advantageous 
acquisitions at the expense of the Porte than could Russia. Austria could 
acquire Serbia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Albania, and likewise subjugate 
Montenegro; while Britain and France could seize the islands of Greece, 
Candia and Egypt. Under such circumstances the Russian flag would be 
called on to face dangerous enemies in southern Europe instead of 
indifferent Turks’.8  
 
The Committee concluded that the Russian policy had to be ‘not at 
all new acquisition, nor the expansion of [Russia’s] frontiers, but far more 
their security and the development of Russia’s action in the midst of 
neighbouring peoples’,9 and that Russia ‘could most easily attain that 
[security and development of its actions] by prolonging the existence of the 
Ottoman Empire under certain conditions’.10 However, if the Ottoman 
Empire collapsed ‘by the force of circumstances’ without the intervention 
of Russia, the decision of the Committee was that Russia should militarily 
occupy the Straits until such time as an international congress could 
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decide upon the fate of the region in line with the true interests of 
Russia.11  
 
 The Committee did not specify what the ‘certain conditions’ were, 
but they could be understood from the Nesselrode memorandum12 
presented to the Committee for its deliberation. The said memorandum 
stated, ‘We [Russia] have always considered that the maintenance of that 
empire was more useful than detrimental to the true interests of Russia, 
that any order of things which might be substituted there would not 
balance for us the advantage of having for a neighbour a weak state, 
always menaced by the spirit of revolt which agitates its vassals, reduced 
by a successful war to submit to the law of the conqueror’.  
 
This recommendation of the Kochubey Committee was endorsed by 
Tsar Nicholas I and was forwarded to Diebetisch , the general commander 
of the Russian army in the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War, to be used 
as the basis of the peace negotiations with the Ottoman delegation in 
Adrianople. But the peace terms had been already agreed upon which 
were compatible with the essence of the Committee’s conclusions. 
However, the recommendations of the Committee, that is, the 
maintenance of a ‘weak Ottoman Empire’, and in case of its collapse, the 
occupation of the Straits region until a settlement could be found among 
the great powers, were going to form the basis of Russia’s policy between 
1829 and 1854 with regard to the Ottoman Empire.13 
 
To sum up, Russia realised that she could not decide upon the 
future of the Ottoman Empire alone under the existing structural 
imperatives of the 1815 European States System.14 She had already 
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established predominance over the Ottoman Empire, and maintaining that 
status quo would be much more beneficial to her than having to face 
challenges from the great powers. In short, she preferred the certainty of 
the present than uncertainty in the future regardless of the potential 
greater gains.  
 
b. Domestic Situation of the Ottoman Empire 
After suffering defeat in the 1828–1829 war the Ottoman ruling 
elites gave up all hope of a reversal of the Russian power against the 
Ottoman Empire.15 Until the time of the war Istanbul had been vulnerable 
only to a Russian seaborne threat over the Black Sea, but after the 1828–
1829 war Istanbul also became vulnerable to a Russian overland threat 
through the Balkans. Secondly, Russia was able to consolidate her self-
appointed role as the protector of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire, as the autonomies of the Principalities and Serbia had been so 
strengthened that their dependencies on the Sultan were reduced to the 
payment of an annual tribute. It should be noted that the great bulk of the 
people in the Empire’s remaining Balkan territories, such as Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were Orthodox and/or Slavs. This 
situation compelled the Ottoman government to re-consider her relations 
with Russia since the support of the western great powers against Russia 
was not absolute any more as the events indicated in the Greek rebellion. 
 
As explained in the previous chapters, Sultan Mahmud had launched 
very ambitious reform programs,16 the most remarkable of which was to 
centralise the administration and re-organise the army, and to this end he 
managed to bring many of the local notables in the Balkans and Asia 
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Minor under his authority.17 The Sultan was also aware of the ambitions 
and long-term plans of Mehmed Ali,18 however the Greek rebellion and the 
following Russian war allowed Mehmed Ali to survive the Sultan’s 
centralisation efforts. Surprisingly, the Sultan had to ask for Mehmed Ali’s 
assistance to suppress the Greek revolt, and in return he was offered the 
governorship of Mora, which was inconsistent with his reform programme.  
 
c. Egypt under Mehmed Ali 
Mehmed Ali, who was of Albanian origin, was born in Kavala19 in 1769 
and joined the Ottoman army there at the age of 17. His unit, in which he 
was the second in command, was sent to Egypt to fight against the 
invading French army under Napoleon in 1798. He would go on to become 
the commander of the Kavala units and would remain in Egypt after the 
French withdrawal. 
 
How did he become that powerful? The answer partly lies in the 
consequences of the French invasion of Egypt in 1795. One of the most 
concrete outcomes of the French invasion for Egypt and the ensuing war 
was the loss of the majority of its local notables, Mamluks, who were the 
main pillars of both state and society and were an obstacle in the way of 
effective central government in Egypt.20 Their departure left a vacuum in 
the political spectrum in Egypt, which was filled by Mehmed Ali.21 His 
formal recognition as the Viceroy of Egypt came in 1805 after he agreed to 
restore order in the Arabian Peninsula where the holy cities of Islam were 
located, which had been disrupted by the Wahhabi sect. His success in 
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eradicating the Vehhabi sect boosted his reputation among Muslims; but 
his reputation in the eyes of the Ottoman government grew following his 
defeat of the British army in 1807 and his liberation of the occupied 
Alexandria, after which the coastal areas were also placed under his 
jurisdiction.22  
 
After being appointed as the Viceroy of Egypt, Mehmed Ali intensified 
the modernisation efforts in the country. Egypt was in a much better 
situation domestically and internationally than the Ottoman Empire, and 
so Mehmed Ali was much more successful in implementing economic and 
military reforms than the Sultan. The Ottoman Empire had been at war 
with Russia from 1806 until 1812, after which she had to suppress the 
Greek insurrection, throughout which Mehmed Ali continued to carry out 
his reform programmes. As to the other great powers, France and the 
coalition of Russia, Great Britain and Austria were fiercely engaged in 
wars for dominance in Europe. 
 
  By the 1820s Mehmed Ali had succeeded in everything that Sultan 
Mahmud II was still trying to achieve: he had centralised the 
administration and made the economy more efficient through the 
construction of irrigation systems and canals for transport, opening new 
areas for agriculture and creating state monopolies.23 As result of these 
measures, Egypt’s annual revenues increased from 8 million Francs in 
1805 to 50 million Francs in 1821.24 Moreover, he founded a new army 
based on conscription and built a navy with the help of French experts. 
According to one Turkish historian, the discipline of collective working 
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that the Nile River had brought to the Egyptian people was an essential 
element in Mehmed Ali’s success.  
 
It should be noted that all these successes paradoxically sowed the 
seeds of conflict, since they required more resources to sustain than Egypt 
could provide for Mehmed Ali’s grand projects and his army. The adjacent 
Syrian territories under various Governorships were rich in both human 
and material resources, for recruits and industry so that the ambitious 
Mehmed Ali would set his eye on Syria.25 The question was how to 
convince the Sultan for such a concession, given his determination to 
restrict the power of the provincial governors. Opportunity for Mehmed Ali 
would come not from Syria but from somewhere completely different, and 
under completely different circumstances: the Mora Peninsula, which was 
under the control of Greek rebels. The governorship of Mora offered 
Mehmed Ali the resources he needed, but only on the condition that he rid 
the territory of Greek rebels.26  
 
As Mehmed Ali was in possession of a well-trained and well-equipped 
army and navy, it came as no surprise when the Sultan asked for his 
military assistance in the suppression of the Greek insurrection in Mora 
in 1825; and as anticipated, the new Egyptian army would quickly prove 
its merits on the battlefields of Mora.  
  
d. Great Powers and Egypt 
The successes of Mehmed Ali and his relations with the Sultan could 
not go unnoticed by the great powers of the 1815 European States 
System, given the strategic location of Egypt as a bridge between the 
Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Black Sea and Asia Minor. Mehmed 
Ali was well aware of the significance of international support for the 
realisation of his aims and the converging and diverging interests of the 
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great powers over the whole region. Britain and France had consuls in 
Egypt who were following closely the developments in Egypt at close 
quarters. France was the most active of the great power in terms of 
relations with Mehmed Ali prior to 1831. France’s historical relations with 
the Ottoman Empire since the 16th century, Napoleon’s recent military 
campaign in Egypt, France’s role in the Catholic Church in Palestine, and 
the commercial dependence of the Marseilles region on trade in the Levant 
all contributed to her close relationship with Mehmed Ali.27 As underlined 
in Chapter II, the overall objective of France was to rid herself of the 
isolation imposed by the 1815 Settlements, and the Levant region and 
North Africa, specifically Egypt, could be instrumental in its bids against 
Russia and Britain.28 According to Puryear, the French policy of 
strengthening Egypt within well-defined limits began in 1824,29 and to 
this end, many French military and technical experts played important 
roles in the restructuring of the Egyptian state and its army and in the 
construction of a number of public facilities. All of these led a 
contemporary French statesman to regard Mehmed Ali as a lieutenant of 
France in the region.30  
 
The new policies of Britain and Russia towards the Ottoman Empire 
were also instrumental in the bid of France to Egypt to turn it a French 
protectorate.  Britain always considered the Ottoman Empire necessary 
for the balance of power against Russia in the region; but the influential 
position that Russia had gained over the Ottoman Empire after 1829 led 
Britain to intensify its efforts to strengthen the Ottoman Empire through 
reforms. As indicated above, Russia sided with Britain in the preservation 
of the Ottoman Empire to some extent, thus France’s contribution in the 
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maintenance of the Ottoman Empire would no longer be so precious in the 
eyes of the Ottoman ruling elite, and for this reason France chose to side 
with Mehmed Ali rather than the Ottoman Empire. 
 
France’s close relations with Mehmed Ali cooled after France decided 
to join the alliance of Britain and Russia for the settlement of the Greek 
issue since Mehmed Ali’s forces had been in fierce struggle against the 
Greek rebels in Mora. However, after the evacuation of Mora in 1828, 
France re-approached Mehmed Ali who was concerned about the Sultan’s 
reaction to the withdrawal of his forces from Mora without consent.31  
 
2. First Revolt of Mehmed Ali and its International Implications 
 
The intervention of the great powers in the Greek issue and the 
following independence of Greece invalidated the promise given by the 
Sultan to Mehmed Ali. Upon that, Mehmed Ali again requested the 
governorship of Syria in return for his services during the Greek 
insurrection, however his request was turned down and the post was 
offered to Girit.32  
 
The main reason behind the Sultan’s decision to decline Mehmed Ali’s 
request was that his position and power were not consistent with the 
centralisation policy of the Sultan, but this was not the only reason. 
Mehmed Ali had declined the Sultan’s request for troops during the war 
with Russia, and moreover, he had not consulted with the Ottoman 
government before agreeing to evacuate Mora with the allies of the London 
Treaty.33  
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Self-confident in his power, and in full awareness of the weakness of 
the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of its devastating war with Russia, 
Mehmed Ali considered that this was the most appropriate time to act 
against his master, planning to take advantage of the discontent of the 
people regarding the Sultan’s reforms, whose dignity had already been 
ruined after defeat at the hands of Russia. He started making 
preparations for a military advance on Syria to take by force what had 
been refused by the Sultan. A delegation from Istanbul was sent to 
negotiate with Mehmed Ali in a final attempt to stop his march on Syria, 
however the negotiations were unsuccessful. 
 
  Why was Mehmed Ali so interested in Syria? As previously 
mentioned, he needed human and material resources for economic 
development and to maintain a strong army in Egypt. For example, 
Mehmed Ali faced a shortage of timber for the construction of merchant 
vessels, as well as fuel, coal, copper and iron, and Syria could provide all 
of these resources.34 More importantly, from a strategic point of view, 
Syria could serve as an excellent barrier against any Ottoman advance 
southwards in the future due to its high mountain ranges, narrow passes 
and deep valleys.35  
 
a. Start of the Rebellion: Ibrahim’s Military Campaign in 
Syria and Asia Minor 
By 1831, Mehmed Ali had fallen out with Abdullah Pasha, the 
governor of Acre, over some of his actions, including Abdullah’s refusal to 
return the 6,000 Egyptians who had fled to several districts under the 
Acre governorship to escape conscription and other duties.36 Moreover, 
Abdullah had been levying exactions on the Egyptian merchants, and had 
not repaid the debts to Egypt that he had incurred during the internal 
                                                 
34
 Altundag, op. cit., p. 36 
 
35
 Kutluoglu, op. cit., p. 32 
 
36
 Kamil Pasa (1911), op. cit., c. III, p. 122 
 
  
 
 
179 
disturbances of the 1820s.37 The Ottoman government urged the two 
parties to resolve their disagreements peacefully and specifically warned 
Mehmed Ali not to act on his own, stating that the Ottoman government 
would take the necessary steps for the settlement of the dispute.38  
 
Committed to his designs on Syria, Mehmed Ali ignored the 
warnings of the central government,39 and dispatched an Egyptian army 
numbering 35-40,000 troops under the command of his son Ibrahim in 
October 1831. The internal feud among the local rulers and the discontent 
of the people in their administration blocked any successful resistance to 
Ibrahim’s army, and the cities of Jaffa, Jerusalem and Nablus quickly 
surrendered without resistance. As we will see later, the reaction of the 
people to the reforms of Sultan Mahmud, in particular the abolition of the 
Janissary Army, facilitated the easy advance of Ibrahim into Syria and 
Asia Minor. Ibrahim laid siege to Acre in November, 1832.40 
 
The fall of Acre opened a route to Asia Minor for Ibrahim, whose 
successes raised his prestige in the eyes of Syrians and allowed him to 
take quick control of Damascus and Aleppo in July 1832.41 The last clash 
in Syria between Ibrahim and the Ottoman army before Ibrahim’s thrust 
into Asia Minor took place in Antioch, and ended with victory for Ibrahim 
on July 29. With that victory, Ibrahim took control of the Taurus passes 
leading to Central Anatolia.  
 
Although all those initial clashes and developments were an 
indication of the severity of the threat, the Sultan was far from ready to 
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compromise; and so the two sides began preparing for the next and final 
confrontation, in which both the Ottoman Empire and Sultan Mahmud 
would be relying on some sort of the external support.  
 
Before proceeding to the confrontation between Ibrahim and the 
Ottoman army under the command of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Reşid in 
Konya in December of 1832, mention will be made of the diplomatic and 
military support that the Ottoman government sought from the great 
powers. 
 
b. Seeking British Naval Assistance against Mehmed Ali’s 
Military Movements  
Sultan Mahmud’s first choice for external support was obviously 
Britain, given the British attitude toward the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire and her naval capacity. The existing close relationship 
between France and Egypt made France unreliable in the eyes of Ottoman 
officials, and an offer of mediation by France during Ibrahim’s Syrian 
campaign between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali had already been turned 
down.42 
 
As the Ottoman navy had not yet recovered from the devastating 
impacts of the Navarino battle, what they needed was British naval 
assistance in their bid for the subjugation of Mehmed Ali to complement 
the overland mission of the Ottoman army against Ibrahim’s forces.43 A 
significant proportion of the British navy was already present in the 
Mediterranean and the Ottoman government believed it could cut off the 
supply lines to the Egyptian army if Britain agreed. They were ready to 
pay Britain’s expenses for carrying out such a mission, which was 
illustrative of the Ottoman military chiefs’ confidence in their military 
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strength and their underestimation of Ibrahim’s army before the final 
confrontation in Konya.  
 
To this end, the first step was taken by the Ottoman government 
when Stafford Canning, the British ambassador, was in Istanbul to obtain 
the consent of the Sultan for the Concert decision relating to the borders 
of the newly-established Greek state. Direct proposals for an Ottoman-
British alliance were made by both the Sultan and the Foreign Minister 
and, while the British ambassador made no commitment, he did promise 
to convey the request to his government.44 According to the Turkish 
archives, Canning urged the Ottoman officials to demand help from the 
British.45 
 
However, the Ottoman government did not think Canning wielded 
enough influence, and so decided to send a special envoy, Namık Pasha, 
to Britain with a request for naval assistance from the Sultan,46 as had 
been previously expressed to Canning.47  
 
Namık Pasha called in on Vienna and Paris on his way to London. In 
Vienna he had an audience with Metternich, who told him that the 
Ottoman government should seek a compromise over Syria with Mehmed 
Ali if it was not confident in the strength of its army so as to avoid further 
grave consequences. Moreover, he suggested that the Ottoman 
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government should not request the active mediation of Britain, but rather 
a strong political opposition to the actions of Mehmed Ali and not to let the 
ships operating under the Egyptian flag in the Mediterranean.48 It seemed 
that Metternich did not share the confidence of the Ottoman officials in 
the capability of the Ottoman army, and was afraid that an active British 
presence in the Near East could lead to reaction from Russia, which could 
potentially complicate the matter further. However, he instructed the 
Habsburg representative in London to assist Namık Pasha in his mission 
in London.49 
 
Namık Pasha’s next stop was Paris. As related earlier, the offer of 
mediation by the French government had already been declined, and 
therefore the visit did not bring about any change in the French attitude. 
He arrived in London on 17 November in 1832. 
 
In Britain, Namık Pasha was very well received by Palmerston and 
the King,50 and Palmerston was in favour of granting assistance to the 
Ottoman government.51 He wrote to Granville that ‘the general interest of 
all Europe except Russia [was] to uphold the Sultan’s power against 
[Mehmed Ali] Pasha’,52 however there was hesitation and division among 
the cabinet members over the Near East, blocking a definite decision on 
the matter. Also, the issues of Belgium, Spain and Portugal and the 
upcoming general election would further prevent any breakthrough in the 
issue. On 27 January, 1833 the British cabinet decided to decline the 
request of the Ottoman government for naval assistance, but proposed the 
mediation of British government between the Ottoman government and 
Mehmed Ali. Palmerston was to label Britain’s position on this issue in the 
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first month of 1833 as ‘the tremendous blunder’53 and ‘the great 
mistake’.54 Despite being declined by the British government, Namık 
Pasha stayed in London until the middle of March of 1833 to try and 
change the British position regarding the issue.55 
 
While Namık Pasha was in London negotiating British assistance, 
Ibrahim inflicted a decisive defeat on the Ottoman army near Konya and 
took the Grand Vizier prisoner. With this victory, the last obstacle between 
Ibrahim and Istanbul had been removed, leading Austria and France also 
to seek an alliance with Britain in an effort to settle the matter.  
 
c. Efforts of Austria and France to Bring Britain on Board 
Austria had already offered assistance to the Ottoman delegation in 
London, but after the defeat of the Ottoman army in Konya Metternich 
suggested that British, French and Russian ships should act together to 
guard Istanbul from the Sea of Marmara.56  
 
The second state seeking British cooperation was France. French 
Premier Broglie suggested that France and Britain should guarantee the 
Sultan’s throne on the condition that he did not admit Russian ships, and 
at the same time allow both powers to mediate between the Sultan and his 
vassal. If Mehmed Ali could not be convinced, then they would coerce him 
with naval sanctions.57 Neither proposal could pass through the British 
cabinet even though Metternich’s envisioned concerted action on the 
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matter;58 and the division of the great powers in the 1815 European States 
System between the Eastern monarchies and the liberal Western powers 
and their mutual commitments in each block had, by 1833, effectively 
blocked any advance among the great powers regarding the Egypt issue.59 
 
d. Dispatch of the Ottoman Delegation to Egypt, and 
Russian and French Mediations  
The defeat of the Grand Vizier’s army in Konya in December must 
have totally altered the expectations of the Ottoman government. The 
refusal of Britain and the strong favouritism of France toward Mehmed Ali 
paved the way for Russia to provide an alternative to the Ottoman 
government, as Stafford Canning had anticipated.60 The Sultan had 
already inquired through the Russian Chargé d’Affaires Butenev in the 
summer of 1832 what Russia could do for the Ottoman Empire in its 
struggle against the rebellious vassal.61 At the end of November 1832, 
Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister of Russia, informed Butenev that Russia 
was able to send a fleet at very short notice upon the request of the 
Sultan.62 Later, Russia sent special envoy General Murayev to Istanbul to 
assure the Sultan of the resoluteness of the Tsar regarding the well-being 
of the Ottoman Empire, and to that end, he was ready to provide military 
assistance if the Sultan asked. Murayev arrived in Istanbul on the same 
day as the military defeat in Konya and held meetings with Foreign 
Minister Reis Effendi and with the Chief Commander of the Army 
Serasker, both of whom expressed their gratitude to the Tsar’s offer, but 
declined his offer of military aid.63 Murayev continued his mission by 
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setting out for Egypt to convey the message of the Tsar to Mehmed Ali that 
the Tsar was a friend of the Sultan, and that he would not allow Mehmed 
Ali to destabilise the Ottoman Empire.64 Obviously, the Tsar’s concern was 
that he would lose his recent gains over the Ottoman Empire as a result of 
Mehmed Ali’s victories. 
 
In the meantime, the Ottoman government decided to enter into 
direct negotiations with Mehmed Ali,65 and to that end the Ottoman sent a 
delegation in response to a request from Mehmed Ali at the end of 
November. This decision to negotiate with Mehmed Ali was the last step 
before the acceptance of the Russian offer, in which French efforts also 
played an important role. Halil Rıfat Pasha and Reşid Bey were selected as 
the special envoys of the Sultan to be sent to Egypt.  
 
The decision of the Ottoman government to enter into negotiations 
was the determining factor in Mehmed Ali’s decision to stop Ibrahim from 
going any further after the battle of Konya, being aware that marching his 
army into Istanbul would result in international intervention, and 
consequently his objective of gaining Syria would fail. Recent 
developments had all been in his favour, and his meetings with Murayev 
had demonstrated to him that Russia was not concerned whether Syria 
came under his rule or not, as Russia’s primary focus was on Istanbul 
and the Balkans.66 On the other side, France was already on his side and 
would not take part in any international efforts to expel him from Syria. As 
a result, the Sultan finally consented to enter negotiations with Mehmed 
Ali, whose best course of action was to wait and force the Sultan to 
concede. For this reason he refused Ibrahim’s request to continue 
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marching, asking him to stop in Kutahya.67 Ibrahim’s departure from 
Konya on 20 January rang alarm bells in the Ottoman government, who 
requested Russian military help in defending Istanbul,68 but first an 
explanation will be made of the final attempts of the Ottoman government 
and the French to reach a settlement before the Russian military was 
summoned. 
 
The Turkish delegation was instructed to offer Mehmed Ali the city of 
Acre and the districts of Jerusalem, Nablus and Tripoli, in addition to the 
governorship of Egypt, Jidda and Crete. If Mehmed Ali asked also for 
Damascus and Aleppo, Halil Pasha was not to consent, but was to await 
instruction from Istanbul.69 Obviously there was a big gap between what 
was being offered by the Ottoman government and what Mehmed Ali 
demanded. 
 
Varannes, the French Chargé d’Affaires in Istanbul, wrote three 
letters with the knowledge of the Ottoman government to Mehmed Ali, 
Ibrahim and Suleyman, dated 8 January, to be delivered by the Ottoman 
delegation.70 Halil Pasha took the letter to Mehmed Ali in which Varannes 
underlined their willingness to reach an agreement, and his sincere hope 
that the ‘deplorable debate which agitated the empire and attracted the 
attention of Europe’ would be terminated.71 In the letter addressed to 
Ibrahim, Varannes informed him of the dispatch of a delegation with full 
powers to meet his father, requesting he halt his advance and wait for the 
outcome of the negotiations. He also added his assurances that Turkish 
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forces would remain inactive as long as Ibrahim stayed put.72 Ibrahim 
replied to Varennes’ letter on 17 January, informing him that his army 
would proceed until his father instructed him otherwise,73 and also 
informed the Ottoman government about his intentions on Bursa – a 
coastal city by the Marmara Sea that was less than one day from Istanbul. 
This news brought panic to the Ottoman government, which made 
preparations to request the already-granted Russian assistance. The news 
from Egypt from the Turkish delegation was not encouraging, as Mehmed 
Ali was demanding all of Syria, as well as the districts of Adana, İçel and 
Alanya in Asia Minor, and said that if his demands were not met he would 
instruct his army to march on Istanbul.74  
 
Ottoman officials considered seriously the offer of Russian 
assistance, and informed the Russian representative of their intentions. 
The French and English representatives again intervened to stop that 
happening; however their efforts did not change the attitude of the 
Ottoman government to summon the Russian fleet, as Ibrahim’s army was 
only a two-week march from Istanbul, and his movements were 
suspicious.  
 
e. Summoning of Russian Military Assistance for the 
Defence of the Capital against the Rebellious Egyptian 
Forces 
The Sultan finally made an official request for the intervention of the 
Russian fleet on 2 February.75 The first part of the Russian fleet anchored 
in the Bosporus on 20 February, and a small army unit landed in the 
Asiatic shores of Bosporus in April. This event can be said to have 
signified the failure of the Concert of Europe, and was a milestone in the 
great power politics of the 1815 European States System for the period of 
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1833–184. The aloofness and hesitation of the British, and the French 
favouritism towards Egypt were the major factors in that failure. An 
analysis of the long-term implications of the Russian military arrival on 
the Bosporus for the 1815 European States System will be covered in the 
following section, after an explanation of the short-term consequences of 
the Mehmed Ali issue.  
 
The deployment of Russian troops and ships in Istanbul forced Britain to 
reconsider the seriousness of the issue for the Ottoman Empire, but their 
immediate efforts concentrated on the departure of Russian forces as soon 
as possible. To this end, the arrival of new ambassadors of France and 
Britain in Istanbul were hastened, while Britain and Austria sent special 
envoys to Egypt to speed up the settlement of the Egypt problem. Without 
a settlement, they were aware that the Sultan could not be asked to 
request the withdrawal of the Russian military units from Istanbul, and in 
this respect, as had previously been the case, the French efforts were of 
great significance.  
 
f. French Efforts for the Settlement of the Egypt Problem 
Roussin, the new French ambassador in Istanbul, arrived in 
Istanbul two days before the Russian fleet arrived in the Bosporus. As 
soon as he took office in Istanbul he assumed a very active role in the 
Egypt issue, not as a mediator, but as a dealer disposed to forging a 
settlement between the parties on the basis of granting Syria to Mehmed 
Ali.76 His immediate request to cancel the summoning of the Russian fleet 
received no response from the Ottoman government, and so his next act 
was to try to persuade the Ottoman government to ask for a Russian 
withdrawal if he could make Mehmed Ali accept the terms that had been 
offered to him by Halil Pasha.77 He signed a convention with the Ottoman 
government on 21 February, one day after the arrival of the Russian 
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military, which contained a pledge to take coercive measures against 
Mehmed Ali if he refused the terms,78 justifying his actions thus, ‘What 
consideration can balance the immense fact of a Russian squadron 
anchored under the walls of Constantinople’.79 The conditions of the 
Convention were approved by Britain too, since they limited the 
possessions of Mehmed Ali to Syria, which had been her overall 
objective.80 
 
In accordance with that convention, Roussin sent letters to Mehmed 
Ali and Ibrahim. In his letter to Mehmed Ali, he stated that the Ottoman 
government were rightly suspicious of the movements and intentions of 
Ibrahim, and had, in consequence, requested Russian help. He added that 
this event had disrupted the peace in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, 
and that Mehmed Ali would be held responsible for the consequences. In 
order to avoid this responsibility, he advised that Mehmed Ali on behalf of 
France accept the Acre, Jerusalem, Tripoli and Nablus governorships, and 
advised him of the convention signed between the Ottoman government 
and France, underlining that France would stand behind its signature.81 
 
 However, the warning given by Roussin to Mehmed Ali was not 
supported by his government, and Broglie, the French Premier, told 
Roussin that France would not support the use of force against Egypt, and 
that the precise delimitation of Syria was of secondary importance to 
France.82 For this reason, the French initiatives ended without success. 
Mehmed Ali’s reaction was swift, with a reply to Roussin on 8 March 
stating that the acceptance of such terms would mean his political death, 
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and that he would prefer real death to political death.83 At the same time, 
he informed the Turkish delegate in Egypt that he fully authorised Ibrahim 
to conduct negotiations, and that unless his [Mehmed Ali’s] terms were not 
meet, Ibrahim would continue his advance.84 On that, Resid returned to 
Istanbul with the demands of Mehmed Ali, and Halil Pasha remained in 
Egypt.  
 
g. The Temporary Settlement of the Egypt Issue: the 
Kutahya Settlement  
The Ottoman government was in a position in which it could either 
accept Mehmed Ali’s terms or reject them, relying on the military 
assistance of Russia, however the latter option would have very serious 
domestic and international implications. The reaction of the public 
towards the Sultan and Russia could not be thoroughly predicted,85 and 
so the Ottoman Council decided to send the newly returned Resid to meet 
Ibrahim in Kutahya, accompanied by French Chargé d’Affaires Varanne. 
This time the Ottoman government was prepared to hand over the whole 
of Syria, but not the districts of Alaiyye, Silifke and Adana in Asia Minor, 
which were the key passes between Syria and Asia Minor, and were also 
rich in timber resources. 
  
Finally, a compromise was reached between Resid and Ibrahim on 9 
April, although the question of Adana was not decided upon86 until 14 
May. According to the settlement, which was not a convention in nature 
but rather was a grant that would be subject to renewal every year, 
Mehmed Ali would gain the governorship of all of Syria, besides his 
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existing governorships of Egypt and Jeddah.87 As for Adana, he gained the 
right to collect taxes there, but would not be able to militarise it. This 
agreement was secured by the ferman (decree) of 5 May that was delivered 
to Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim respectively on 7 and 14 May. The pressure 
being applied by the newly-appointed special envoys to Egypt by Britain, 
France and Austria did much to persuade Mehmed Ali to agree to the 
deal.88 However, the delay between 8 April and 14 May brought a further 
reinforcement of the Russian military on the Bosporus, which raised the 
suspicions of Britain and France. 
 
h. Attempts to Balance Russia in the Near East and the 
British and French Fleets in Dardanelles 
The continuing reinforcement of the Russian troops in Istanbul was 
being followed with great concern by the other great powers. Apart from 
the diplomatic efforts in Istanbul to speed up the withdrawal of the 
Russian forces, Britain and France also resorted to military means to put 
pressure on Russia by sending fleets to the Mediterranean. The British 
fleet was instructed on 10 May to sail to Alexandria and wait there until 
the peace was concluded,89 after which it sailed to Besika Bay just outside 
of the Dardanelles, where it anchored on 22 June, and was soon to be 
joined by the French fleet.90 The collective aim was to demonstrate to 
Russia that they would not remain silent as long as Russian troops 
remained in Istanbul, with the intention being to force Russia to withdraw 
as soon as the terms of peace had been fulfilled by Ibrahim. On 26 May, 
France suggested that both powers should jointly instruct their 
ambassadors in Istanbul to order their respective fleets to pass the 
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Dardanelles and wait in the Sea of Marmara should a strong indication 
arise that Russia was preparing to seize the Dardanelles.91  
 
Palmerston hesitated in his response to the French suggestion, 
preferring to wait for a report from the newly arrived British ambassador, 
Ponsonby, in Istanbul.92 Ponsonby’s report did not raise alarms regarding 
Russia’s activities and intentions in Istanbul. The Russian special envoy, 
who had been sent to Istanbul by the Tsar to compensate for the 
shortcomings of the Russian Chargé d’Affaires in the face of the French 
Ambassador’s actions, assured Ponsonby that the Russian military would 
return home as soon as Ibrahim’s army crossed the Taurus Mountains.93 
Ponsonby also considered that any attempt by Britain and France to pass 
the Dardanelles would result in the Russian troops remaining in the 
Bosporus, forcing the restraint of both countries from an approach 
through the Dardanelles.94  
 
i. Withdrawal of the Russian Military and the Peak of 
Russian Dominance in the Near East: Defence Treaty of 
Hünkar Iskelesi between the Ottoman Empire and Russia  
Russia was monitoring closely French activities in Istanbul and fleet 
movements in the Mediterranean. In this respect, Butenev, the Russian 
Chargé d’Affaires in Istanbul, declared in April that the withdrawal of the 
Russian troops was dependent upon the complete withdrawal of Ibrahim’s 
army from Asia Minor.95 This declaration made sense for the Ottoman 
Empire, since France and Britain had increased their pressure on Mehmed 
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Ali after the difficulties encountered over the status of Adana between the 
Porte and Mehmed Ali.  
 
When the situation in Istanbul was entering into a precarious stage 
on the eve of the complete withdrawal of the Egyptian forces, the Tsar 
decided to send A. Orlov, who was very well-known among Ottoman 
officials as one of the signatories of the 1829 Adrianople Treaty, to 
Istanbul as his special envoy.96  
 
Orlov’s primary mission was to convince the Ottoman government 
that it could rely to a great degree on Russia’s support, both now and in 
the future.97 By proving the sincerity of Russia regarding the maintenance 
of the Ottoman Empire, Orlov was able to nullify the French influence, 
and also to close the door on collective European action in the Near 
East.98  
 
It seemed that Russia still considered the Near East as its exclusive 
area of influence, and wanted to keep it within the domain of the bilateral 
relations between itself and the Ottoman Empire. Given the weakness of 
the Ottoman Empire, the advantages to Russia as a result of such 
bilateral relations in the Near East were obvious.99 
 
The Russian desire to keep the Near East in the bilateral domain 
was consolidated by the Ottoman request to sign a bilateral defence treaty. 
According to Altındag, Ahmet Fevzi Pasha told Butenev in April that the 
existing entente between the two powers should be raised to the status of 
                                                 
96
 As Hall pointed out, ‘his appointment was due to the Tsar’s desire to be represented at Constantinople by 
someone who could be depended upon resolutely to oppose Admiral Roussin [the French Ambassador]’ Hall 
(1912), op. cit., p. 162 
 
97
 Ibid., Altındag (1945), op. cit., pp. 147–148 
 
98
 Altındag (1945), op. cit., pp. 148 and Georgiev et al(1978), op. cit., p. 101 
 
99
 Georgiev et all (1978) op. cit., p. 101 
 
  
 
 
194 
a definite treaty (par un traité definitive).100 Orlov left Istanbul together 
with the Russian troops on 9 and 10 June after the Russian officer 
received news of the complete withdrawal of the Egyptian army on 6 
June.101 The days between the Egyptian and Russian withdrawals saw the 
most remarkable international consequence of the rebellion of Mehmed Ali 
for the 1815 European States System. A defence treaty was signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia that was known as the ‘Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi’. This came as no big surprise, as there had been rumours 
about it weeks before the withdrawal of the Russian units.102 It was the 
Sultan who first suggested the treaty during an audience accorded to 
Orlov shortly after his arrival.103 As Temperely highlighted, the Sultan 
suspected France of helping Ibrahim, and resented Britain’s refusal to 
grant naval aid.104   
 
The Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi contained six public articles and one 
secret article, and was signed for a period of eight years with an option to 
extend it for a further eight years.105 The treaty stipulated that both states 
would assist each other militarily upon the request of either party in case 
of an attack by a third party; however the crucial point was how would a 
state like the Ottoman Empire, which had been unable to cope with a 
rebellious governor, go to the aid of Russia in the event of Russia coming 
under attack? The answer lay in the secret article of the treaty, which 
allowed for the closure of the Straits to war vessels of any nations at war 
with Russia, although it was unclear whether the passage of Russian 
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vessels would be allowed or not. Russia’s immediate gain from this was 
security against any naval threat from the Black Sea via the Straits. In the 
long term, the treaty would enable Russia to enter the Straits for defensive 
purposes in case of any threat to Istanbul, which was not beyond the 
realms of possibility given Russia’s past activities.106 
 
As for the reactions of the other great powers to the Treaty, Britain 
and France instructed their representatives in Istanbul to advise the 
Ottoman government not to ratify the Treaty.107 Accordingly, France and 
Great Britain were resolved to act as the circumstances might appear to 
require ‘equally as if the treaty above-mentioned were not in existence’.108 
Put in simple terms, they said that they would be free to act as they saw 
fit if the Russia sent military forces to Istanbul. A copy of this note was 
sent also to the Russian government.109  
 
Russia responded to the British and French declaration using the 
same tone.110 Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, contended that 
the Treaty was purely defensive, being aimed only at the preservation of 
the Ottoman Empire; and that Russia was determined to faithfully carry 
out its contracted obligations [towards the Ottoman Empire] ‘as though 
the declaration contained in the French and British notes did not exist’.111 
Palmerston reiterated Britain’s displeasure at the Treaty; however, the 
British Chargé d’Affaires in St. Petersburg ended the discussion about the 
true nature of Treaty by stating that his government ‘was resolved not be 
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drawn into a controversy upon a question in which it differed so widely 
from the [Russian] imperial cabinet’.112  
 
In fact, the most worrying aspect for Britain regarding the new 
alliance was the preponderance that Russia had acquired in its relations 
with the Ottoman Empire, rather than the controversial issue of the 
Straits. Assurances from the Ottoman Empire and Russia that the closure 
of the Straits would, in principle, apply to all warships did not help reduce 
the concerns of Britain and France. The responses of Britain and France 
will be covered in the following section, after an explanation of how Russia 
addressed the concerns of her allies in the Holy Alliance, namely Austria 
and Prussia. As long as the Holy Alliance continued undisrupted, Russia 
had little to worry about from Britain and France. To that end, Russia 
called a meeting of the rulers of the three Eastern monarchies on the 
pretext of becoming better acquainted with the new King of Austria, 
Franchis.  
 
j. Revival of the Holy Alliance: Munchengratz Agreement 
between Russia, Austria and Prussia over the Near East   
The 1830 Revolution in France and the close relations between 
Britain and the new dynasty in France convinced the Tsar to share 
Russia’s dominant position with her conservative Eastern brethren. To 
this end, Russia took the initiative to eliminate the concerns raised by her 
alliance with the Ottoman Empire and remove doubts about her future 
intentions among her allies in the Holy Alliance. The result was the 
signing of the Munchengratz Agreement between Russia, Austria and 
Prussia in 1834, through which Russia was attempting to stop her 
Eastern allies from joining forces with Britain and France. This resulted in 
a revival of the Holy Alliance, which had been damaged by the Anglo-
Russian-French alliance in the settlement of the Greek issue in 1826–
1830.  
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 The Munchengratz Agreement was a type of road map to be followed 
by the Eastern monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia regarding the 
issue of the Ottoman Empire. The three powers pledged to cooperate in 
protecting the existing regime in the Ottoman Empire against any threat. 
Also, in a secret article, they agreed to prevent any further expansion of 
Mehmed Ali’s authority in the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, and to 
cooperate should the Ottoman dynasty be overthrown. With that 
agreement Austria and Prussia forced a compromise from Russia 
regarding the Ottoman Empire in the event of its collapse – that Russia 
would not act alone in such a situation, while Austria and Prussia, in 
return, would remain within the Holy Alliance and not form a block 
together with France and Britain against Russia.  
 
To conclude, the first rebellion of Mehmed Ali had ended with a 
further increase of Russian dominance over the Ottoman Empire, which 
by 1833 was not only weak and vulnerable to Russian influence, but also, 
to some degree, dependent on Russia, partly as a result of the failure of 
the Concert of Europe. The process to include the Ottoman Empire in the 
general settlement had started at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 
although her existence and stability was vital for the maintenance of 
peace. This setback further deteriorated after the Ottoman Empire was left 
at the mercy of Russia in 1828; and the same failure of the Concert of 
Europe was apparent when the Ottoman Empire, following the devastating 
war with Russia,  was left unsupported against the rebellious governor of 
Egypt. On both occasions, Russia took advantage of the opportunity to 
establish her predominance in the Near East; however this situation was 
affecting the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System, 
which would only be remedied when Mehmed Ali again made moves to 
march on Istanbul in 1839. As will be seen in the second part of this 
chapter, the predominant position of Russia would be only checked 
following a profound change in British policies, as the other flanking and 
relatively structurally independent power in the 1815 European States 
System. The substantial rise of the British economic interests in 30’s and 
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40’s in Near East was the most determining factor in the establishment of 
the new policies that England would pursue in Near East against 
Russia.113  
 
3. Second March of Mehmed Ali on Istanbul in 1839 and the 
Replacement of the Bilateral Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi with the 
Multilateral Straits Convention in 1841  
 
The Kutahya Settlement failed to bring any enduring solution that 
would be to the satisfaction of either party. Sultan Mahmud would 
continue to reform his empire and regard the administration of Mehmed 
Ali in Egypt and Syria as the biggest obstacle in the way of the 
restructuring of the state organisation.114 Mehmed Ali’s army was still a 
threat, even though it had retreated to beyond Adana, and Syria was an 
important part of the Ottoman Empire, having the population and natural 
resources that the state badly needed to expand the central government’s 
services.  
 
Despite attracting the initial support of the local people in Syria during 
the clashes, the implementation of steep taxes and the introduction of 
conscription by Mehmed Ali resulted in unrest among the people, who for 
centuries had been used to relatively autonomous administration under 
the Sultans.115 Mehmed Ali found that Syrians were not as submissive as 
Egyptians, and in some cases he had to resort to military means, resulting 
in a number of revolts in Syria during the 1834–1839 period.116 
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Mehmed Ali was not very comfortable, despite his successes both in the 
field and around the negotiation tables.117 He could not militarise Adana 
and its surrounding region, and therefore continued to feel the pressure of 
the Ottoman army standing right next door. Secondly, his holdings were 
subject to renewal every year, meaning that the security of his home and 
family were not guaranteed as he headed into old age. For this reason he 
sought hereditary rights for himself and his family over his holdings in 
both Egypt and Syria. 
 
a. Great Powers and the Near East, 1833–1839 
Britain underwent a complete change in policy concerning the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia in 1833, leaving behind her hesitant and defensive 
attitude for a much more resolute and assertive one to curb Russian 
dominance in the Near East.118 As underlined in the previous section, the 
increasing of the British economic interests in Near East played important 
role in that shift.  To this end, she began collaborating with the new 
monarchy of France on a new set of agreements known as the ‘entente 
cordiale’119. On the other side, Russia had managed to revive the Holy 
Alliance block through the Munchengratz Agreement, meaning that 
international alignments by the end of 1833 were almost identical to those 
forged in 1815 that remained until the Anglo-Russian accord of 1826.  
 
Although Britain and France were aligned against the dominant 
position of Russia in the Near East, their stand on Mehmed Ali’s policies 
and his sovereignty over Syria was completely different. 
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Britain did not consider the transfer of Syria to Mehmed Ali as 
consistent with its modal tendencies,120 being against anything that 
undermined the authority and reforms of Sultan Mahmud. Secondly, 
Britain was concerned about Mehmed Ali’s policies for expansion. His 
influence and control over the region of Mesopotamia, which neighboured 
Syria, could put at risk Britain’s land and sea routes to India through the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Persian Gulf. The invention of steam 
power and its use for maritime and rail transport also brought the 
potential to connect Asia Minor via the Mediterranean, along the Tigris 
and Euphrates and into the Persian Gulf.121 As early as March 1834, 
Palmerston was voicing his concerns: ‘[Mehmed Ali’s] real design is to 
establish an Arabian Kingdom including all the countries in which Arabic 
is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself, but as it 
would be necessary imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not 
agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as 
an active Arabian sovereign would be’.122  
 
On the other hand, France was quite content with the balance 
between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali brought about by the Kutahya 
Settlement. Unlike Britain, France ‘looked upon him [Mehmed Ali] as, in a 
sense, a protégé, who was continuing the glories of Bonaparte’s short but 
brilliant Egyptian regime’.123 In line with its aspirations to expand into 
North Africa and the Mediterranean basin, France sought to consolidate 
its influence on Egypt, which had become very significant for its 
possession of Algiers. France’s recent arguments with Mehmed Ali through 
its ambassador in Istanbul, which had ended abruptly with the 
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disapproval of Paris, were not based on her objection to placing Syria 
under the control of Mehmed Ali, but on the fear that it would increase 
Russia’s grip on the Ottoman Empire.124  
 
Regardless of their deep division over the future of Mehmed Ali, the 
termination of Russian dominance in the Near East was the overriding 
objective for Britain and France; however this could only be achieved 
through an annulment of the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi. The Quadruple 
Treaty of 1834 among France, Britain, Spain and Portugal that ended the 
clash over the Carlist question in Spain facilitated the pursuit of a policy 
to curb the influence of Russia in the Near East. To that end, as a 
practical means, the two powers, and Britain in particular, carried out a 
‘watchful waiting’ policy in the Mediterranean through their fleets.125 
Moreover, Britain supported the reform movements of the Sultan and tried 
to strengthen its commercial ties with the Ottoman Empire. The 1838 
Treaty of Free Commerce between the Ottoman Empire and Britain is 
worthy of mention here for its impacts on Egypt and for its political 
support of Britain for the Ottoman Empire.126  
  
Despite all the differences among the great powers in their pursued 
objectives between 1833 and 1839, they all had one thing in common: to 
prevent the start of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali.127 
During this period, for example, the Ottoman government sought to cross 
into Syria utilising the opportunities that the revolts against Mehmed Ali 
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in Nablus, Jerusalem, Damascus and Acre offered.128 However Russia 
warned the Ottoman government that Russia could not assist in this 
endeavour, as the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi was a purely a defence treaty 
that could not be invoked if the Ottoman Empire was the aggressor.129 
Russia was aware that the re-appearance of the Russian navy in the 
Bosporus would provoke the arrival of the British and French fleets into 
the Sea of Marmara, and so the last thing that Russia wanted was an 
Ottoman-Egypt clash. Russia, as Gorionov pointed out, was not in favour 
of war, realising that the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi furnished a constant 
danger to the peace of Russia in Europe and tried to prevent the 
circumstances to call it into operation,130 and a similar stance was taken 
by the British and French ambassadors in 1834.131  
 
International and domestic restraints would hold the Sultan and 
Mehmed Ali only for five years, until June 1839, when the need to address 
domestic issues far outweighed the international efforts to restrain them. 
In May 1838, Mehmed Ali told British Consul Cambell that he was 
resolved to be independent,132 and by April 1839 the armies of both sides 
were facing each other across the Euphrates and the outbreak of war was 
imminent.  
 
b. Second Rebellion of Mehmed Ali in 1839 
The battle that ended the five years of peace between the Sultan and 
Mehmed Ali took place in Nizib on 24 June. The Sultan would never hear 
of the crushing defeat of his army, as he died a few days before the news 
of his loss reached Istanbul. Worse was yet to come, as the Ottoman navy, 
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having set out on a mission to blockade Egypt, was surrendered to the 
rebels by its commander amid the power struggles among the high 
officials of the Ottoman Empire upon the death of Sultan Mahmud.133 In 
the words of Guizot, ‘within three weeks, Turkey had lost her Sultan, her 
army and her fleet’.134 It seemed that her days were really numbered.  
 
Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government had only one 
remaining path open to them – negotiating terms for peace with Mehmed 
Ali. The new Sultan sent an envoy with an imperial pardon to Mehmed Ali, 
also offering him the hereditary governorship of Egypt, on the condition 
that he return Syria and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.135  
 
The Sultan’s offer and international mediation was not enough to 
persuade Mehmed Ali to yield after his second victory. He informed the 
General Consuls of the great powers that he had no intention of keeping 
the Ottoman fleet, and would return it as soon as his hereditary rights for 
the all places he now held were assured, and the Grand Vizier, Husrev, 
who was his sworn enemy, was removed from the office.136  
 
The Ottoman envoy returned to Istanbul bearing a letter to Husrev 
Pasha from Mehmed Ali containing the same demands he had expressed 
to the consuls. As a last desperate measure, the Ottoman government 
decided to send Minister of Justice Saib Effendi to meet with Mehmed Ali 
for fresh talks, contemplating offering him the lifelong governorship of 
Syria, in addition to the hereditary governorship of Egypt.137 However, that 
intended mission did not take place, as it was superseded by a collective 
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decision among the great powers that would change the whole course of 
the Egypt affair. 
   
c. Intervention of Great Powers under the Concert of Europe 
The representatives of the great powers in Istanbul delivered a 
collective note to the Ottoman government on 27 July requesting they 
suspend all negotiations with Mehmed Ali. The collective note offered that 
the Ottoman government should suspend all negotiations with Mehmed Ali 
and inform him that the affair is now in the hands of the five powers.138  
 
The collective note from the five powers came into existence out of a 
collective desire to avoid the consequences of invoking the Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi. Russia was also in agreement, being aware that the re-
appearance of the Russian navy in Istanbul would result in the French 
and British navies entering the Dardanelles. As had been the case in the 
Nizib War, none of the great powers wanted the situation to deteriorate, 
but the division between the Anglo-French and Holy Alliance blocks made 
it impossible to reach a solution that would be acceptable to all.  
 
d. Start of Disagreements between France and Britain over 
Course of Action on Mehmed Ali  
As time advanced, disagreements started emerging between Britain 
and France over how to deal with Mehmed Ali, the first of which was 
related to the return of the Ottoman navy. Britain, naturally, was very 
sensitive to changes in the balance of power among the naval forces in the 
Mediterranean, and was in favour of taking a very hard line. In that 
respect, Palmerston ordered the British fleet in the Mediterranean to use 
force if necessary and to work together with the French admiral there, 
whom he hoped would receive a similar order from Paris.139 This wasn’t to 
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be, as on 6 August, the French government decided to reject Palmerston’s 
proposal to take coercive measures against the Egyptian forces.140   
 
The second disagreement regarding the settlement of the Egypt 
issue was much more significant in terms of its long-term implications. As 
touched upon earlier, France was in favour of formalising the status quo 
by forcing the Ottoman government to include Syria in the hereditary 
rights of Mehmed Ali, who in return should cede Adana and Crete back to 
the central administration. This policy was totally inconsistent with the 
British policy for reasons as have been expressed in the preceding 
paragraphs.  
 
The stalemate among the great powers would be broken by a 
Russian policy shift in August 1839. Russia had been aware of the 
importance of the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi Treaty for the structural 
balance of the 1815 European States System, which was due to come to 
an end within two years, although there was a possibility for renewal for 
another eight years. The security that the Treaty was to provide could be 
gained by dividing the maritime powers, namely France and Britain; while 
on the other side, the other continental powers of Austria and Prussia 
posed no maritime threat, and were even structurally dependent on 
Russia. Based on this, Russia decided to find ways to cooperate with 
Britain regarding the Egypt issue rather than going it alone. From another 
perspective, Russia could be seen to be returning ‘the favour’ that Britain 
gave in 1826 by leaving Austria to approach Russia for the settlement of 
the Greek issue, however now it was France that was going to be isolated 
through the cooperation of the flanking powers of the 1815 European 
States System. 
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e. Second Anglo-Russian Accord for the Settlement of Egypt 
Issue and the Isolation of France 
To discuss matters with the British government, Nesselrode, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, sent Baron Brunnov on a special mission to 
London on 15 September, 1839,141 where he raised the following points:142 
Russia is ready to consider the closing of both Straits to all warships in 
times of peace and war. In this respect, his government would consider 
not renewing the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi; but in return the maritime 
powers should agree not to dispatch their fleets into the Sea of Marmara 
should the Russian fleet show up in the Bosporus, which in turn would be 
at the disposal of the allies to guard Istanbul against Ibrahim’s army. 
Finally, the maritime powers should abandon any idea of concluding a 
convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.   
  
  Palmerston immediately informed French Ambassador Sebastian 
about the Russian proposal. When Sebastian conveyed the proposal to his 
government, he did so underlining Palmerston’s positive assessment of the 
Russian approach. His assessment was, in fact, heralding under which 
priorities the matter would be settled, which would be to the advantage of 
Britain and Russia rather than France. He wrote that the British Foreign 
Ministry ‘was regarding the abolition of the Treaty as ample success’, and 
added that the proposed unilateral action of Russia in Istanbul in case of 
Ibrahim’s advance ‘seems to Palmerston to be the action of the five courts 
and abdication of the exclusive protectorate of Russia’.143  
 
The reaction and disappointment of France was not unexpected. 
Marshal Solt, the French Premier, informed his ambassador that the 
government would not change its policy to leave the hereditary rule of 
Syria to Mehmed Ali, would not to apply coercive measures against him, 
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and would pass through the Dardanelles should the Russian navy make 
an appearance in Istanbul. He summarised the French stance thus: ‘we 
will keep our ground’.144  
 
The British reply to the Russian proposal arrived on October, 1, and 
the British Cabinet gave its conditional approval to the scheme. If Russia’s 
military intervention became necessary for the protection of Istanbul, it 
should take action with the cooperation of the British navy. Palmerston 
suggested that the cooperation should take place in such a way that the 
fleets of the two powers should not be brought into contact with each 
other.145 This should be done, he suggested, by placing one Strait under 
the control of one power, while the other Strait would be controlled by the 
other. Put differently, Britain proposed to Russia what France had so far 
threatened, that if Russia sent her fleet to Bosporus under the Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi, then France would pass into the Dardanelles.  
 
Brunnov expressed that he was not in a position to approve the 
proposal and would have to relay it to his government. The first leg of the 
Brunnov mission ended with a positive attitude and conditional approval 
by the British government. Brunnov then left London for his original post 
in Stuttgart.146  
 
f. Brunnov’s Second Mission to London and the Completion 
of the Second Anglo-Russian Accord for the Near East: 
Signing of the London Treaty of 15 July, 1841 
The Foreign Minister of Russia, Nesselrode, wrote in October 1839 
that ‘the Tsar received Brunnov’s reports with real satisfaction’.147 Thus, 
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he instructed Brunnov to return to London to conclude a convention on 
the basis of the British conditions.148 This attitude of Russia allowed 
Palmerston to both settle the Egypt question and conclude the issue of the 
Straits. The price of terminating the Anglo-French entente, which had 
started with the Quadruple Treaty of 1835, would be worth paying for 
Britain, since she would achieve the two primary objectives that had been 
her policy since 1833.  
 
Palmerston wrote to Granville on December 9, 1839 that: “The 
Russian government agrees to our proposal about the Dardanelles … This 
will give us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry our own views 
into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia will side 
with us and Russia – and France if she stand aloof – will be left to 
herself’.149   
 
Brunnov, the Russian envoy, submitted the Russian proposals to the 
British government in January 1840. The proposal contained a provision 
that Mehmed Ali should receive Egypt and the Acre fortress part of Syria 
in hereditary possession, and return the rest of the territories to the 
jurisdiction of the Porte; and if he declined, the allies should apply 
coercive measures. These would include Russia sending its fleet into the 
Bosporus and landing troops to defend Istanbul on behalf of the Concert if 
Ibrahim advanced into Istanbul. The other allies, namely Britain and 
France, may pass the Dardanelles and anchor between Gallipoli and 
Mudanya Bay in the Sea of Marmara. Finally, once the Mehmed Ali’s 
suppression had been achieved, the Ottoman Government would 
implement her ancient right to close both Straits to all warships in times 
of peace and war.150 
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These proposals were consistent with the proposal of the Ottoman 
government for the settlement of the Egypt issue, which was to grant 
Mehmed Ali the hereditary possession of Egypt, and in return he would 
restore the Ottoman fleet and evacuate all the other areas. However the 
problem was not with the Ottoman Empire, but with France, which was 
against reducing Mehmed Ali’s power. Austria and Prussia, as the 
continental powers, also did not wish France to remain isolated and tried 
to reconcile the French demands with those of Russia, Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire.151 To this end, Metternich took action to bring France 
into the concert of the four powers. Previously, Neumann, the Austrian 
Ambassador, had suggested that the life-long governorship of Syria could 
be left to Mehmed Ali in order to win French approval for a collective 
compromise, however his suggestion failed to win over France, which 
argued that any agreement should be acceptable to both the Ottoman 
government and Mehmed Ali, and that Mehmed Ali would not find the 
conditions acceptable.152 This time, Neumann, acting under the 
instruction of Metternich, on 5 May suggested that Syria could be divided 
into two parts, and the part covering Acre and its surroundings could be 
retained by Mehmed Ali, but before he received a reply on 15 May he 
amended his proposal, this time suggesting leaving all of Syria to Mehmed 
Ali for the duration of his life. 
 
However, France declined to step back from its previous position. 
The new French Premier, Thiers, declared that ‘France could not suggest 
the proposals to Mehmed Ali, he would refuse it, and we could not refute 
his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be sound and well-
founded’.153 
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While the negotiations among the five great powers were going on in 
London, the pressure of the pro-Mehmed Ali faction in Istanbul increased 
for a direct settlement between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali. It seemed that 
France was hopeful of a satisfactory result, and was expecting news of a 
settlement anytime. The removal from office of Husrev, the Grand Vizier, 
and Mehmed Ali’s decision to send an envoy to restore the Ottoman fleet 
raised the hopes of France to this end.  
 
Finally, the determination of France to take Syria out of the control 
of Mehmed Ali and the developments in Istanbul convinced Palmerston 
and the representatives of Russia, Austria and Prussia to agree to a 
settlement. The Convention of London was signed without France on 15 
July, 1840, with the Ottoman representative also appending his signature. 
The isolation of France meant also the end of the Anglo-French entente 
over the Near East, having been based on France’s strong favouritism 
towards Mehmed Ali.  
 
The London Treaty stipulated that Mehmed Ali would be granted the 
hereditary rule of Egypt and the rule of some regions of Syria for life if he 
accepted the proposal within 10 days; however if he failed to accept the 
proposal he would be forced to give up Syria and would risk losing 
everything. France did not sign the London Treaty due to its humiliation 
at not being invited by Britain and Russia to take part in drawing it up. 
Being aware of the opposition of France and counting on the friction 
among the great powers, Mehmed Ali refused the first proposal, resulting 
in the Sultan making a formal declaration that Mehmed Ali had lost all of 
the rights and concessions given to him previously with regard to the 
administration of Egypt.  
 
After Mehmed Ali had refused the proposal, an Ottoman 
expeditionary force, reinforced by some European military experts, landed 
in Lebanon, while a joint navy of the allied great powers blockaded the 
Syrian cost. After a while, the Ottoman army captured Akka, and a local 
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riot was organised in Syria against the forces of Mehmed Ali. Meanwhile, 
Russia said that it would not object to the dispatch of a joint fleet to 
Istanbul to defend Istanbul if necessary, which was obviously aimed at 
France. Realising that he was going to become further isolated, Mehmed 
Ali consented to the hereditary rule of Egypt, bringing to an end the 
second rebellion of Mehmed Ali; however the problem of the 1834 Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi for Britain still remained to be settled. 
 
With the settlement of the Egypt problem, the allies turned to the 
delicate but strategically important issue of the status of the Straits. The 
Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi had been signed for eight years and still had two 
more years to run. Russia, for the sake of an alliance with Britain and to 
widen further the gap between Britain and France, had tacitly accepted 
the re-signing of the Treaty, having become well-aware over the last couple 
of years that the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi would not be as effective as 
Russia had previously anticipated. This would facilitate the signing of the 
1841 Straits Convention, which formally recognised the old principle of 
the Ottoman Empire – that the Straits would be closed to warships during 
times of both war and peace. With the signing of the Convention, Britain 
managed to make all sides accept that the regulation of the passage in the 
Straits could not be subject to any bilateral, but only multilateral 
arrangements, which had been the main aim of Britain since the signing 
of the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
It was concluded in the second chapter that the capability structure 
of the 1815 European States System remained mostly unchanged between 
1815 and 1856.  Therefore, it has been postulated that the structural 
effects of the 1815 European States System over the Ottoman-Russian 
relations of this period can be understood and explained from the 
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processes and interactions taking place between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia and the other great powers. 154 
 
Within this methodological framework, the workings and effects of 
the structure of the 1815 European States System are attempted to be 
understood through an analysis of the processes between the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia, and among the other great powers at the time of the 
rebellion of the governor of Egypt in 1833–1841. 
 
It was argued in the previous chapter that the Treaty of Adrianople 
in 1829 was a milestone for Russia, in that she was thus able to increase 
and consolidate her influence over the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it is 
suggested that the increase of Russian influence in Istanbul brought 
about structural changes with transformational implications in the 1815 
European States System.  
 
This advantageous situation induced Russia to reconsider her policy 
concerning the Ottoman Empire, with her new policy being to keep ‘a 
weak Ottoman Empire’ on her southern borders. The reason behind such 
a shift was that Russia could not predict either the nature or scope of the 
prospective settlement in case of the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire; and the existence of a weak Ottoman Empire was at that time her 
best means of preventing the infiltration of any great power into her 
southern wing.  
 
Unexpectedly, the influence of Russia over the Ottoman Empire 
turned into predominance as result of the Russian military support of the 
Sultan against the rebellious governor of Egypt and the signing of the 
bilateral defence Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833. This was due to the 
fact that it was only Russia among the great powers that responded to the 
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Sultan’s request for military support in the face of the advance of 
Ibrahim’s army towards Istanbul.   
 
The crucial gain for Russia that the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi 
afforded was that she could ensure the Straits were closed to states with 
which she was at war, so long as the Ottoman Empire remained neutral; 
and more than that explicit gain, Russia was also able to reinforce her 
bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. This legal instrument that 
had been defensive in nature could be effectively used to turn the 
Ottoman Empire into a mere vassal state under Russia’s revisionist modal 
tendency towards the Ottoman Empire, and her past attitudes and 
disposition to interfere in the Sultan’s domestic affairs.  
 
By 1833, it was only France that was resolute in her attempts to 
prevent the summoning of the Russian fleet by the Sultan. After its arrival 
in Istanbul, it was France rather than Britain, whose aid had been sought 
before requesting Russian support, which actively tried to send the 
Russian fleet back. The motivation behind the French efforts, apart from 
general concerns related to the balance of power, was that she did not 
want lose the advantages to Russia that she had acquired in the 
Mediterranean over Egypt. 
  
As argued in the second chapter, the primary objective of France 
after 1815 was to rid herself of the restrictions imposed by the 1815 
Settlements. In this respect, she tried to find new areas for influence, and 
Egypt, and the ambitions of its governor, Mehmed Ali, suited very well 
France’s interests. Egypt’s significance was doubled for France as a result 
of her occupation of Algiers in 1830, and the French ruling elite 
considered Mehmed Ali as a French protégé due to his extensive 
employment of French experts. In the eyes of many French people, 
Mehmed Ali’s modernisation efforts in Egypt were in fact following on from 
the mission that Napoleon had left uncompleted in 1797. This strong 
affiliation of France with Egypt explains why the Ottoman Empire sought 
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Russian rather than French aid against Mehmed Ali after Britain declined. 
However, as a result of the unilateral action of Russia upon the request of 
the Sultan, the two revisionist states in the 1815 European States System 
came head-to-head in the Near East. This can be described as the second 
failure of the Concert of Europe after the Ottoman-Russian War in 1828–
1829, in which it was again Russia that benefited at the expense of the 
other great powers in the Near East, putting the maintenance of the 1815 
European States System further at risk.  
 
It was the Sultan’s concession that saved the further deterioration of 
the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System in 1833. The 
Kutahya Settlement between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali ended the first 
rebellion of the latter and brought the Russian military into the Bosporus. 
Mehmed Ali gained more than his initial demand of Syria, extending his 
area of governance to Adana in Asia Minor. 
 
After the departure of the Russian military, the first reaction to the 
disrupted balance of power in the Near East from the maritime powers of 
Britain and France was their declaration that they would not recognise the 
Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi. Secondly, they made it clear that their fleets in 
the Mediterranean would pass through the Dardanelles if the Russian 
navy showed up in the Bosporus in the implementation of the Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi.  
 
The close understanding between Luis Philippe’s France and 
Britain, known as the Cordiale Entente, also contributed the cooperation 
of the two maritime powers against Russia’s predominance in the Near 
East. In reaction, Russia attempted to revive the Holy Alliance The result 
was the signing of the Münchengratz Agreements in 1835 among Russia, 
Austria and Prussia, who pledged to preserve the Ottoman dynasty 
against any threat; and in case of its collapse, they would act together so 
as not to permit an Egyptian expansion of power into the Balkan 
territories of the Ottoman Empire. This was a sign that Russia was still a 
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proponent of cooperation with regard to the Ottoman Empire under the 
confines of the Concert of Europe.  
 
Other than on the point of the elimination of Russian predominance 
over the Ottoman Empire, there was no common ground between Britain 
and France. While Britain did not accept the rule of Mehmed Ali over 
Syria, which was located between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean, 
and thus covered much of her overland and maritime routes to Central 
Asia and India, France was in favour of consolidating Mehmed Ali’s power 
base, in a way contemplating it as her extension in the Near East.  
 
 The stalemate between the Cordiale Entente and the Holy Alliance 
lasted until Mehmed Ali’s army defeated the Sultan’s army in Nizib in 
1839 for the second time, and opened up the way to Istanbul. Unlike in 
1833, the great powers acted in concert at the beginning of the second 
crisis, which meant that the revisionist powers could act with restraint. In 
other words, Russia would act in moderation and France would act in 
restriction which was the foundation principles of the 1815 European 
States System. 
 
The initial agreement to act in concert for the settlement of the issue 
did not last longer due to France’s unwillingness to restrict Mehmed Ali, 
and this led to the second Anglo-Russian accord in the Near East in the 
1815 European States System. In the beginning, Russia had acted with 
restraint by not acting alone in accordance with the defence Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi; and this moderate approach would continue with her 
consent to replace the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi with a multilateral 
convention.   
 
The unwillingness of Russia to renew the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi 
and to take Syria out from under the control of Mehmed Ali was enough to 
convince Britain to give up the Cordial Entente with France for concerted 
European action. As a result, France could not oppose the concerted 
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actions against Mehmed Ali, and remained isolated by the four great 
powers. This time, the Concert of Europe re-emerged in the form of the 
Quadruple Alliance against France, however, France would soon join the 
four great powers when the bilateral Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi was 
replaced with the multilateral Convention of the Straits in 1841, which 
renewed the right of the Ottoman Empire to close the Straits to military 
vessels on a permanent basis. As to Mehmed Ali, France had to accept the 
offer made by the four great powers that left him the hereditary rule of 
Egypt and the life-long rule of a small part of Syria.  
 
The Concert of Europe functioned as a peace-making body in the 
Egypt issue, and was an example of the collective use of hegemony over 
the states of the second order in the 1815 European States System, 
ensuring peace by restricting France and moderating Russia. By agreeing 
to act in concert, Russia was exercising self-restraint, while France, which 
had declined to cooperate, was forced to act in moderation.  
 
With the Convention of the Straits, Russia gave up all of the 
advantages she had gained under the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi; but 
managed to secure her Black Sea shores from maritime threats from 
Britain and France by accepting the closure of the Straits. What Russia 
had to accept was the loss of the predominance she had gained by being 
allowed to dispatch her fleet to the Bosporus with the signing of the Treaty 
of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833. Put differently, Russia returned to her pre-
1833 position in her relations with the Ottoman Empire, meaning that she 
still held great influence over the weakened Ottoman Empire. It would 
take another decade for Russia to be stripped of the advantages that had 
resulted from her bilateral treaty rights, and the removal of the constant 
Russian naval threat to Istanbul from the Black Sea. This issue will be 
dealt with in the following and final chapter of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXTENSION OF THE 1815 SETTLEMENTS TO THE NEAR EAST, OR 
THE END OF RUSSIAN PREDOMINANCE OVER THE OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE: THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE CONGRESS OF PARIS   
 
Introduction 
 
The two previous chapters have argued that the interactions 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the 1815–1841 period led to 
an increase of Russian influence over the Ottoman Empire and a level of 
structural dependency of the Ottoman Empire on Russia. This was in part 
a result of the omission of the Ottoman Empire from the 1815 
Settlements; and also partly a consequence of the structural changes with 
transformational implications resulting from the 1828–1829 Ottoman-
Russian war and the subsequent Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople), and then 
by the defence Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi (1833). Although this structural 
dependency was decreased somewhat with the replacement of the bilateral 
Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi by the multilateral Straits Convention of 1841, 
still Russia retained great influence over the Ottoman Empire as a result 
of her bilateral treaty rights and claims prior to 1815 regarding the 
administration of the Principalities and Serbia and the Orthodox subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire. When those rights and claims were bolstered by 
Russia’s superior military power, and specifically by keeping the Ottoman 
capital in check through the presence of her naval bases in the Black Sea, 
the extent of Russia’s influence over the Ottoman Empire can be 
accurately understood. Russia’s past behaviour during the Greek issue 
(1820–1830) offers a good indication of how Russia was able to interpret 
those treaty rights in accordance with her modal tendencies. 
 
This situation was obviously not compatible with the foundation 
principles of the 1815 European States System. Therefore, the main 
question for the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System in 
1841-1854 was how Russia would use her influential position in the Near 
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East – whether she would act in moderation and exercise restraint, or try 
to realise her goals at the expense of the other four great powers. 
 
This final chapter will contain an analysis of how Ottoman-Russian 
relations were shaped in the 1841–1856 period. In more precise terms, the 
chapter will explain how Russia was militarily and politically restricted in 
the Near East, and how the 1815 Settlements were somewhat extended to 
cover the Ottoman Empire, which they had failed to do in 1815. 
 
Within this overall framework, the first step will be to analyse 
Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1841–1848 period and the Russian 
attempts to strike a pre-agreement with Austria and Great Britain about 
the future of the Ottoman Empire. Then, the political implications of the 
1848 revolutions of the 1815 European States System will be briefly 
discussed; followed by an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian refugee 
crisis after the 1848 Revolutions and its effect on Ottoman-Russian 
relations. The second part of the Chapter will be devoted to the Holy 
Places issue and the Crimean War and its concluding Treaty of Paris.  
 
1. Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1841–1852 
 
The period between 1841 and 1848 was very tranquil in Ottoman-
Russian relations, with no remarkable development taking place between 
the two states. Despite that tranquillity, the Tsar continued in his efforts 
to strike an agreement between Russia and Britain on a course of action 
should the Ottoman Empire collapse, for whatever reason. Russia’s 
initiatives in that respect, and Britain’s position, were as follows: 
 
a. Russia’s Efforts for a prior Agreement over the Future 
of the Ottoman Empire with Britain  
 With the signing of the London Straits Convention of 1841, Russia 
implicitly accepted that she could not rely on her bilateral treaty rights 
with the Ottoman Empire, which became somewhat the subject of the 
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collective hegemony of the oligopoly of the great powers under the Concert 
of Europe.1 However, this did not mean that Russia gave up her privileged 
position and revisionist objectives. In this respect, the Tsar’s ceaseless 
efforts to reach a prior agreement with Britain in 1844 and 1853 over the 
future of the Ottoman Empire or the post-Ottoman order in the Near East 
are worthy of mention. On both occasions Russia’s argument was that the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire was so near that both powers had to agree 
on a course of action after its disintegration. The Tsar’s attempt to reach 
an Anglo-Russian understanding over the Ottoman Empire in 1844, which 
will be covered in the following section, can be considered as an example 
of Russia’s ‘managed revisionism’ in the Near East. 
 
While visiting Britain in 1844, the Tsar raised the issue of a prior 
agreement over the future of the Ottoman Empire with Aberdeen, the then 
Foreign Minister. It seemed that the Tsar still held the view that Ottoman 
Empire was a ‘corpse’, despite all of the reforms that had been undertaken 
since 1839.2 He suggested that the two powers should consult over the 
steps to be taken in order to avoid a general war among the great powers 
should the Ottoman Empire disintegrate; however the British government 
believed that any such scheme would speed up her demise, although not 
doubting the sincerity of the Tsar regarding the preservation of the 
Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the government was inclined to 
interpret his overtures as being based on concerns about the preservation 
of the order brought about by the 1815 Settlements rather than for any 
form of aggrandisement.3   
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In a subsequent visit by Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode, both 
states agreed on the need to preserve the Ottoman Empire for as long as 
possible; but concurred that ‘her collapse was highly likely and that two 
powers must then confer to decide on a course of action that would 
remove the danger of a general war’.4 However, this understanding did not 
result in a treaty, as each state had different priorities and objectives. 
While Britain thought that the agreement should consolidate the views 
and policies of both states with the aim being to strengthen the Ottoman 
Empire and allow it to stand on its own two feet, Russia believed the 
agreement should provide a base for cooperation in the post-Ottoman era. 
Put differently, there was no change in the policies of either power 
regarding the Near East. Britain would not step back from her policy of 
maintaining the status quo, and Russia still held on to her revisionist 
objectives. In this case, an Anglo-Russian agreement on the issue would 
likely be impossible, as the events leading up to the Crimean War would 
illustrate.5 
 
The second attempt of Tsar Nicholas I to come to a prior agreement 
with Britain over the future of the Ottoman Empire occurred in 1853, and 
is popularly known as the ‘Seymour Conversations’.6 This issue will be 
covered in an analysis of the antagonism between France and Russia over 
the Holy Places issue; however first an assessment will be made of the 
most important event in the lead up to the Crimean War and its 
implications on the 1815 European States System: the 1848 Revolutions.   
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b. 1848 Revolutions and the 1815 European States 
System. 
The 1848 revolutions were a highly significant event that brought 
systemic changes to the workings of the 1815 European States System 
and in the domestic regimes of all the great powers, aside from those of 
Britain and Russia.  
  
The wave of 1848 revolutions started in January 1848 in Palermo 
and spread   to the rest of Italy and France in February, before sweeping 
over central Europe. The social and economic causes and consequences of 
those revolutions fall outside the scope of this thesis, and so will not be 
covered here; however the resulting changes to the political map will be 
covered in depth. Increasing nationalism was one of the primary causes of 
the revolutions. Politically, they brought about significant changes in the 
domestic regimes of France, Austria and Prussia. The consequence of 
those revolutions and the accompanying social upheavals was the 
replacement of the ruling elites, who had lived through the Napoleonic 
wars and were to some extent involved in the forging of the 1815 
Settlements, with a new generation of rulers in the governments of all the 
continental great powers in central Europe. Not even Metternich, who had 
been involved in the 1815 Settlements and their execution, could escape 
the effects of the regime changes. This change in the political decision-
making bodies of those states was a sign that the restrictive and 
cautionary effects of the Napoleonic Wars in the processes of foreign 
policy-making of those states were starting to erode.  
 
It was in France that the most remarkable domestic regime change 
occurred. France had become a republic with the overthrow the Orleans 
dynasty, which had replaced the Bourbons in 1830. Napoleon III, the 
nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, was elected as the president of the second 
French Republic under the new constitution that was promulgated after 
the 1848 Revolutions, but he masterfully succeeded in abolishing the 
constitution and became the Emperor of France in 1852. 
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With the 1848 Revolutions, one of the principles of the Concert of 
Europe, which was to prevent revolutionary movements and preserve the 
European dynasties, ceased to function, meaning that the nationalist 
movements would no longer come face-to-face with system-wide coercive 
measures and resulted in the emergence of a much more suitable 
environment for the destabilisation of multinational Empires. 
 
As for Ottoman-Russian relations, an immediate effect of the 1848 
Revolutions was the crisis of Hungarian-Polish refugees between the two 
states. After the Hungarian rebellion was suppressed by the Russian army 
in 1848–1849, around 3,000 Hungarian and Polish refugees fled to the 
Ottoman territories, among which were many notable political and military 
figures.7 The most famous of these were Kussuth, the Hungarian 
insurrection leader, and Zamoysky, the Polish General. 
 
Russia and Austria demanded the repatriation of the refugees on 
the grounds of articles in the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade between Austria and 
the Ottoman Empire, and the 1774 Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire; however the Ottoman government 
argued that those treaties did not commit the Ottoman government to the 
return of political refugees, and declined their demands on the 30 August, 
1849. Instead, she settled them in places far from the Austrian and 
Russian frontiers in accordance with the common practice of the time in 
international relations for political fugitives.8  
 
Russia and Austria reacted. The Tsar sent a special envoy to 
Istanbul, who on September 4, together with the Austrian Ambassador in 
Istanbul, requested the return of the refugees on the grounds that they 
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were criminals; and threatened to break off diplomatic relations if their 
demands were not met. The Ottoman government refused to comply, and 
Austria and Russia suspended diplomatic relations on 17 September, 
although their ambassadors remained in Istanbul.9 
 
This suspension of relations and the threat of war alarmed Stratford 
Canning, the British ambassador in Istanbul, who wrote to London and to 
William Parker, the British admiral in Malta, requesting part of the British 
naval fleet sail to the Dardanelles as a precautionary measure. In his 
despatch to London, he gave a full account of the matter, including 
Austria and Russia’s threats to break off relations, and stated that he had 
so far supported the Ottoman government, in agreement with the French 
ambassador. He added that he hoped ‘Her Majesty’s Government will 
sympathise with the Sultan and be earnestly disposed to rescue him, if 
possible, in some way or other from the necessities of his present 
position.’10    
 
Palmerston, the British foreign minister, had already made up his 
mind on a course of action even before Canning’s dispatch arrived. He 
wrote in a dispatch to the British ambassador in Paris on 29 September 
that the only way to avert the crisis between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia-Austria would be to make Austria and Russia understand that the 
Ottoman government had friends who would back and defend her in times 
of need. To that end, he asked the ambassador in Paris to ask the French 
be ready to deploy squadrons in the Mediterranean and to take up 
position in the Dardanelles, ready to sail to Istanbul if invited by Sultan.11   
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Upon receiving the requests from Canning and the Ottoman 
government, Palmerston immediately told Russian Ambassador F. 
Ivanovich Brunnov on 2 October that Britain would support the Ottoman 
Empire against any threat.12 On the same day he obtained the Cabinet’s 
approval to enter into communications with the government of France in 
parallel with the views he had expressed to Canning in Paris in his 29 
September dispatch, and communicated his actions to Canning in 
Istanbul.13 British policy regarding the issue was finalised on 7 October, 
and Canning was instructed accordingly.14 Palmerston stated that Britain 
would not hesitate to comply with a request of support from the Ottoman 
government, and reminded the five powers of their solemn declaration in 
1841 to respect the inviolability of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and that 
he believed the French government would be also ready to grant support if 
sought by the Ottoman government. 
 
France did not want to pass up the opportunity to forge an 
alignment with Britain, and made similar promises. To that end, the 
French fleet was also instructed to join the British fleet in the Dardanelles. 
 
In the meantime, the Ottoman government sent a special envoy, 
Fuad Effendi, on a secret mission with a letter in reply to the Tsar. He held 
several meetings with Nesselrode in the second week of October, and a 
deal was struck to relocate the refugees as far away from the borders as 
possible.15 On the other hand, Austria had already decided to separate her 
diplomatic activities from those of Russia.16 This parting facilitated to 
bring an end to the crisis.  
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The resoluteness of Britain and her leading role in obtaining French 
support were decisive factors in the reaching of a result, however the 
development of the crisis and the reactions of Britain and France were a 
clear signal to Russia that if she did not act with moderation in the Near 
East, an Anglo-French alliance would be the most likely outcome within 
the 1815 European States System.  
 
2. The Events Preceding the Crimean War 
 
The events that led up to the Crimean War started with a dispute of 
symbolic importance over some rights and privileges concerning the use 
and repair of a number of sites of religious importance for Orthodox and 
Catholic (the Latin) Christians in Jerusalem. The actions of the involved 
parties, which turned it from a purely civil matter into the greatest 
international crisis of the time, offers a good illustration of how far states 
in the 19th century could use seemingly minor issues to engage in power 
politics, and how delicate the territorial and political equilibrium of the 
1815 European States System truly was.  
 
There were a number of significant events from the start of the 
dispute over the Holy Places in May 1850 until the outbreak of war in 
1854 between the alliance of Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire, 
and Russia. These events, in chronological order, were the dispute of the 
Holy Places between the Orthodox and Latin Churches under the 
patronage, respectively, of Russia and France; the forced entry to the 
Straits of the French warship on the pretext of carrying the newly 
appointed French ambassador to Istanbul; the Tsar’s attempt to form an 
Anglo-Russian alliance; the Menshikov Mission to Istanbul; and the 
occupation of the Principalities by Russia. 
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a. Question of Holy Places and Russian-French Rivalry in 
the Near East 
Jerusalem has occupied a special place in the minds of the followers 
of Judaism, Christianity and Islam since time immemorial, irrespective of 
the sovereignty of the city.  
 
Being aware of the religious significance of the place for all Christian 
denominations, the Ottoman authorities opened the sanctuaries to all 
sects, but to varying degrees. There had been no problem in this regard 
until the beginning of the 19th century, as most of the followers of the 
Orthodox or Eastern Church were Ottoman subjects, and so had an 
inherent right to perform services there, while the non-Ottoman Catholics 
were also given some rights in this regard. In any case, the last word in 
regulating access lay solely with the political authority, and order in the 
use of the sanctuaries had been maintained until the 19th century. 
 
 The first half of the 19th century witnessed the steady ascendancy 
of Orthodox influence in Jerusalem, in parallel with the rise of Russian 
power in international politics. On the other side, the influence of the 
Latin Church decreased as a consequence of a rise in the domestic 
influence of secular forces in France after the 1789 revolution17 and the 
international restriction of France in the 1815 European States System. 
The steady growth of the Orthodox Church brought great disappointment 
and discontent among the Latin community in Jerusalem, and 
consequently in the Catholic Church.18  
 
The first seeds were sown of the 1852 dispute over Holy Places when 
the Greeks were given the right to rebuild the Church of the Saviour (Holy 
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Sepulchre) in 1808 after it had been destroyed by fire.19 That event ignited 
a bitter feud between the two sects, as the Orthodox Church replaced the 
Latin symbols and inscriptions with Orthodox ones during the repair. The 
Catholic clergy mounted a bitter campaign, asking for their historical 
rights to be recognised and for the church to be restored in that respect. 
When its cupola was due for repair, the Catholic Church claimed that it 
was their right to carry out the repair, and turned to France to mediate in 
their dealings with the Ottoman authorities. 
  
The second incident related to the 1852 dispute of Holy Places 
occurred in 1847. During a service held by the Orthodoxies in the Church 
of the Nativity in Bethlehem, a star of religious importance for Catholics 
was lost, and naturally, the Catholic community blamed the Orthodox 
clergy.  
 
France’s Demand to Invoke the 1740 Capitulations and the Start of 
the Holy Places Issue 
The complaints from the Catholic Church and their application for 
state mediation coincided with the desire of Luis Napoleon to have the 
support of the Church in his domestic politics and to continue the 
assertive role of France in the Near East. As indicated in previous 
chapters, successive French governments, as part of their revisionist 
efforts, had applied policies aimed at playing a more assertive role in the 
Near East since 1815.  
 
The starting point of the internationalisation of the Holy Places’ 
issue occurred when the French ambassador in Istanbul communicated a 
request from Napoleon III to the Ottoman government in May 1852 for the 
return to the Catholic Church of nine Holy Places, on the grounds that 
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they had been assigned to the church by the 1740 capitulations.20 The 
request had been endorsed also by representatives of other Catholic 
countries, including Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sicily and Tuscany.21 At the 
same time, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem made a formal request for 
permission to repair the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre.22   
 
Assessing the sensitivity and international implications of the issue, 
the Ottoman government acted with great caution, taking almost a whole 
year to deliver its reply to the French Embassy, which it did on 30 
December, 1850.23 The Ottoman government informed the French 
Embassy of its intention to set up a mixed commission with members 
from all of the involved parties to make a study of the dispute, since the 
complexity of entangled historical rights, privileges etc. was making it very 
difficult for them to reach a fair and quick decision.  
 
France was not satisfied with the Government’s decision to defer the 
issue to a commission, and made a much more serious inquiry on 23 
February, 1851 asking ‘whether the Porte considers itself still bound to 
her by the Capitulations of 1740 … and if not, the Porte will understand 
that the result can only be a serious prejudice to its relations with 
France’.24 France’s argument was based on the principle that none of the 
unilateral arrangements, such as the fermans (imperial decrees) and 
concessions giving rights to the Orthodox clergy with regard to the use of 
the sanctuaries, could invalidate such bilateral arrangements as the 1740 
Capitulations between the Ottoman Empire and France. However France 
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later moderated its position, consenting to the establishment of the mixed 
commission after appreciating the complexity of the matter.25 The French 
representative, M. de Lavalette, proposed a settlement that envisioned the 
joint use of three of the nine places under the sole possession of the 
Orthodox Church,26 as the remaining other six places were already in 
common use. 
 
Following this French proposal, the Ottoman government, 
considering a resolution to allow all of the holy places of the Christian 
faith in Jerusalem to be opened for use by all, informally inquired whether 
France would consent to sharing the sacred places, other than the nine 
currently disputed sites under the sole use of the Catholic Church. De 
Lavelette turned down the proposal, saying that no such demand had 
been made by the Orthodox community for the use of the sacred places 
possessed by the Catholic Church.  
 
Intervention of Russia on behalf of the Orthodox Church  
The Orthodox community in Jerusalem was aware of the French 
request in Istanbul, and so it did not take long for Russia to intervene. 
Russia was content with the existing situation, in which the Orthodoxies 
had an advantage, and so did not want the balance to change in favour of 
the Catholics. To this end, Russia was adamant that there should be no 
change to the status quo.27 Apart from her efforts in Istanbul in the 
Ottoman court, Russia also tried to dissuade France from pursuing the 
matter any further, since it would also disturb further the situation among 
the Christians in the Levant.28 
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When all efforts failed to dissuade the French and to prevent the 
Ottoman government from processing the French request, Russia decided 
to become actively involved in the matter. Russian Ambassador M. D. 
Titov had an audience with the Sultan and conveyed a message and two 
letters of the Tsar. Nicholas I stated in his letters, which were addressed to 
the Sultan in person, that there should be no ‘unjust concessions 
regarding the religious establishments that have been possessed since 
time immemorial by the Greek Church and visited by annually by my 
subjects by virtue of the treaties that fortunately exist between our 
countries’.29 In this way Russia was stating that it would not allow any 
change to take place regarding the possessions of the sanctuaries in 
dispute, that is, a change in the status quo that currently favoured the 
Orthodox Church.30  
 
Upon the reaction of Russia, the Ottoman government proposed the 
common use of all of the places in dispute. In this way it was trying to 
meet the demands of both states, while asking considerable concessions 
from the French side. However, the proposal was rejected by both sides,31 
and, moreover, the rivalry between the two countries reached the level of 
threats to break off relations with the Ottoman Empire unless their 
demands were met.32  
 
The works of the Commission were superseded by the diplomatic 
disputes; however the Commission had already reached a deadlock in the 
discussion related to the validity of some of the documents presented by 
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the Orthodox members, who subsequently decided not to participate any 
further.33  
 
Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government decided to 
replace the mixed commission with the new one, comprising only leading 
Muslim experts and scholars, to examine the rights and privileges of the 
two sides under the existing treaties and fermans (imperial decrees).34  
 
Findings of the New Commission and Disagreements over its 
Conclusions 
The new commission concluded its assessments towards the end of 
the year after a meticulous study of all the relevant documents and 
claims. Its first conclusion was that the 1740 Capitulations between 
France and Ottoman Empire did not supersede the previous unilateral 
fermans that had granted certain rights and privileges to the Orthodox 
Church in regard to the use of the Holy Places. Secondly, Russia, in 
contrast to the position of France, had no right to act on behalf of the 
Jerusalem Orthodox Church for the Holy Places, whose rights only came 
from the fermans issued by previous Sultans.35   
 
On the basis of these two main principles, the Commission 
submitted its report and recommendations to the Ottoman government, 
which approved the conclusions and recommendations with slight 
modifications.36  
 
In accordance with the Commission report, the Ottoman 
government prepared a note addressed to France and issued a ferman to 
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the Jerusalem Orthodox Church for the settlement of the Holy Places 
dispute. The French note gave the Catholics two keys to the north and 
south doors of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, and a key to the 
Grotto of the Nativity. The Latin priests and the Ottoman subjects of the 
Catholic religion were to be admitted to the Tomb of the Blessed Mary to 
perform their services on the condition that they make no alterations, 
either in the administration or in the existing state of the monument.37 As 
for the repair of the dome of the Church of Saviour, the works were to be 
carried out by the Ottoman government in consultation with 
representatives of all parties.38 
 
On the other hand, the ferman to the Orthodox Church, which was 
issued later than the French note, underlined that the new arrangements 
would not permit any alteration to the existing state of the sanctuaries or 
their contents. The government also decided that there was no need to 
read the ferman out but only to register, advising that it be kept and 
produced only in case of emergency.39  
 
Contrary to the expectations of the government, the dispute did not 
end with these decisions, as the stipulations contained within the ‘French 
Note’ contradicted the ferman issued to the Orthodox Church. While with 
the ‘French Note’ the Ottoman government intended to maintain her treaty 
obligations with France and with the other Catholic powers, on the other 
hand, she tried to preserve the existing states of affairs of the Orthodox 
Church with the ferman. In simple terms, she to an extent tried to satisfy 
both sides by giving and taking to and from each side.40  
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It seemed that the government had tried to meet the demands of 
both sides, that is, the restoration of the rights of the Catholics and the 
preservation of the status quo for the Orthodox; however the way the note 
and ferman were formulated fell short of achieving that goal, and so the 
dispute did not end there. The persistent interventions and threats of the 
French and Russian representatives prevented the Ottoman government 
from reaching a precise and final decision in the dispute.41  
 
The Ottoman government, in October 1852, sent its commissioner 
to execute the decision. The Commissioner read out the order of the 
Sultan in the presence of the consuls of Russia, France and Austria, 
permitting the Catholics to celebrate Mass once a year, but requiring the 
altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. When he was asked to 
read out also the ferman, he replied that he did not have it in his 
possession, and that his instruction did not cover the promulgation of the 
ferman, upon which the Russian consul walked out of the ceremony. 42 
This was only a partial execution of the decision, and it was not until 
December that its execution could be completed. On 22 December the 
Latin Patriarch deposited the Silver Star with great ceremony in the 
sanctuary in Bethlehem, and two keys to the sanctuary were handed over 
to the Catholic clergy. In the words of the British Consul,’ the Greeks 
(Orthodox) felt this severely and were highly indignant’.43     
 
b. Arrival of the French Warship in the Bosporus 
France did not hesitate in using threatening language in her 
relations with the Ottoman Empire in the context of the Holy Places issue. 
Her representative in Istanbul on one occasion mentioned the need to 
dispatch the French fleet to the Dardanelles to force the Ottoman 
government to adhere to her commitments after she abolished the mixed 
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commission.44 When the Ottoman Empire issued the ferman, which 
contained phrases that were out of accord with the French note of 9 
February, France protested harshly, and even accused the Ottoman 
government of yielding to Russian threats. 
 
 Naval intervention became possible when Lavalette returned to 
Istanbul as ambassador. The French government sent its new steam-
powered warship Charlemagne to Istanbul on the pretext of carrying the 
ambassador. Although permission for passage in the Dardanelles was 
given on the spot by a special decree of the Sultan, Russia and Britain 
protested that the event was in explicit violation of the 1841 Straits 
Convention.45 In response, the Ottoman and French governments 
confirmed that such acts would not be allowed to happen, however the 
French naval show did not end there. On two separate occasions, France 
made a show of strength to the Ottoman provincial administrators in 
Tripoli and Epirus when her requests were not met by the local rulers,46 
which compelled Russia to adopt a harsh stance against the Ottoman 
Empire. Before relating the Russian reactions, first, the consequences of 
the demands of both states in the context of the Holy Places issues will be 
addressed. 
 
c. Differences in the Consequences of the Demands of 
France and Russia over the Holy Places Issue 
There was a huge difference in the implications of the French and 
Russian demands concerning the Holy Places issue for the Ottoman 
Empire. France’s demands were very clear, under the 1740 Capitulations 
in that they were limited to the Catholic clergy‘s spiritual and religious 
functions and the ecclesiastical establishments, and had nothing to do 
with the Catholic subjects of the Sultan. Russia’s position, on the other 
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hand, was very different, since she was citing Article VII of the Treaty of 
Kucuk Kaynarca (1774) and her own wide interpretation of its contents in 
her demands.47 Therefore, her argument was based around not only the 
Orthodox Church and its ecclesiastical establishments, but also the 
protection of the 12 million Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.48 In fact, 
Article VII merely committed the Ottoman government to protect the 
Christian religion and its churches,49 and had nothing to do with the Holy 
Places issue, as both sides were Christian. This situation raised the 
suspicions of Britain and Austria against Russia since her arguments 
threatened to undermine the loyalty of the majority of the Sultan’s non-
Muslim subjects and shifted their sovereignty to the Tsar.50 
 
d. Menshikov Mission to Istanbul and Seymour 
Conversations in St. Petersburg – Preparing the 
Ground for War 
The Ottoman government’s decision regarding the Holy Places was 
taken by the Orthodox Church and Russia as a breach of the promise to 
maintain the status quo given to Russia by the Sultan. They considered it 
the work of a pro-French clique lead by Foreign Minister K. Fuad.51 The 
conclusion had wounded Nicholas I too deeply for him to accept defeat.52 
In fact, as Goldfrank pointed out, the Ottoman government did not 
concede to all the demands of the French government but had actually 
tried to strike a balance between the demands of the two sides. 53  
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For Russia, the issue went way beyond the possession of some keys 
and places of worship, as their concern was based on the change to the 
status quo that had prevailed since the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War 
and the concluding Treaty of Adrianople in the Near East. As touched 
upon in the previous chapters, the policy of Russia with regard to 
Ottoman Empire shifted from bold revisionism to managed or controlled 
revisionism after 1829, with the main intention being to preserve the weak 
Ottoman Empire, so long as it remained under the influence of Russia. 
The French attempt to revoke the 1740 Capitulations was interpreted as a 
challenge to Russia in the Near East, however France was the last power 
that Russia could bear to see increase her influence in the Near East. 
France was pursuing a policy for the revision of the 1815 Settlements, and 
had been the traditional ally of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century 
until the beginning of the 19th century. Therefore, the French challenge 
could have been tolerated in Egypt, for example in 1839, but not in 
Istanbul in 1852, specifically a challenge from Napoleon III.  
 
In the eyes of the Russian statesmen, the Ottoman Empire gave in 
to the French demands under the threat of French reprisals, and very 
recently, Austria, likewise, had succeeded in convincing the Ottoman 
Empire to accept her demands in the Montenegrin crisis.54 Similarly, if 
this was the way to handle affairs with the Ottoman Empire, Russia had 
to prove her political weight in the Near East. It had to take coercive action 
and force the Ottoman government to make good on the broken promises 
made to the Tsar, and to restore the status quo for the Orthodox Church. 
To this end, Nicolas I decided not to send any further personal 
communications to the Sultan, since his letter had not produced anything 
different but to send extraordinary envoy to Istanbul. Moreover, he 
decided to mobilise two army corps in the Balkans and speed up the 
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preparations of her Black Sea fleet to demonstrate his seriousness over 
the issue.55  
 
However, the Tsar was aware of the international implications of any 
military action against Ottoman Empire without the consent or agreement 
of Britain, at the very least, and so Nicholas I decided also to attempt to 
revive the 1844 agreement with Britain. In the meantime, the new British 
government, under the premiership of Lord Aberdeen, who had taken part 
in forging the 1844 agreement, raised the hopes of Nicholas I to ally with 
Britain in the Near East against France in 1853 as it had over the Greek 
and Egyptian issues in 1826 and 1839. 
   
The Tsar’s initiative to look for cooperation with Britain in the Near 
East resulted in meetings between the Tsar and British Ambassador 
Hamilton Seymour in St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1853. The 
‘Seymour Conversations’ failed to reach their objectives, serving rather to 
raise the suspicions of Britain over the Tsar’s intentions for the Ottoman 
Empire, and would become a milestone in Anglo-Russian relations 
regarding the Near East and pave the way for Anglo-French Alliance in 
Near East.  
  
The first meeting, although brief, is the most referenced, taking 
place on 9 January, 1853 over dinner. The Tsar, after remarking on the 
new Aberdeen government, said: ‘The affairs of Turkey are in a very 
disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces; the 
fall will be a great misfortune. It is very important that Britain and Russia 
should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs and that 
neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised’. 
Then he continued, ‘we have a sick man on our hands, it will, I tell you 
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frankly, be a great misfortune, if one of these days he slips through our 
hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made’.56  
 
Following this short but striking conversation, the Tsar met 
Seymour again on 14 January and elaborated his views.  He assured 
Seymour that Russia was not on any territorial quest and that he 
considered the Ottoman Empire to be a good neighbour as it was not 
aggressive. However, he said, she had fallen into decay and could die very 
soon; and while nobody wanted that to happen, if it did, she would not be 
able to rise again. He therefore suggested that it would be wise to make 
plans for a course of action beforehand rather than face ‘the chaos, 
confusion, and the certainty of European war if it should occur 
unexpectedly and before some ulterior system has been sketched’.57  
 
The British statesmen, in the beginning, were not alarmed by Tsar’s 
views, considering them to be the same as those expressed by him in 
1844,58 however the Tsar revealed that he had more in mind when he 
approached Seymour at a ball and asked for the reply of the British 
government to his offer. On learning that the British government did not 
consider that Ottoman Empire to be at the end of her life, and 
consequently was not in favour of a scheme that could stir up trouble, his 
reaction was, ‘I repeat to you that the sick man is dying.’59 
 
The last of the series of meetings was on 21 February, when 
Nicholas I set out some details of his ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. He 
explained that his intention was to demonstrate that Britain and Russia 
had a common interest in providing ready access to the Black Sea and the 
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Mediterranean. When Seymour raised the position of Austria during the 
meeting, the Tsar said, ‘When I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well, 
what suits the one suits other; our interests as regards Turkey are 
perfectly identical’ 60 Seymour regarded these words as the understanding 
having been struck between Austria and Russia regarding the Ottoman 
Empire. Then Nicholas elaborated some details of his proposal for the 
setting of the post-Ottoman order: ‘The Principalities and Serbia would 
remain under Russian protection, as they have since the beginning of the 
19th century; Bulgaria can be an independent state; Britain should occupy 
Egypt,’ and added that if Britain wants that he would not object to Candia 
(Crete) as well.61 As for the status of Istanbul, Seymour wrote, ‘He 
especially employed precise terms with respect to commercial policy to be 
observed at Constantinople when no longer held by the Turks’, but with 
regard to its political status, he wrote that ‘his Majesty is intentionally 
inexplicit as to its temporary occupation’.62 
 
On the following day, Nesselrode sent a verbal note to Seymour to 
soften the position of the Tsar, asserting that the Tsar was not proposing 
the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, but was rather ensuring that each 
side avoid acting at cross-purposes.63  
 
The meetings between Nicholas I and Seymour would determine the 
British position with regard to Russia for the next two decades. Rather 
than gaining an ally, the Tsar made the British government suspicious of 
his intentions in the Near East. His efforts to come to an understanding, 
or, in his terms, ‘a gentlemen’s agreement’ in 1853 for what he had 
already proposed in 1844 about a course of action in the event of the 
                                                 
60
Seymour to Russell,  February 22, 1853, No. 6,  pp. 9-12,  Part V,  EP 
 
61
 Seymour to Russell,  February 22, 1853, No. 6,  pp. 9-12,  Part V,  EP  
  
62
 Ibid.  
 
63
Zayonchkovskiy, Vostochnaya Voyna v Svyazi s Sovremennoy ey Politicheskoy Obstanovkoy, 4 volumes, 
(St. Petersburg, 1908–1913), Prilozheniye, p. 362  
 
 240 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire played a significant role in the shift of 
Britain to the side of France. Seymour concluded from his meetings with 
the Tsar that Russia had already made up her mind and had come to an 
agreement with Austria about the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, and 
was trying to win Britain over to complete the isolation of France.64  
 
 Menshikov Mission 
The choice of A. S. Menshikov as the special envoy to send to 
Istanbul indicated the importance of the mission for Nicholas I, being one 
of the most influential dignitaries in the Russian imperial court and also 
personal friend of the Tsar.65 However, he had been the former general 
governor of Finland so that he lacked the necessary experience and 
knowledge about the Near Eastern affairs.66   
 
His instruction contained three main goals:67 Firstly, he was to 
secure a new ferman from the Sultan confirming the Orthodox privileges 
as they had existed in February 1852. In that respect, the repair of the 
cupola of the Church of the Nativity was to be carried out under the 
control of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. Secondly, a new 
convention or sened (unilateral commitment by the Ottoman government) 
was to be obtained from the Sultan granting and guaranteeing all of the 
rights and privileges to the Orthodox subjects of Sultan for the future. 
This would acknowledge Russia’s right to protect the Orthodox subjects 
and would have the force of a treaty. To that end, Menshikov was given a 
draft of seven articles.68 Thirdly, the religious influence of France had to 
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be checked in Near East. Actually, this instruction, although specifying 
religious influence, hinted at the overall influence of France given that the 
number of Catholic subjects of the Sultan were very limited To curb the 
influence of France, Menshikov would offer to sign a secret defensive and 
limited alliance with the Ottoman Empire if she hesitated in signing a 
convention with Russia about the rights and privileges to her Orthodox 
subjects because of fear of France. 
 
Moreover, the instruction stated that he should refuse to deal with 
Foreign Minister Fuad, who had convinced the Sultan to break his pledge 
to the Tsar and was the driving force behind the pro-French faction.  
 
As Goldfrank pointed out, Menshikov’s portfolio of instructions 
prepared him mentally and operationally not for negotiations, but for 
diktat.69 His journey to Istanbul, with an accompanying delegation, was 
also consistent with his instructions, starting with a visit to the 5th Corps, 
which had already been ordered to mobilise,70 after which he called in on 
Sebastopol where the Black Sea fleet was anchored, where a great military 
display was held by the navy in his honour. He finally arrived in Istanbul 
aboard a warship.71 His delegation included the son of Nesselrode, Vice 
Admiral Kornilov, the Chief of the Black Sea Navy, and the Chief of Staff of 
the 5th Army Corps. All of these details can be considered as a response to 
the French naval show of force during the negotiations of the Holy Places 
issue the previous year, and a challenge to Russian influence in the Near 
East.72   
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The menacing aspects of the Menshikov mission did not end with 
his arrival in Istanbul, but went on unabated for the duration of his stay 
in Istanbul, as we see shortly. The first of them was to refuse to see the 
Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, which was unusual in the diplomatic 
practices so that the British and French representatives were alarmed.73 
After visiting the Grand Vizier (equivalent to the post of Prime Minister in 
the Ottoman Empire), he deliberately bypassed the office of Foreign 
Minister Fuad Pasha in the adjoining room of the Grand Vizier,74 an  act 
that was in clear violation of established diplomatic traditions and 
practices. This snub to Fuad was due to his perceived impartiality during 
the negotiations for the Holy Places issue. Upon that intended explicit 
insult, the Foreign Minister resigned and was replaced by Rifat Pasha.75  
 
It seemed that the Ottoman government had made up its mind to 
act with patience and restraint, and this would be a key characteristic of 
the Ottoman stance for the duration of the Menshikov mission.76 The goal 
was not to give any pretext to Russia or lose the support of the European 
public, which had been very favourable to the Ottoman Empire due to her 
firm stance against Russia in the issue of the Hungarian refugees in 1849.  
 
The same mood of restraint did not prevail in the British and French 
Embassies, where the harsh and unusual behaviours of Menshikov at the 
outset of his mission had rung alarm bells. Accordingly, they asked their 
governments to dispatch their respective fleets to Istanbul.77 British 
Chargé d’ Affaires Hugh Rose asked Admiral W. D. Dundas to dispatch the 
Mediterranean squadron to Istanbul, who declined the request but 
informed the Admiralty. France, on the other hand, sent her fleet, not to 
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Istanbul, but to Salamis Bay in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British 
government endorsed Dundas’ decision not to act, as Aberdeen still 
believed that the French menaces towards the Ottoman Empire the 
previous year had given Russia a pretext for its actions, besides which he 
tended not to see eye-to-eye with France.78 The refusal to send the 
squadron by the British government seemed to increase the resoluteness 
of Nicholas I in his bid towards the Ottoman Empire. However the British 
government, rather than sending its navy, decided to send Stafford 
Canning back to Istanbul to take up the post he had left six months 
earlier. Canning’s orders were to put pressure on France to settle the 
unseemly dispute of the Holy Places, and his presence would prove to be 
much more effective in the Menshikov negotiations than the presence of 
the fleet.  He was instructed ‘to use every effort to ward off a Turkish war 
and to persuade the powers interested to look to an amicable termination 
of existing disputes.’ Moreover, he was authorised to ask for the 
Mediterranean fleet to be held in readiness, but the final order for its 
deployment would be in the hands of the government.79   
 
 In the meantime, Menshikov had presented a note verbale to the 
Ottoman government on 16 March. In his note, he was accusing the 
Ottoman government of breaking its promises regarding the preservation 
of the status quo in the use of the Holy Places, and asking it to remedy the 
damages that had been incurred. To that end, Russia was requesting an 
arrangement be made that covered not only the Orthodox clergy and 
church, but also all of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman State, citing 
that she ‘can no longer be confined to barren and unsatisfactory promises 
which may be broken at a future period.’ To this end, Menshikov 
submitted a draft sened on 22 March that included guarantees of the 
religious welfare of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.80 
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 The preamble of the draft explicitly referred to the 1774 Kucuk 
Kaynarca Treaty, stating as its intention ‘to better explain and make 
precise the terms and the meaning of articles VII, VIII, XIV and XVI of the 
treaty concluded in the year 1774 at Kucuk Kaynarca and confirmed by 
subsequent treaties and that of Adrianople’ for the constant protection of 
the Christian religion in the Ottoman Empire and all its churches.81 
Moreover, it suggested life tenure for the Orthodox patriarchs, which 
would make them practically independent, with no responsibility to the 
Ottoman state, even in their civil duties.  
 
Those proposals in the form of convention or sened, bilaterally 
committing the Ottoman Empire to Russia, would have very serious 
consequences for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman state, 
and consequently for the future of the political equilibrium of the 1815 
European States System, as the demands covered not only the Orthodox 
Church and its clergy, but also the Orthodox lay-subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire. The text of the note and draft emphasised coverage of ‘the 
Orthodox religion’ as well as for ‘its clergy and benefices’ in the Empire. 
Even if the demand for protection had been restricted to the clergy, it 
would still have serious consequences for the integrity and independence 
of Ottoman Empire, given that the Orthodox clergy were responsible for 
carrying out civil duties related to the 12 million Orthodox subjects of the 
Sultan under the unique ‘Millet System’.82 As pointed out earlier, the 
French demands under the 1740 Capitulations covered only the protection 
of her own Catholic nationals and the Latin monks, and had nothing to do 
with the Catholic lay-subjects of the Sultan. As such, Russia’s demands 
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would definitely place Russia over France in respect of influence in the 
Near East, and would amount to a serious disruption in the political 
equilibrium of the 1815 European States System.  
 
The first round of negotiations in Istanbul between the new Foreign 
Minister Rifat and Menshikov lasted for 12 days.83 Rifat succeeded in 
convincing Menshikov during their negotiations to separate the issue of 
the Holy Places from the issue of the convention or sened guaranteeing 
the future of the religious welfare of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
state.84 As a result, with the mediation of British ambassador, it did not to 
take long for a settlement to be reached on the Holy Places to which the 
Catholics also agreed. The last objections of Russia regarding the 
proposal, communicated on 19 April, were addressed, and the Ottoman 
government promulgated on 5 May two fermans bringing to an end the 
two-and-a-half year issue of the Holy Places.85  
 
After successfully concluding the Holy Places issue, Menshikov 
reopened the last and most significant and controversial part of his 
mission: to obtain a sened or convention agreeing that Russia had a right 
to protect the Orthodox religion and its followers under Ottoman 
sovereignty. To that end, he sent a new note on 5 May to the Ottoman 
Foreign Ministry. The note was in fact an ultimatum, giving the Ottoman 
government five days to reply, and threatening to leave with the embassy 
staff in the event of non-compliance.86 He also enclosed a new draft sened 
(written promise) or convention that was almost identical to that of 22 
March, apart from a few modifications, making no mention of the Treaty of 
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Kucuk Kaynarca or the patriarchs’ life tenure.87  The first article of the 
draft stated that no change should be made in the rights and privileges of 
the Orthodox churches that they had enjoyed until that time and the 
Ottoman Empire was to assure these forever on the basis of the strict 
status quo.88 No change should be made in the rights, privileges, and 
immunities that the churches, the pious institutions and the Orthodox 
clergy had enjoyed or were in their possession ab antique in the states of 
the Ottoman Sublime Porte, which is pleased to assure these to them 
forever on the basis of the strict status quo existing today. Additionally, the 
second article granted automatically to ‘the Ottoman Orthodox cult’ any 
rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman government in the past 
or in the future to the other Christian cults by means of treaties, 
conventions or particular dispositions’. 89  
 
However, Menshikov’s negotiating position was not as strong as it 
had been during the first round concerning the Holy Places dispute, as he 
now seemed to be requesting something that was beyond the religious 
rights and privileges of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This 
was aimed explicitly at establishing the Russian ascendancy and political 
predominance in the Near East over the 12 million Orthodox Christians of 
the Ottoman Empire. Even British Premier Lord Aberdeen, who was 
favourable to Russia, said that Menshikov’s demands were ‘certainly 
unreasonable’,90 and both the English and French ambassadors advised 
the Ottoman government to resist. On 7 May, the British ambassador 
suggested that Rifat promise ‘to redress any grievances fairly made out on 
behalf of the Greek Church and to confirm and to carry into effect all the 
established rights and privileges already secured by imperial favours to 
the Christian religion’; while the French ambassador informed the 
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Ottoman government that concession to the Russian demand for the 
sened would be in breach of the 1740 capitulations, and so had to be 
resisted.91 Both declined to give the Sultan a blank cheque regarding 
naval aid. But later Stratford Canning hinted that he would deploy the 
fleet if Istanbul was under imminent threat.92 All of these overtures from 
the ambassadors of the maritime powers consolidated the stance of the 
Ottoman government for the refusal of the Russian ultimatum.   
 
The Ottoman government responded to the ultimatum of 5 May with 
a conciliatory note on 10 May stating that ‘the Sublime Porte is entirely 
disposed to observe scrupulously the religious immunities which all the 
subjects of the Sublime Porte enjoy … even though the intentions of the 
Russian government may be friendly, but should a government make with 
another government a sened on such a delicate question … it is evident to 
all in general that it is not only entirely contrary to the rights of 
governments, but that it destroys the foundation of sovereign 
independence’.93 The Ottoman government, as expected, was following a 
very strict and clear-cut policy during all negotiations to reject any 
commitment to a third state about the rights and privileges of her 
Orthodox subjects. It rightly argued that such a commitment to a third 
state in the guise of a sened or convention would mean a violation of her 
sovereign rights and the transfer of her sovereignty over some 12 million 
Orthodox citizens to Russia.94  
 
Menshikov, on receiving the reply, did not immediately pack up and 
leave, but rather extended the ultimatum to 14 May with the hope of 
obtaining a sened with a different guarantee.95 However he was not going 
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to wait in silence, and ordered his ship to prepare for embarkation. Being 
aware of the nature of the incoming reply, he sought the mediation of 
Resid Pasha, who had been the Grand Vizier and the brains behind the 
1839 Tanzimat (Reordering) Edict to reform the Ottoman state 
organisation, to use his influence over the Sultan for a compromise and 
for an audience.96 While the council of ministers was waiting to receive 
him,97 he went directly to the Palace and complained to the Sultan about 
the government, adding that if Resid had been foreign minister, a peaceful 
solution would already have been found. Most importantly, he stated that 
the Sultan had two choices: either the Ottoman Empire would be reduced 
to the level of Greece, Belgium or Switzerland, becoming legally obliged by 
treaty to accept intervention by several great powers, or enter into bilateral 
relations with Russia.98  
 
Sultan Abdulmecid, as a last option, reshuffled his cabinet and 
appointed Resid as foreign minister.99 Resid requested from Menshikov a 
further two-day extension to the ultimatum to allow him to make a 
thorough study of the matter. Menchikov consented to three days and 
delayed his departure, but declared that relations had officially been 
broken. The British ambassador prepared a brief memorandum for his 
meeting with Resid, which expanded upon Rifat’s note of 10 May but 
reduced the guarantee to a solemn communication, instead of a sened, of 
the new fermans to all five great powers instead of only Russia.100 This 
became the alternative proposal of the Ottoman government to the 
Russian proposal draft sened of 5 May, and would guide her negotiations 
for the next five months. 
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The Ottoman Grand Council on 17 May authorised Resid to offer 
Menshikov an official note containing the Sultan’s reaffirmation of the 
rights of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects, and a sened covering the 
Russian churches and hospices in Jerusalem.101 The note offered almost 
the same privileges and guarantees for the Orthodox citizens as had been 
given by successive Ottoman governments as required by their state and 
society understandings without any outside intervention, and it did not 
mention Russia at all. This was exactly the opposite of what the 
Menshikov mission had hoped to achieve, and so Menshikov rejected the 
proposal.  
 
Meanwhile, the representatives of Britain, France, Austria and 
Prussia in Istanbul attempted to mediate between Menshikov and the 
Ottoman government by obtaining some concessions from the Russian 
delegation. To that end, the Austrian and French Ambassadors, on behalf 
of the four powers, met with Menshikov on 20 May, but to no avail.102   
 
Seeing the resoluteness of the Ottoman government regarding its 
right of sovereignty over its 12 million Orthodox subjects, no matter who 
was in charge of the foreign office, Menshikov informed them that he 
would consent to a statement from the Ottoman government rather than a 
sened. To that end, he drafted the text of a statement on 20 May and sent 
it to Resid for approval.103 The new draft statement, in the words of 
Jelavich, ‘softened the form but not the basic content of the Menshikov 
mission’.104 It did not offer anything new but changed the wording of the 
previous notes submitted to the Porte.  
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It was obvious from their attitude over the past three months that 
the Ottoman government would not accept such a dangerous bilateral 
pledge to Russia concerning the future of their Orthodox subjects. 
Menshikov, in a private letter to Nesselrode, specified how the draft 
statement would assure Russian influence over the Orthodox Church.105       
 
On the following day, 21 May, Menshikov left Istanbul, reminding 
the Ottoman government of the consequences of any act that might 
invalidate the other rights, privileges and immunities of the Orthodox 
Church.106 
 
e.  Occupation of the Principalities, the Vienna Note for 
Settlement and Russia’s Violent Interpretation of the 
Vienna Note 
After the Menshikov’s departure, Russian Foreign Minister 
Nesselrode sent a note to Resid on 31 May informing him that Russian 
armies would occupy the Principalities as a ‘material guarantee’ of the full 
acceptance of Menshikov’s final proposal.107 He gave the Ottoman 
government a week to reply to the note, which had arrived in Istanbul on 
9 June.108  
 
Before the arrival of Nesselrode’s note, two important developments 
took place. Firstly, the British Cabinet took the decision to send the 
British fleet to Besika Bay just outside the Dardanelles, and France agreed 
to support it with a French squadron;109 and, secondly, the Ottoman 
Empire promulgated two fermans granting some rights to her Orthodox 
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subjects and confirming all of the previous privileges of the Orthodox 
Church.110 With that, the Ottoman Empire was sending a message that 
she was not against any improvement in the state of affairs of her 
Orthodox subjects, but was against associating it to a foreign power, 
namely Russia. 
 
As for the Nesselrode’s note of 31 May, the Ottoman government 
sent a polite refusal to the Russian legation in Istanbul, who were the last 
remaining representatives of Russia left in Istanbul.111 
 
 On July 7, news of the Russian occupation of the Principalities 
arrived in Istanbul and was met with mild reaction from the Ottoman 
government, who refused to accept it as a casus belli.112 Russia, likewise, 
took a softer tone regarding her occupation rather than a hostile attitude, 
stating that her move did not mean war and that it was just a temporary 
measure to ensure a satisfactory answer to the Emperor’s just 
demands.113 In line with that attitude, the Russian troops in the 
principalities took up defensive rather than offensive positions in the 
Ottoman territories.114  
 
On 14 July, the Ottoman government formally protested the 
Russian occupation,115 underlining that Russia’s demands for the 
protection of the Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman Empire were needless, 
as two recent fermans from the Sultan had conceded every legitimate 
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right; and claiming that the Ottoman Empire could not contract ‘exclusive 
obligations’ to any power. Lastly, the government stated that the 
occupation of the Principalities was in violation of the 1841 Straits 
Convention, and appealed to the signatory powers since the Convention 
had guaranteed the territorial integrity and independency of the Ottoman 
Empire.116 
  
The reaction of the great powers to the occupation was mixed. 
Britain did not regard the occupation as grounds for Turkey to declare 
war. In this respect, the British Foreign Minister said that the British fleet 
would not enter the Dardanelles unless there was an imminent threat to 
Istanbul. Britain also considered that Russia was in breach of its promise 
in the 1844 Agreement, which stated that two states would not 
unilaterally act against the Ottoman Empire without consultation with 
each other.117 Likewise, Austria was critical, but asked the Ottoman 
government not to turn the situation into a casus belli.118 France’s 
reaction was the most critical, announcing that the Ottoman government 
was justified in regarding the occupation as an act of war, and said that if 
the Ottoman government opened the Straits to French and British 
warships it would not be in violation of the 1842 Straits Convention.119 In 
that respect, France shared the same view as the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The defence of Russia to those criticisms, in general, was that her 
temporary occupation of the Principalities was partly in response to the 
presence of the allied squadrons in Turkish waters.120 
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 On the basis of the mild reactions and conciliatory attitudes of the 
Ottoman Empire, Britain and Austria, and even France, and the restrictive 
tone of Russia, it seemed that none of the great powers would object to a 
concerted European action to settle the problem. To that end, three major 
initiatives were put forward, but only one of them, known as the Vienna 
Note, would be realised.121 The overall aim of all of the initiatives was to 
satisfy Russia without weakening the sovereign rights of the Ottoman 
Sultan over his Orthodox subjects.  
 
Austria would take a leading role in resolving the dispute, having 
remained in the background since the beginning of the Holy Places.122 The 
Vienna Note was the final attempt to come up with a concerted European 
action to ensure peace, and was finalised by Austrian Emperor Franz 
Joseph and his Foreign Minister Karl Ferdinand von Buol, based on the 
previous work of the representatives of Britain, Austria, Prussia and 
France. 
 
The note was a composite document that was essentially based on 
the previous works of Clarendon and Bourqueney, the British and French 
ambassadors in Vienna, and included a promise from the Sultan that he 
would ‘remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the treaties of Kucuk 
Kaynarca and Adrianople concerning the protection of the Christian 
religion’ and would ‘preserve fully the spiritual privileges of the Orthodox 
Church to enjoy full equality with other rites’. The note also contained a 
reaffirmation of the recent settlement of the Holy Places dispute, with a 
promise to make no changes without the prior understanding of the 
governments of France and Russia, and granting the right to Russia to 
build a church and hospice in Jerusalem. 123  
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Nicholas I approved the note on the condition there would be no 
changes made to it. However the Ottoman government accepted it only 
with some modifications.124 The Porte noted that the phrase of ‘if at all 
times Emperors of Russia have testified to their solicitude for the 
maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Greek Orthodox 
Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan has never refused to 
consecrate them anew by solemn acts’ offered and implied a pretext for 
Russian intervention in the future. The Porte also objected to the reference 
to the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, arguing that the Treaty was not a source 
of religious privileges, and that the religious privileges of the Orthodox 
Church had been recognised and maintained without any outside 
participation since the time of Mehmed the Conquer (1451–1481). She 
further wanted a guarantee from the powers that there would be no future 
interference in or occupation of, the Principalities.125  
 
Nesselrode reacted immediately to the modifications. He sent a 
despatch to Vienna stating that Russia would not accept any changes to 
the note and would thus withdraw its own acceptance, since the proposed 
modifications invalidated the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Kucuk 
Kaynarca.126  
 
It seemed that the Ottoman Empire had destroyed the last chance 
for peace by seeking to modify some of the passages that had been 
designed to satisfy Russia’s demands. This caused much irritation 
throughout Europe; however the negative mood against the Ottoman 
government would abruptly shift in the direction of Russia when a 
German newspaper leaked an analysis made by the Russian Foreign 
Ministry for the Tsar about the proposed modifications.127  
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In that analysis, Nesselrode informed the Tsar that the Vienna Note 
had recognised the rights of Russia to protect the Orthodox subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire.128 Clarendon, the British Foreign Minister, declared that 
Russia had made an ‘unexpected’ or ‘violent interpretation’ of the Vienna 
Note, and thus Britain would longer be advising the Ottoman Empire to 
sign it.129  
 
In the meantime, there was an uprising in Istanbul provoked by the 
pro-war circles against the government and the belief that it was 
conducting pro-Russian policies. Alarmed by the news, France informed 
the Ottoman government of her intention to dispatch her fleet to protect 
the lives and properties of the French citizens in Istanbul. Likewise Britain 
sent an order to Stratford Canning to call up the fleet to Istanbul for the 
same purpose; however Stratford Canning waited until 21 October to give 
the order. Only two steamers from each power were summoned.130 
Needless to say this move meant more than only the protection of 
civilians, as the Russian ‘violent interpretation’ had rendered a further 
step inevitable.131 
 
Russia’s last action before the start of hostilities was an attempt to 
revive the Holy Alliance. The words of Nicholas I to the French ambassador 
summarised the significance of the Holy Alliance for Russia in the Near 
East: ‘The four of you [France, Britain, Austria and Prussia] could dictate 
to me; but that will never happen. I can count on Vienna and Berlin.’132 
However as developments would prove, it was a mistake for Russia to rely 
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the Holy Alliance to that extent; as Taylor put it ‘once the eastern question 
was raised, the Holy Alliance was a ghost, no more’.133 Nevertheless, 
Austria had to be won over by Russia owing to her strategic location in the 
Balkans should war break out with the Ottoman Empire and her maritime 
power allies in the Balkans.  
 
The military manoeuvres in Olmutz offered the opportunity for a 
summit between Austrian Emperor Francis Josef and Nicholas I on 23 
September. Nicholas was very conciliatory in his approach to the problems 
with the Ottoman Empire,134 and spoke of evacuating the Principalities as 
soon as his terms were accepted. However, he stood firm on the 
maintenance of the Treaties of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774) and Adrianople 
(1829), and on the preservation of the status quo relating to the different 
religious groups in the Ottoman Empire. It seemed that Russia was 
seeking for an entente with Austria in case of war against the maritime 
powers of Britain and France. For this reason Russia was flexible 
regarding the Principalities, which were the main concern of Austria.  
 
A new proposal for the settlement of the problem came out of the 
meetings in Olmutz through the initiatives of Boul, the Austrian Foreign 
Minister, who drew up a draft collective note for the four powers of 
Austria, Britain, France and Prussia to mediate between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire.135 The Boul Project, as it would later be known, was 
based on the Vienna Note, but aimed at an authoritative interpretation of 
the Vienna Note which all parties, including Russia, would attach to it.136 
The intention was to address the concerns of the Ottoman Empire that 
Russia would interpret any bilateral commitment over the treatment of the 
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Orthodox religion as a pretext for intervention in domestic issues. 
Moreover, it aimed to alleviate the British reaction to the violent 
interpretation of the Vienna Note by the Russian Foreign Minister.  
 
 
France was content with the note, and the French Ambassador in 
London told Clarendon that France was willing to put its signature to it if 
the British government concurred. Clarendon was reluctant on the 
grounds that the draft note would not provide any real security to the 
Ottoman Empire and would not neutralise the analysis of Count 
Nesselrode, which had disclosed the views of Russia and justified the fears 
of the Ottoman government.137 Clarendon’s attitude led France to follow 
suit in withdrawing her support for the Vienna Note,138 and thus the 
efforts to reach a solution through concerted European action in the form 
of the Vienna Note and the Buol Project ended without success. 
 
This reserved stance of Clarendon against Russia was endorsed by 
the British Cabinet during its meeting on 8 October, during which the 
Cabinet made a number of other important decisions. First, it decided that 
the Tsar’s assurances in the Buol project were not convincing, as the 
Emperor might in the future ‘assert a protectorate over the Greek Church 
and over 12 million of subjects of the Porte’. Second, it sent a pre-emptory 
order to the British ambassador in Istanbul to call the British fleet to 
Istanbul.139 
 
There were two major reasons for such a dramatic change of tack by 
the British government, despite the fact that British Premier, Aberdeen, 
and Foreign Minister, Clarendon, were unwilling to go into war with 
Russia over the Ottoman Empire. 
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Firstly, Britain noticed that she could not expect the Ottoman 
Empire to show restraint any longer, as her territories had been under 
occupation since June. The Sultan had already convened his Great 
Council to decide upon what course the state should follow.140 The 
Council decided unanimously to declare war against Russia if she did not 
evacuate the Principalities, and the Sultan ratified the decision of the 
Council on 29 September, after which the Ottoman commander on the 
Danube front gave an ultimatum to his Russian counterpart to evacuate 
the Principalities within two weeks.141 Under these circumstances, if 
Britain endorsed the draft note by Buol, which did not bring any 
substantial change and was unlikely to be accepted by the Ottoman 
government, then the Ottoman Empire would have to stand alone against 
Russia, as it had in the Greek affair in 1828. The British government 
wanted to avoid such an eventuality.142 Secondly, the British government 
was under pressure from its public, which was severely criticising the 
government as being pro-Russian.  
 
Upon the passing of the deadline for the Russian evacuation of the 
Principalities, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia on 4 October, 
clashes between the Ottoman and Russian forces began on the Danube 
front in the last week of October, and Russia formally declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire on 2 November.143  
 
On 8 October, Resid sent a formal request for the British and 
French fleets to enter the Dardanelles. The British and French 
ambassadors summoned their fleets on 20 October, and they entered the 
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Dardanelles on 22 October.144 Their entrance was not in violation of the 
1841 Straits Convention, since it only forbade the passage of warships 
when the Ottoman Empire was at peace. However, Britain and France 
were still were not formally at war with Russia.   
 
 
3. Failure of Last Minute Efforts and the Declaration of War on 
Russia by France and Britain 
 
Despite the declaration of war between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia, the representatives of the four powers of Britain, France, Austria 
and Prussia did not halt efforts to find a formula that would satisfy both 
sides; and the winter season facilitated further diplomatic efforts since 
actual fighting had not started. 
 
Their attempts focused on developing a base for the start of 
negotiations between the two sides, and to that end they drew up a 
protocol in Vienna on 5 December, 1853 calling for the Tsar to not infringe 
on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and not seek new rights over her 
Orthodox subjects beyond those rights established by the treaties of 
Kucuk Kaynarca and Adrianople. For her part, the Ottoman Empire 
decided that she was ready to recognise all of her commitments under the 
existing treaties as long as her sovereign rights were maintained.145 The 
four powers decided to send a joint communication to the Ottoman 
Empire requesting confirmation of under the conditions under which she 
would be willing to negotiate,146 to which the Ottoman government replied 
at the end of December, stating that her conditions remained 
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unchanged,147 and requested the participation of the other great powers in 
the negotiations if they were to be held. If Russia accepted the conditions 
as the starting point of negotiations, the Ottoman Empire would send a 
plenipotentiary to negotiate peace directly in a neutral place, with direct 
representation by other great powers.148 
 
Russia was highly critical of these conditions, although Austria tried 
hard to convince Russia to accept them.149 Russia adhered to her view 
that the problem should be negotiated on a bilateral basis, and was 
against the participation of the other powers in the negotiation.150 This 
position was not feasible, given that Britain and France had already 
dispatched their fleets to Istanbul. As there was no concession from the 
Russian side, the envoys of the four powers decided that it was impossible 
to achieve a common base for the start of negotiations between the 
sides.151 
 
Despite the failure of the conferences of the four powers to strike a 
base for negotiations to preserve the peace between the Ottoman Empire-
Britain-France block and Russia, Vienna remained the hub of all 
diplomatic initiatives and meetings during the war, as Austria and Prussia 
were both strategic territories, the control of which could affect the course 
of the war. Therefore, while the war was going on in the field in Crimea, 
the eyes of the warring sides were on the Austrian government, and all 
sides sought to win their support.  
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  While the diplomatic efforts of the four powers were continuing in 
Vienna between September 1853 and March 1854, two important events 
took place in the field. On 30 November, 1853 the Ottoman fleet in Sinop 
Harbour in the Black Sea was totally destroyed by the Russian navy.152 By 
attacking the fleet, which was anchored in the harbour, it seemed that 
Russia had abandoned its previous defensive position to go on the 
offensive. This meant that the whole Black Sea and the coasts of the 
Ottoman Empire, from Varna in the west to Batumi in the east, including 
Istanbul, were now vulnerable to attack from the Russian navy. Moreover, 
it was a blow to Ottoman morale and a challenge to Britain and France, 
whose fleets were anchored in Istanbul. The British admiral of the fleet in 
Istanbul had previously sent word to the Russian admiral in Sebastopol 
that if the Russian fleet should leave port to attack the Ottoman Empire, 
he had orders to protect the Ottoman Empire. He added that he hoped the 
Russian admiral would make no move to endanger the peace between 
Britain and Russia.153  
 
Britain and France could not allow Russia to neutralise the offensive 
capacity of the allied navy, so they decided to act to protect the Ottoman 
warships and Ottoman coasts in the Black Sea. They sent their fleets to 
the Black Sea with a notification to the Russian admiral that all Russian 
warships found at sea would be requested to return to a Russian port or 
face destruction.154 Nesselrode asked whether the Russian ships and 
shores would also be protected by the allied navy while protecting the 
Ottoman coasts against Russia.155 Upon receipt of a negative response, 
the Russian ambassadors left London and Paris in the first week of 
February 1854.156  
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The departure of the Russian ambassadors did not result in an 
immediate declaration of war, since efforts to find a solution in Vienna 
were continuing, although the likelihood of a negotiated settlement was 
becoming less and less under the pressure of the developments at the 
fronts. When the conference of the four powers in Vienna failed to 
convince Russia to concede to the Ottoman conditions, which all had 
endorsed, Britain and France agreed to deliver an ultimatum to Russia to 
evacuate the Principalities and to confine her disagreements with the 
Ottoman Empire to purely diplomatic terms. This ultimatum was also 
endorsed by the Austrian government, and in the event of a negative 
answer or continued silence, they would declare war.157 Nesselrode 
promptly replied that ‘the Emperor does not judge it proper to give any 
reply to the letter of Clarendon’,158 to which the response was a 
declaration of war from France on 27 March, and from Britain on 28 
March and a military alliance of France and England.159 
 
a. Austria-Prussia Alliance and the Evacuation of the 
Principalities by Russia 
   As noted previously, the role of the two continental powers, 
Austria and Prussia, would determine the course of the conflict between 
the ‘flanking powers’.  The Black Sea was blockaded by the allied fleets, 
and so Russia’s only alternative for a military drive was overland, crossing 
the Danube through the middle of the Balkans, so long as she could 
secure her rear from the military threat of Austria. Thus, Austrian 
support, or at least her ambivalent neutrality, was a prerequisite for a 
Russian overland operation against the Ottoman Empire. As for the Anglo-
French block, allying with Austria would tremendously facilitate their 
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mission. For this reason both sides put great effort into winning the 
support of Austria.    
 
Russia seemed, at the beginning, to be in a more advantageous 
position in this regard, given her ties to the Holy Alliance, however this 
perception seemed to be illusory as time passed. Both states, but 
specifically Austria, were concerned about Russia’s intentions and her 
likely efforts in the Balkans to destroy the Ottoman Empire.160  Russia 
tried to ease those concerns, or at least to alleviate, them well before the 
outbreak of the actual war. 
 
As have been noted, the first serious attempt by Russia in this 
regard was made during the summit of the three sovereigns of Russia, 
Austria and Prussia in Olmutz in September 1853; however both German 
Kings declined to offer to support Russia in the event of war between 
Russia and the Anglo-French bloc.  
 
Franz Joseph, the Emperor of Austria, expressed to the Tsar that 
Austria’s biggest concern was the destabilisation of the Balkans as a 
result of the insurrection of the Slavs and/or Orthodox subjects in 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina and the 
Principalities, which would be a likely consequence of the weakening of 
the authority of the Sultan. He refrained from offering any military 
support if war should come, claiming that the only promise he could make 
was neutrality, but said that he would not hesitate to act if Austria’s 
interests were affected.161 Prussia, on the other hand, did not want to 
upset France and Britain, and so did not leave a door open for any 
military help, and, like Austria, promised nothing more than neutrality if 
circumstances allowed.162 
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 The second attempt by Russia to find allies took place after the 
declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire but before the declaration of 
war by France and Britain in February 1854. The Tsar sent A. F .Orlov on 
a mission to Vienna and Berlin163 to, at minimum; obtain assurances of 
neutrality if they do not ally with Russia when the Russian army crossed 
the Danube to advance on Istanbul through Bulgaria. When Orlov met 
Franz Joseph he said that Russia could no longer take a defensive 
position across the Danube, and that if Austria remained neutral, her 
interests would be protected, and guaranteed that Russia would not make 
any settlement in the Ottoman territories without a preliminary agreement 
with Vienna. However the Emperor expressed his doubts about whether 
Russia and Austria would be able to control the Slavs in the Ottoman 
territories, and thus would be able to impose any settlement over them to 
the interest of Austria when they rose.164 In their second meeting he 
obtained only the promise that Austria would take the position of armed 
neutrality if Russia provided a formal guarantee regarding the 
maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and an agreement to return the 
border populations to the conditions that they enjoyed under the 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Orlov’s offer to share the Russian 
protectorate over Serbia at the mouth of the Danube did not change the 
attitude of Austria.165 
 
After the declaration of war on Russia by Britain and France, Buol 
presented a proposal to the Emperor about the likely course that Austria 
could follow. He stated that Russia could rekindle a revolutionary blaze 
that extended from Bulgaria to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina to destroy the Ottoman Empire, and for this reason Austria 
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had to focus on blocking Russia in the Balkans. The Anglo-French alliance 
could not defeat Russia without the help of Austria, and therefore if 
Russia chose not to withdraw from the Principalities and give up the plan 
of Slav insurrection in the Balkans, Austria would have to join the Anglo-
French alliance. For that, Austria had to secure the following conditions: 
the allies were to make a decisive attack on the Principalities so that 
Austria would not bear the brunt of Russia’s anger. Then, the allies must 
promise to make no conquests and induce the Ottoman Empire to give 
Austria the protectorate of the Principalities instead of Russia. Finally, 
none of the allies should make a separate peace with Russia.166  
 
However, the Emperor could not approve the plan because of some 
harsh but reasonable objections from the other circles. The objections 
were two-fold: firstly, the Austrian army could not stand against Russia 
alone, and so an alliance should first be secured with Prussia before 
aligning with the allies; and, secondly, Austria could not risk all-out war 
with Russia. Britain and France were more revolutionary than Russia, and 
Austria would always need Russia’s protection against the power of 
France. If Russia lost, Poland would rise again and Austria would have to 
deal with unrest in the east, which could cause her to lose Italy in the 
west.167   
 
 As Austria was trying to clarify her stance, a conference of the four 
powers of Austria, Britain, France and Prussia was held in Vienna on 9 
April at the request of Britain and France to address the concerns of 
Austria and to establish a common base among the four states. The four 
powers agreed that the existence of the Ottoman Empire was unseparable 
part of the general equilibrium of Europe, and decided to deliberate upon 
the best means of achieving this equilibrium. In this regard, they agreed 
upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the evacuation of the 
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principalities, and the consolidation of the civil and religious rights of the 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the four 
governments pledged not to enter into any agreement with Russia or any 
other power that went against those principles without having deliberated 
them in common discussion.168       
 
The agreements at the conference of 9 April paved the way for the 
Austro-Prussian offensive and the defensive alliance of 20 April. They 
pledged to protect each other’s territories, and to that end, both states 
were obliged to mobilise part of their forces. Austria was also authorised to 
call for the evacuation of the Principalities, which would be strongly 
backed by Prussia; and if that call was rejected, action would be taken 
under the provisions of the alliance agreement. On the other hand, it was 
agreed that no mutual offensive movement would be taken unless Russia 
incorporated the Principalities or attacked or passed through the 
Balkans.169 Through this alliance, both the Germanic powers were able to 
urge the Anglo-French alliance to moderate its actions against Russia. At 
the same time, they tried to force Russia back from the Principalities and 
preserve stability in the Balkans as much as possible. This was the 
optimum position for the continental powers, which were squeezed 
between the flanking powers under the conditions of the 1815 European 
States System.  
 
On the basis of her alliance with Prussia, Austria forwarded its 
requests to Russia in the form of an ultimatum on 3 June, 1854. Through 
those requests, she urged the Tsar to bring an end to the crisis, which had 
caused substantial damages to the Austrian economy due to the 
prolonged occupation of the Principalities. The Austrian Emperor fervently 
wanted to see an end to Russian military operations to the south of the 
Danube, and to obtain a date from the Tsar when he would put an end to 
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his occupation of the Principalities.170 Furthermore, Austria proposed to 
Russia that it subscribe to the principles of the 9 April Protocol for the 
settlement of the crisis.  
 
In response to Austria’s ultimatum, Russia sent A. Gorchakov to 
Vienna to take up the post of ambassador at the end of June, with orders 
to explain the Russian position with regard to the Protocol of 9 April, and 
to clear the way the way for an agreement. 
 
Gorchakov informed the Emperor that it was not Russia’s intention 
to hold on to the Principalities indefinitely, and that she was ready to 
evacuate if provided with suitable guarantees. Russia had been in support 
of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire since 1829, and was ready to 
respect its sovereignty as long as it was respected by the other powers. 
Finally, Russia claimed that it would not object to common European 
guarantees for the rights and privileges of the Ottoman Christians.171 It 
seemed that Russia was moving into a more moderate position after the 
protocol of 9 April. Austria immediately conveyed these messages to 
London and Paris, promising her clear support.172  
 
In early August 1854, France and Britain established their 
conditions in response to the Austrian-Prussian inquiry following the 
Russian overtures, as follows: firstly, the Russian protectorate of the 
Principalities was to be replaced by a European guarantee; secondly, 
navigation of the Danube was to be ‘freed’; thirdly, the Straits Convention 
of 1841 was to be revised ‘in the interests of the Balance of Power in 
Europe’; fourthly, Russia was to abandon its claim as protector of the 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and instead the five great 
powers were to obtain from the Ottoman government a promise of the 
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security of the Christians; and, finally, the British and French Cabinets 
reserved the right to make additional demands later in the war.173   
 
Since the first, second and fourth points had already been 
negotiated, and Russia could be somewhat brought into line, the third 
condition, to revise the 1841 Convention of the Straits in the interest of 
the balance of power in Europe, was going to be the sole war objective of 
the allies. The allies regarded the naval presence of Russia in the Black 
Sea as a threat to the balance of power in Europe, and so wanted it to be 
curbed. In that way, they considered the influence of Russia over the 
Ottoman Empire would be reversed, which was something that was also 
sought by Austria.174 Russia, not surprisingly, was unyielding on that 
point, and consequently rejected the proposal.175 
 
In the meantime, Russia was already considering the evacuation of 
the Principalities and to adopting a watchful position in the west, which 
was the only way to stop Austria joining the Anglo-French bloc. If the 
occupation of the Principalities ended, Austria could not risk going to war 
with Russia, as it would put her in opposition with Prussia.176 Russia 
completed the withdrawal from the Principalities at the end of August, and 
after a while, Austria, in agreement with the Ottoman government, 
occupied the Principalities and declared the Principalities closed to the 
bloc powers.177 Thus, the Balkans issue was dropped from the agenda of 
the allies, allowing them to focus on the Russian Black Sea coasts in a bid 
to realise the third condition.  
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b.  Stages of the Crimean War and the Diplomatic 
Initiatives  
Developments in the Danube turned the Crimean Peninsula, home 
to the largest Russian naval base in the Black Sea, into the centre of the 
war efforts. If the allies were to ensure the third condition, which was to 
curb and reduce the strength of Russia’s power in the Near East for the 
general interests of the balance of power of the 1815 European States 
System, Sebastopol on the Crimean Peninsula was deemed the most 
suitable war objective.178 
 
The allies landed a military power of 50,000 soldiers on the Crimean 
Peninsula in the middle of September 1854. The first attempt by the 
Russian army to expel the allied army was successfully thwarted by the 
allied forces on 20 September at the battle of Alma; after which two 
successive attempts at Balaklava and Ackermann, respectively on 25 
October and 5 November, 1854, also failed. Following those battles, the 
Russian army withdrew to Sebastopol and remained on the defensive. The 
allied siege laid on Sebastopol at the end of 1854 and it lasted almost a 
full year, and; both sides suffered great losses without either achieving 
any decisive result.179 
 
While the war was going on in the field, the diplomatic efforts did 
not stop, with initiatives by both sides, as expected, focusing on Austria 
since her position would be decisive in ending the deadlock in the field for 
both sides. Russia wanted to secure her benevolent neutrality so that she 
would be able to shift her troops in the west to the Crimean front; while 
the allies, if Austria was not going to enter the war, wanted just the 
opposite. Austria no longer felt the need of the allies, as the likelihood of 
an attack by Russia on the Habsburg domain was very unlikely while 
dealing with the invaders in Crimea. Therefore, instead of taking a definite 
position with either side, she preferred to use her weight to induce the 
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sides into a compromise to stop the war, which would be the best outcome 
for Austria’s interests. Furthermore, her alliance of 20 April with Prussia 
was also binding her not to engage on either side of the belligerents too; 
however Austria was not as resistant as Prussia owing to her vulnerability 
in Italy against France, particularly as France was in an alliance with 
Britain.180 Thus, it did not take long for Austria to tilt again in favour of 
the allies. 
 
The first concrete result of the diplomatic initiatives and the 
pressure of the allies on Austria was a treaty among Austria, Britain and 
France, signed on 2 December, 1854.181 According to that Treaty, the 
signatories pledged not to negotiate with Russia apart from on ‘the four 
points’. If peace was not assured, the three allies would deliberate over the 
best means, which actually meant war, of securing the object of their 
alliance.182 To this end, if Russia attacked Austria, then Britain and 
France would help Austria militarily. Even though Prussia declined to join 
the latest treaty, Austria’s action effectively brought an end to the Holy 
Alliance.183 Seeing that Austria was shifting its allegiance to the allies, 
Russia accepted the four points on 29 November, but according to its own 
interpretations, which were not shared by Britain or France. However this 
was enough to dissuade Austria from ratifying the military alliance part of 
the treaty, except the four points, and so no conclusive military shift could 
come out of the Treaty between the block of Britain, France and Austria. 
 
 The most remarkable result of the 2 December Treaty was a 
guarantee for Austria that France would preserve the status quo in Italy, 
backed by an agreement between the two powers on 22 December. This 
facilitated the tilt of Austria toward the Anglo-French bloc, and more 
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importantly, allowed the active participation of Piedmont in the war in 
Crimea with 15,000 troops.184  
 
The third concrete step of the diplomatic initiative during the war 
campaign was the Conferences held in Vienna among the five powers on 
the basis of the four points between 15 March and 4 June, 1855. These 
Conferences enabled the warring powers to clarify their positions in regard 
to what they could concede and what they could not from among the 
previously agreed four points.185 Put differently, the warring sides revealed 
their understandings of the four points, making the war objectives much 
clearer. 
 
The first point, which was to place the Principalities under a 
guarantee from the five-powers, in other words under the Concert of 
Europe, was readily accepted by Russia. In this way, the exclusive rights 
of Russia over the administration of the Principalities, gained by Russia 
over the past 75 years as a result of the four wars and several treaties, 
would end.186  
 
The second point was about the free navigation of the Danube. 
Russia had gained islets at the mouth of Danube in the Black Sea with 
the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, effectively giving her full power to 
regulate navigation. The Danube River was the only exit for Austria to the 
Black Sea, Istanbul and the Levant region, and as such she was much in 
favour of its collective management. The acceptance of Austria’s demand 
in this regard was not difficult in the Conference, as the Principalities at 
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the mouth of the Danube were already under the temporary control of 
Austria.187   
 
Once the agreements were finalised regarding the first and second 
points, the Conference turned to the most significant and controversial 
item at the end of March, being the third point. This was about the 
establishment of the balance of power in the Near East by curbing the 
naval power of Russia in the Black Sea through the revision of the 1842 
Straits Convention188. 
 
 The third point, as Curtiss pointed out, was the part of the allied 
plan aiming at bringing the Ottoman Empire into the guarantee of the 
public law of Europe, thereby protecting it and saving Europe from new 
troubles;189 and the material base of this arrangement was a reduction of 
the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea.  
 
 However, Russia questioned the rationality of such a measure on 
the grounds that the existence of the Russian naval power balanced the 
other naval threats from the Mediterranean, meaning the British and 
French navies.190 The British and French delegates agreed to a joint policy 
on the third point, with the neutralisation of Russian power in the Black 
Sea as the first proposal. If Russia rejected it, then they would suggest a 
strict limitation on her naval forces, which was to be presented as an 
Austrian ultimatum. If the second proposal was also turned down, then 
they would break up the Conference and concentrate on winning the 
war.191 
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 The parties were unable to reach any compromise on the third 
point, and consequently the conference did not move on to negotiating the 
fourth point.192 The discussions collapsed on 4 June, and settlement of 
the issue was thus left to the military. 
 
The failure of the Conference in the end did not lead to the entry of 
Austria into the war, and the Austrian army demobilised on 10 June,193 
but the timing of Austria’s departure was of great benefit to the allies, as it 
deprived Russia of the ability to transfer its troops from the western front 
to Crimea. This was to be the only concrete contribution of Austria to the 
allied efforts in Crimea. 
 
c. Austrian Ultimatum and the End of the Crimean War 
Since the diplomatic efforts at the Conference of Vienna had failed 
to convince Russia to accept the neutralisation of its power in the Black 
Sea, the Allies intensified their siege of Sebastopol from June onwards. 
The city fell on 8 September, however Russia was unyielding and 
established a new defensive line immediately after Sebastopol, and started 
consolidating her power there. The fall of Sebastopol had not had the 
desired result; and so the allies started considering a second battle front 
in the Baltics for which Britain entered into negotiations with Sweden.194 
France was also disposed to give serious consideration to a Baltic front, as 
Napoleon had once thought that a war in the Baltics could bring about the 
liberation of Poland.195  
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On the other hand, there were some objections on the side of France 
that she was being dragged along by British interests in continuing the 
war, and Napoleon III also began considering the necessity of ending the 
war. In the end, he had achieved what he had always wanted: to terminate 
the Holy Alliance by bringing Austria over to his side; to restore the 
military glory of France in Europe; and most importantly, to ally with 
Britain against Russia, which is something his uncle had been unable to 
achieve. If France was to bring an end to the war, there were two paths 
open to her.196 The first one had been already tried over Austria and 
Austria did not enter the war. The other was to establish direct contacts 
with Russia to discuss a settlement. Napoleon III opted to open behind-
door discussions with the Russians.  
 
  This caused great alarm in Austria, where it was seen as ‘A 
Franco-Russian deal over Austria’s head’.197 The likelihood of that deal 
forced Austria hastily to act. Austria decided to issue an ultimatum to 
Russia in agreement, after agreeing the conditions with Britain. The 
ultimatum was delivered on 16 December, the conditions of which can be 
summarised as follows:198 
– The Principalities should be put under the collective supervision of 
the great powers, and the Ottoman Empire is not to deploy troops 
without their prior endorsement. 
– The free navigation of the Danube is to be secured. 
– The Black Sea is to be demilitarised. 
– The rights of the Christian subjects are to be guaranteed without 
infringement of the sovereignty or independence of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
– The states may present some other specific conditions in 
accordance with the interests of Europe. 
                                                 
196
 Taylor (1956), op. cit., p. 58 
 
197
 Taylor (1956), op. cit., p.79 
 
198
 Armaoglu (2007), op. cit., p. 250 
 
 275 
If the conditions were not accepted within a month, Austria vowed to enter 
the war on the side of the Allies against Russia, which would result in 
Prussia also being dragged into the war together with Austria. Accordingly, 
Russia accepted the conditions as the framework of a settlement on 16 
January, 1855. The seriousness of Austria and Prussia played a 
significant role in convincing Russia to accept the ultimatum, and an 
armistice was concluded, with the new political and military arrangements 
planned to be mapped out at a subsequent congress in Paris.  
  
4. Congress of Paris  
 
The warring sides, being the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain, 
France and Piedmont, together with non-warring states of Austria and 
Prussia, convened in Paris and concluded the peace treaty on 30 March, 
1856.  Prussia was allowed to participate only during the deliberations 
about the status of the Straits, given its status as one of the signatories of 
the 1841 Straits Convention.  
 
The Crimean War was, in fact, a European war under the guise of 
the protection of the sovereignty (Russia’s claims over the Orthodox 
communities) and the territorial integrity (the evacuation by Russia of the 
Principalities) of the Ottoman Empire. Three of the five great powers were 
involved directly, while one of the remaining two, Austria, was also actively 
engaged in all the stages of the war, and played a determining role in the 
course of war through its actions, even though she never took part in the 
actual fighting. The only power that had remained strictly neutral was 
Prussia. Naturally, the post-war settlement had to satisfy the main goals 
of the victors. The overall goal of the Anglo-French bloc, together with the 
non-belligerent Austria, had been to stop Russia from becoming a 
hegemonic power by destroying the Ottoman Empire. During the pre-war 
era, Russia had an imbalanced political weight in the Principalities, the 
Black Sea and the Caucasian region under the advantages of the treaties 
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of Adrianople (1829), Hunkar Iskelesi (1833) and the Convention of 
Munchengratz (1835).199 
 
The main peace treaty contained 34 articles.200 Since the basic 
premises had been agreed earlier, deliberations did not take long; and 
beside the main treaty some other auxiliary agreements were also signed. 
 
a. Territorial Readjustment 
During the Congress, four significant territorial readjustments were 
made aimed at reducing the offensive capacity of Russia and increasing 
the defensive capacity of the Ottoman Empire. The most striking 
arrangement in that respect concerned the Black Sea. The strategic 
importance of the Black Sea for the security of Istanbul has been 
examined in the second and third chapters in detail, and so will not be 
repeated here, but suffice to say the vulnerability of Istanbul had 
increased tremendously after Russia had consolidated her power base in 
the north of the Black Sea and on the Crimean peninsula. Due to 
Istanbul’s proximity to the naval bases of Russia, the Western naval 
powers of Britain and France were compelled to keep their naval fleets 
anchored in the Eastern Mediterranean, and their eventual attack on 
Sebastopol was aimed at destroying the naval capacity of Russia in the 
Black Sea. Therefore, the resolution of the allies for the demilitarisation of 
the Black Sea was not surprising. The agreement was that neither the 
Ottoman Empire nor Russia would keep naval or military establishments 
in or around the Black Sea, and any existing bases were to be 
decommissioned; however both states would be allowed to maintain a 
small and equal number of light vessels for coast guard services (Art: 10-
14). Such a restriction on the Ottoman Empire can be considered as little 
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more than symbolic, since it could still keep its navy in the Straits and in 
the Marmara Sea.  
 
The second arrangement in the territorial re-adjustments was an 
agreement regarding the free navigation of the Danube River, for which 
the principles of the Congress of Vienna were to be applied, and for which 
a special expert international commission would be set up to deal with the 
problems of navigation (Art: 2-4). These arrangements were directly 
concerning Austria, as the Danube River was her only outlet to the Black 
Sea and to the Levant through the Straits, other than via its Adriatic 
coast. Russia had taken over the small islands at the mouth of Danube in 
the Black Sea with the Edirne Treaty in 1829, giving Russia a key role in 
controlling the navigation of the Danube, but under the new arrangements 
those islands were to be demilitarised and returned to the Principalities.  
  
Thirdly, in connection with the Danube river arrangement, a part of 
Bessarabia was rejoined in Walachia, one of the Principalities that had 
been annexed by Russia in 1829. Through the final territorial 
arrangements, Austria would succeed in removing Russia from around the 
Danube River. 
   
The last arrangement was related to the places captured on the 
Crimean Peninsula by the Allies, and some territories taken by Russia in 
the east, all of which were to be returned to their former owners (Art: 2-4). 
In this regard, Sebastopol and the other places occupied by the allies 
would be returned to Russia, while Kars and some other occupied 
territories in the east would be restored to the Ottoman Empire by Russia. 
This last point was important for Britain, as it meant that Russia had 
been prevented from advancing in the east, which would have given her a 
military advantage in the event of future conflicts over the Basra Gulf and 
Persia. 
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b. Transfer of Rights and Obligations  
As related in the second and third chapters, Russia obtained some 
rights over the Ottoman Empire through the Treaties of Kucuk Kaynarca 
(1774), Yassy (1792), Bucharest (1812), Ackerman (1827) and Adrianople 
(1829), including the administration of the Principalities and Serbia, and 
most controversially, the protection of the Orthodox Church in the 
Ottoman Empire. The acceptance of the Ottoman Empire as a non-
European state in terms of public law facilitated Russian claims as the 
protector of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.  
  
The Congress of Paris tried to resolve this problem by formally 
admitting the Ottoman Empire into the domain of European public law 
(Art: 7). In this way, it aimed to eliminate the Russian claim that it needed 
to protect the non-Muslims subjects of the Ottoman Empire; but at the 
same it obligated the Ottoman Empire to provide sufficient security for her 
non-Muslim subjects. It was agreed that Russia would have no claim 
whatsoever regarding the non-Muslim communities (Orthodox) of the 
Ottoman Empire, and thus Russia could not use the pretext of the 
protection of Orthodox subjects to intervene in the Ottoman Empire, as 
she had done since 1774. 
 
Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire issued an imperial decree 
(‘Reformation Edict’, in Turkish ‘Islahat Fermani’)201 about the rights and 
obligations of her non-Muslim subjects, and the Treaty of Paris referred to 
the Edict by underlining that the principles in the Edict were emanating 
from the free will of the Sultan. As a cautionary measure, so as to avoid 
Russia’s subjective interpretation in the future, they added that that 
confirmation was not empowering or giving any right to any individual or 
group of states to intervene in the internal affairs of the Sultan between 
him and his subjects (Art: 9)202 
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The signatory states also agreed on how disputes between the 
Ottoman Empire and the other European states would be settled, by 
which the disputing party would seek the mediation of the other signatory 
states before resorting to the use of force (Art: 8). In this way, the intention 
was to stop Russian’s unilateral recourse to action in relation to the 
Ottoman Empire. In other words, every issue concerning the Ottoman 
Empire, according to that article, should be internationalised. 203   
 
 As for the other two issues, the administration of the Principalities 
and Serbia, over which Russia had some treaty rights, the Congress of 
Paris followed the same approach defined for the non-Muslims issue. The 
Congress re-confirmed the autonomous status of the Principalities and 
Serbia under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire; however those 
entities now fell under the collective supervision of the signatory states 
instead of under the treaty rights of Russia that had existed for the last 75 
years (Art: 22-27).  Both entities were to have their own Parliaments, and 
none of the signatory states would have the right to intervene in their 
internal affairs. The rights of their Suzerain, the Ottoman Empire, were 
also to be limited. For example, apart from some designated locations in 
Serbia, the Ottoman Empire could not send any extra troops into Serbia 
without the consent of the signatory states (Art: 29) 
  
c. Auxiliary Agreements 
In addition to the main treaty, multilateral auxiliary agreements 
were also signed at the Congress of Paris, two of which were very 
important for Ottoman-Russian relations. 
 
The first one was signed by Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire 
on 15 April, 1856, in which Britain and France guaranteed the 
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independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, with any 
violation of that guarantee by a third party being a cause for war.  
 
 The other agreement was about the status of the Straits, and was 
known as the Straits Convention of Paris. This convention did not bring 
any substantial changes to the existing 1841 Straits Convention, but 
reconfirmed the principle of closure, obliging the Ottoman Empire to 
adhere to her customary practice of keeping the Straits closed to the naval 
vessels of all states.  
 
Conclusion 
Russia’s gains from the Treaty of Adrianople following the1828-1829 
Ottoman-Russian War brought about a deterioration of the political 
equilibrium that the 1815 Settlements had brought. Although Russia had 
to step back from the advantages of the 1833 Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi, 
she was still a dominant power in the Near East due to the treaty rights 
she had obtained in 1774 through the Treaties of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774), 
Yassy (1792) and Bucharest (1812). However, Russia acted in concert with 
the majority of the great powers in the Greek and Egypt issues and 
remained moderate in those issues in line with the foundation principles 
of the 1815 European States System. For this reason her behaviour did 
not result in hostilities with the coalition of the great powers. 
 
The Ottoman Empire became part of the 1815 Settlements with the 
multilateral Straits Convention, which replaced the bilateral Treaty of 
Hunkar Iskelesi of 1833 and was signed by all the great powers in 1841. 
This convention regulated the use of the Straits during times of both peace 
and war; but more importantly, brought relative stability to the Near East, 
although Russia maintained a position of dominance. During this era, the 
Ottoman Empire became much more economically integrated with the 
European economy as result of the Trade Agreement with Britain in 1838, 
and then even more so after the inclusion of other states.   
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This relative stability in the Near East lasted until a dispute between 
Orthodox and Catholic priests over the use of sites of religious importance 
in Jerusalem turned into a Franco-Russian rivalry in the Near East.    
 
The Ottoman government tried to settle the dispute without 
damaging her relations with France or Russia, while attempting to meet 
the demands of both sects. Unfortunately her central ground solution to 
the dispute did not satisfy either the Orthodox or Catholic Churches. 
From that point onward, France would take a much more moderate path 
than Russia. Russia’s claims and demands surpassed the rights of 
religious character to be the formal recognition of her protector position 
over the Orthodox Church and subjects of the Ottoman Empire, while 
France’s demands were limited to the assurance of the ecclesiastical rights 
of the Catholic Church in Jerusalem, and did not involve France in the 
assurance of the rights and situations of the Catholic subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
     
The grounds for the Russian argument were the 7th and 17th Articles 
of the 1774 Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca which, Russia claimed, gave her the 
right of protection of the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire, which was often referred to during the Greek 
Rebellion in 1821–1829. This claim was never accepted by the Ottoman 
Empire or the other great powers, as it would mean the transfer of the 
Ottoman Empire’s sovereign rights over 65 percent of her subjects in the 
Balkans to Russia. This would amount to the removal of the intermediary 
function of the Ottoman Empire for the smooth operation of the 1815 
European States System, which obviously was not acceptable to the 
Ottoman Empire. This would also be incompatible with the political 
equilibrium of the 1815 European States System, since it would 
substantially disrupt the balance of power to the detriment of the other 
great powers. Put differently, it meant that Russia was not moderate in 
the Near East, which was one of the principal requirements of the 
foundation of the 1815 European States System.  
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The Ottoman Empire refused to yield to the political and military 
pressure imposed by Russia during the Menshikov mission to Istanbul in 
1853. Britain had taken a negative view of the Tsar’s approach in 1853 to 
reach an agreement over a course of action if/when the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed. The insistence of Russia that she be allowed to protect the 
Ottoman Orthodox subjects through her occupation of the Principalities in 
1854 led to balance of power politics in the 1815 European States System 
against Russia, going against the functions of the Concert of Europe.  
 
The Concert of Europe was established around the Anglo-French 
accord, and led to the Anglo-Russian agreements of 1826 and 1839. The 
objective was not hegemony, but rather a re-establishment of the political 
equilibrium in the European States System. In precise terms, it was to 
compel Russia to act with moderation in the Near East, and as a result, 
both of the functions of the Concert of Europe, being peacekeeping and 
peacemaking, were in effect during the crisis. It was peacekeeping, 
because it did not pursue hegemony or the punishment of Russia; and 
peacemaking due to the coercive measures that were put into operation 
against Russia, whose policies and objectives in the Near East threatened 
the balance of power in the European States System. 
 
Therefore, the Crimean War, which seemed to have started over a 
dispute over the rights of two Christian sects, was in fact a European war 
over the Ottoman Empire. The war was in fact between Russia, which 
wanted to turn her into a vassal state, and an Anglo-French bloc, which 
wanted to preserve the status quo in the Near East. The Anglo-French bloc 
was supported by the armed neutrality of Austria and her temporary 
occupation of the Principalities. The Austrian position meant that Russia 
had to keep a huge army in her west, and prevented her from launching 
an overland operation over the Balkans to the Ottoman Capital, as she 
had done in the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War. As to Prussia, her 
strict neutrality and her decision to act with Austria released France to 
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concentrate on the war in the Crimean. In addition, the trends in the 
capability structure of the 1815 European States System also prevented 
the Russian bid for hegemony in the Near East.   
 
The Crimean War was the first among the great powers since 1815, 
and would be followed by the French-Austrian (1859), Austrian-Prussian 
(1864) and French-Prussian (1870) wars. The Crimean War changed the 
special requirements for the multi-polar structure of the 1815 European 
States System, meaning a whole new phase in its history. With the Treaty 
of Paris, the isolation and restriction of France was lifted, while Russia 
became isolated and restricted, meaning that her supporting role in the 
order of Central Europe also came to an end.  
 
The institution of the Concert of Europe continued carrying out the 
two functions of peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Crimean War, 
but not as effectively as in the 1815–1854 period. Nevertheless, all of the 
great power wars from 1856 until 1914 were limited both in terms of 
scope and aim, with none of the warring sides ever seeking hegemony. In 
other words, the essence of the Concert of Europe for political and 
territorial equilibrium was still effective.  
 
On the other hand, the significance of the Concert of Europe 
increased for the Ottoman Empire, since it took on the responsibility to 
observe the implementation of some of the arrangements of the Treaty of 
Paris. These arrangements involved the rights of the non-Muslim subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire and the relations between the Ottoman Empire 
and her autonomous vassals, being the Principalities and Serbia. In 
different terms, the Concert of Europe somewhat took over the role of 
Russia in applying the former treaty rights over the Ottoman Empire. In 
this way, the peacekeeping function of the Concert of Europe in the Near 
East increased. 
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Ottoman-Russian relations became normalised as a result of the 
Congress of Paris. The clauses regarding the demilitarisation of the Black 
Sea removed the constant seaborne threat to her capital city; while the 
removal of the treaty rights of Russia over the Principalities and Serbia 
eliminated pressure on the Ottoman Empire. In this way, Russia’s 
relations with the Ottoman Empire can be said to have returned to their 
pre-1774 and pre-1829 levels in terms of her political and military 
capacities.  
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Overall Conclusion 
 
It was argued at the beginning of this thesis that Ottoman-Russian 
relations in the 1815–1856 period should be analysed on the basis of the new 
structural conditions that prevailed in the international system after the 
Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815). This argument was based on the assumption 
that the European States System entered a new phase after the Napoleonic 
bid for hegemony in Europe had been thwarted by the coalition of Britain, 
Russia, Austria and Prussia. The foundation period of the new phase in the 
System culminated in the 1815 Settlements, which comprised several multi-
lateral treaties and the conventions signed during the Congress of Vienna in 
1814. Under these new conditions, Ottoman-Russian relations were bound to 
take a different form; and it was the nature of these relations as a result of 
this new structure that was the central question raised by the thesis. To 
answer this question, first, the new structure needed to be analysed in order 
to understand its characteristics and how it worked. Then, as a second step, 
the Ottoman-Russian relations that developed around three specific events in 
the 1815–1856 period needed to be examined to find out how that new 
international structure worked and what affect it had on those relations. 
 
For clarity, the detailed analysis of the structure of the new 
international states system has been split into two analytical but interrelated 
parts: Relationship Structures, and Capability Structures, with the 
relationship structure being a function of the capability structure.   
 
It can be observed that the new international system founded by the 
1815 Settlements retained some of the characteristics of the System that had 
prevailed before the Napoleonic wars, particularly multi-polarity and the 
sovereignty of the unit states. Put differently, the new system was operating 
on the principles of Westphalia, while being perceived as anarchical in its 
  
286 
general conditions. It is also apparent that there was a new institution that 
was hierarchical in character in the ordering principle of the structure of this 
international states system, accompanied by a quasi-hierarchical relation 
between two groups of states. The first group of states, referred to here as the 
great powers, assumed a governing role in international relations, and 
operating in consensus, imposed some decisions on the other states of the 
second and third tiers. Secondly, there emerged some structural 
differentiations among the unit states of the second and third tiers in this 
new international states system as a result of the introduction of the new 
hierarchical form. Moreover, the special imperatives or requirements for the 
balance of power, and subsequently for multi-polarity, were considerably 
different from those of the pre-Napoleonic Wars era.   
 
 In order to emphasise the distinctiveness of the new patterns of 
international relations that the 1815 European States System brought, they 
are referred to herein as ‘the 1815 European States System’. This name 
denotes that the new international states system maintained some of the 
essential characteristics of the System that had existed since the 15th 
century, while introducing a number of new elements. 
 
   The ‘1815 European States System’ can be perceived as ‘a managed 
multi-polar international system based on the balance of power’, in which the 
‘managing’ feature was new, being built upon the newly introduced 
hierarchical institution in the ordering principle of its structure, as 
underlined in the last two paragraphs, and was known as the ‘Concert of 
Europe’.  
 
The Concert of Europe was the most salient invention of the 1815 
European States System, being a regime for collective security and concerted 
action. Its overall objective was to help maintain the 1815 Settlements and to 
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ensure the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System. Rather 
than replacing the balance of power politics, the two existed in harmony.  
 
The Concert of Europe had two roles and operated in two different 
capacities, relying on certain principles and norms. 
 
Firstly, it was an intervening variable and functioned to alleviate the 
competition for security among the great powers. In this way, it paved the 
way for cooperation in security so that the great powers could easily achieve 
the same ends as those sought through balance of power politics.  Secondly, 
as an independent variable, it facilitated the collective use of hegemony over 
the lower tier powers for the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements. 
 
The Concert of Europe acted as a structural modifier in the operation 
of the 1815 European States System in both of its functions, in that it both 
constrained and shaped the foreign policies and objectives of the unit states, 
including those of all of the great powers. 
 
The analysis indicated that the capability structure of the 1815 
European States System changed very little throughout the 1815–1856 
period, although there was a shift in the balance of power from Russia and 
Austria to Britain, France and Prussia. For this reason, attention has been 
paid to the changes in the elements of the relationship structure so as to 
understand and explain the structural impacts of the 1815 States System on 
Ottoman-Russian relations in that period. The elements that combined 
within the relationship structure were the Concert of Europe, functional 
differences, modal tendencies, divergences of the great powers and finally the 
types of changes.  
 
These changes can be categorised according to whether they were 
related to the founding principles or to the relationship structure. If related 
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to the maintenance of multi-polarity, that is, the restriction of France and 
moderation of Russia, they can be considered as structural changes with 
transformational implications; while those related to the elements of the 
relationship structure, such as modal tendencies, diverging issues and the 
decision making procedures of the Concert of Europe can be considered as 
significant structural changes without transformational change. 
 
While focusing on the changes in the relationship structure, it became 
clear that the processes and interactions between the five great powers were 
a determining factor in the emergence of the structural forces affecting 
Ottoman-Russian relations, and as a consequence, the structural 
characteristics and modal tendencies of the five great powers became the 
focal point of the analysis. The five great powers were divided into two 
different blocks in accordance with their modal tendencies relating to the 
maintenance of the 1815 Settlements and their attitudes and policies related 
to the constitutionalist/liberal and revolutionary movements.   
 
The first block divides the great powers on the basis of whether they 
were seeking to maintain the status quo, or were revisionist in their 
attitudes. France, and to a certain extent Russia, may be considered as 
revisionist powers; while Britain, Austria and Prussia had an interest in 
maintaining the status quo. Russia in particular diverged from Britain over 
her policies related to the Ottoman Empire, and with Austria in her policies 
regarding the Slavic and/Orthodox nations in the Balkans.  
 
The second division was related to the stances and attitudes of the 
powers towards the constitutionalist/liberal and revolutionary movements. 
This time, France and Britain constituted one block, in that they did not 
regard every revolutionary movement against the dynastic regimes as a 
systemic threat to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements. Britain, under 
governments relatively responsible and vulnerable to public support, were 
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reluctant to become associated with the absolute monarchies of Russia and 
Austria, which were brutalising the Poles and Hungarians under their rule, 
and in this respect was on the same path as France. On the other hand, 
Russia, Austria and Prussia considered such movements as having a 
destabilising impact on the dynastic regimes, and consequently, on the 
smooth operation of the 1815 European States System. For this reason, they 
took a rigid stance of intervention in the name of the Holy Alliance, which 
had been founded among the three eastern monarchies, whenever and 
wherever the uprisings took place. The reaction of Britain to this policy was 
to boycott the conferences and congresses of the Concert of Europe after 
1820.  
 
 
The revisionist policies and objectives of Russia and France, although 
different in scope and nature, constituted the biggest challenge to the 
maintenance of the 1815 Settlements. In France, despite being admitted to 
the Directory of the Concert of Europe in 1818, the priority of successive 
governments was to rid the nation of the restrictions imposed by the 1815 
Settlements. On the other hand, Russia’s prime objective was to promote and 
support the Orthodox and non-Muslim Slavic subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Balkans. To this end, Russia proclaimed herself as the legal 
protector of the Orthodox subjects of Ottoman Empire, and thus maintained 
a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. France 
was looking for any opportunity to divide the Quadruple Alliance so as to lift 
her imposed isolation and containment. 
 
 The prevention of the revisionist aspirations of both states was a 
requirement of the foundation of the 1815 European States System. Russia 
had to act with moderation and France had to remain within the confines 
imposed by the 1815 Settlements, since any quest for gain would mean a 
revival of her bid for hegemony. Of these, it was the complex Russian 
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revisionist policies that had more serious implications, since Russia was a 
member of the Quadruple Alliance, and thus was party to the mission to 
keep France under control after 1815.  
   
It can be understood from the analysis that both balance of power 
politics and the Concert of Europe worked in tandem to constrain the 
revisionist powers of Russia and France, and thus maintain the 1815 
Settlements. To this end, the powers seeking to maintain the status quo 
exercised various strategies under the Concert of Europe to moderate Russia 
and to restrict France.  
 
The restriction of France was carried out through the concerted efforts 
of the Quadruple Alliance; but in the case of Russia, the strategy was either 
to compel her to show self-restraint through group norms, or to establish a 
bloc with the participation of France to force Russia into a position of 
restraint. With the emergence of the Concert of Europe in the 1815 European 
States System, the five great powers engaged in different behaviour patterns, 
depending on the issue at hand. While some of the great powers cooperated 
in ‘active and affirmative’ action, others rather remained ‘passive and 
negative’. By being ‘passive and negative’, the great powers were exercising 
self-restraint, with the intention being to forego any concrete advantages or 
gains in the interest of long-term goals. Such behaviours could at first sight 
be seen as a burden for the state(s) involved; however they were necessary for 
the continued cooperation of the great powers in maintaining the 1815 
Settlements, in which all of the great powers had a stake.  
 
Because of the diverse structural characteristics and modal tendencies 
of the great powers, the success of the Concert of Europe in achieving all of 
its goals was not absolute, as issues would be only sometimes be settled, and 
to varying degrees, up until its demise in 1914, although its rate of success 
drastically diminished after the Crimean War. It can be said that the most 
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remarkable achievement of the Concert of Europe was its success in 
preventing a general war among the great powers between 1815 and 1914. 
 
The second stage of the research was devoted to understanding the 
shape of Ottoman-Russian relations under that structural environment in 
the 1815–1856 period, beginning with an analysis of available evidence.   
 
Ottoman-Russian relations after 1815 cannot be described as 
balanced. The Ottoman Empire belonged to the second tier of states, and as 
such was subject to the tutelage of the Concert of the great powers within the 
1815 European States System. Moreover, she had an ‘intermediary’ and 
‘buffer’ role to play between the great powers as a result of her very strategic 
territories. In this way she contributed the territorial and political balance of 
the 1815 European States, but had been under pressure from Russia since 
1774 and was very much preoccupied with internal reforms. For this reason, 
she relied on the support of the other great powers to withstand the Russian 
threat. 
 
Russia, in contrast, while at the zenith of her power, was going 
through a dilemma in her foreign policy in that period. She had to reconcile 
her revisionist goals in the Near East with those of defending the status quo 
in Central Europe. Put differently, she wanted to achieve her objectives 
concerning the Ottoman Empire while not allowing France to free herself of 
her restricted status and form an Anglo-French alliance with the possible 
participation of Austria.  
 
Russia’s revisionist goals arose out of her strategic considerations after 
she became a littoral state of the Black Sea. From the defensive perspective, 
Russia was concerned about sea-borne threats, as her southern and 
Caucasian territories would become vulnerable to the naval forces of the 
great maritime powers via the Black Sea if the Straits were opened to them. 
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The Straits also became a lifeline for the Russian economy, being the 
shortest route to the trade centres in the Levant, the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the main European ports. 
  
On the other hand, from the offensive perspective, Russia wanted to 
become a maritime power with naval offensive capabilities, which could only 
be possible if she could secure an outlet to the Mediterranean over the 
Ottoman territories, as both the Baltic region and Central Europe did not 
afford such a possibility.  
 
All of these security and economic considerations compelled Russia to 
focus on the Ottoman Empire, more so than any other great power in the 
1815 European States System. She had already secured unique rights prior 
to 1815 through bilateral treaties related to the administration of the 
Principalities (present-day Romania) and Serbia, and had some debatable 
rights regarding the Empire’s Orthodox subjects. Therefore, Russia was 
against the Ottoman Empire becoming a part of the 1815 Settlements, as 
this would have resulted in collective intervention of all the signatory great 
powers in the case of a dispute between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. In 
other words, Russia wanted to keep her relations with the Ottoman Empire 
on a bilateral basis.     
 
Ottoman-Russian relations after 1815 developed around three 
remarkable events: the Greek Revolt (1821–1830), the rebellions of the 
Viceroy of Egypt (1833 and 1839) and the Holy Places Issue and subsequent 
Crimean War (1852–1856). As initially hypothesised, the Ottoman Empire 
had to remain independent and free of any influence or association with any 
of the great powers for the smooth operation of the 1815 European States 
System. For this reason, the key state in the course and direction of 
Ottoman-Russian relations was France within the structure of the 1815 
European States System, being that Austria and Prussia were structurally 
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dependent on Russia. Therefore, the only effective way to keep Russia in the 
parameters of the 1815 European States System was the British-French 
alliance in Near East.  Britain, without an effective land army, could not be 
enough to keep the status-quo in Near East. 
 
The Greek Revolt was the first test of the great power diplomacy after 
1815. Italy and Spain had previously experienced uprisings that were 
repressed without resulting in any systemic problems; but the Greek 
uprising had some unprecedented implications, being the first uprising in the 
Near East after 1815 and the first by Orthodox subjects. Also, the leaders of 
the rebellion had close associations with Russia, with the organisers of the 
revolt based there.  
 
 The workings of the Concert of Europe in regard to Ottoman-Russian 
relations after the Greek revolt in 1821 took two distinct forms. The first of 
these emerged during the initial phase of the Greek Revolt in 1820–1825, 
when the Concert of Europe operated with the agreement of the five great 
powers, although the policy lines were drawn by Britain and Austria. In this 
period, Russia cooperated as part of the Concert of Europe and resisted from 
making any unilateral interventions. 
 
In contrast, in the second phase, 1825–1830, the Concert of Europe 
was centred on an accord between Britain and Russia with the participation 
of France, while Austria and Prussia remained neutral. However, an 
unexpected event, the annihilation of the Ottoman navy in 1827 in Navarino, 
resulted in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–1829, which the Concert of 
Europe was unable to prevent. Britain, without the effective cooperation of 
France, could not prevent Russia from going to war with the Ottoman 
Empire, although she was able to stop Greece falling under Russian 
influence, and thus moderated Russia in her war objectives. 
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 With the concluding Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 between the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia, the Greek Issue was settled. The new 
independent Greek state was put under the tutelage of the Concert of 
Europe, and Russia returned all of the territories occupied during the war, 
aside from some locations in the east of the Black Sea and at the mouth of 
the Danube, to the Ottoman Empire. This had the effect of preserving to a 
great extent the territorial equilibrium of the 1815 Settlements; however the 
political equilibrium in the Near East was drastically altered in favour of 
Russia as her influence over the Ottoman Empire was substantially 
increased. This was to be a structural change with transformational 
implications for the 1815 European States System in the long term. Russia 
consolidated her status as the protector of the Orthodox world, 
demonstrating clearly that she was prepared to go to war for the cause. This 
had a tremendous impact on the Ottoman Empire, as sixty five percent of her 
subjects in the Balkans were Orthodox. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire 
realised that she could not rely on the absolute support of the great powers 
in her struggle against Russia. In short, the 1821–1830 period witnessed an 
ascendancy of Russian power in the Near East, the result of which was that 
the maintenance of the 1815 Settlement became questionable in the long 
term for the 1815 European States System.  Being aware of that fact, Russia 
re-approached Austria and Prussia and revived the Holy Alliance by pledging 
that she would act together with them in Near East. The outcome was the 
Munchengratz Agreement in 1834. The response was the ‘Entente Cordiale’ 
between Britain and France. In a way, the structure of the 1815 European 
States System took the same pattern of relations as had been in 1815-1826.   
 
The rebellions of the Viceroy of Egypt in 1833 and 1839 constituted the 
second significant event in Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1833–1841 
period. The first rebellion brought no concerted European action, and so 
Russia was able to act unilaterally when the Ottoman Sultan asked for 
Russian military assistance to defend Istanbul against the army of the 
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Viceroy of Egypt. A small Russian fleet was anchored in the Bosporus, while 
a limited number of Russian troops were deployed to the Asian side of the 
city in 1833. When a temporary settlement was achieved between the Sultan 
and Mehmed Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, the Tsar pulled its troops and navy out 
of Istanbul, but not before a defence treaty, the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi, 
was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.  
 
Upon signing the Treaty, Russia gained the right to intervene in 
Ottoman affairs when the latter was in need; and in return, the Ottoman 
Empire would close the Straits to states with which Russia was at war. With 
the signing of the bilateral defence treaty, Russia reached the peak of her 
influence over the Ottoman Empire, which rose to the level of dominance. 
The already-disrupted political equilibrium of the 1815 Settlements was 
further deteriorated, and so the reaction of the other great powers was swift. 
Both Britain and France declared that they did not recognise the treaty, and 
Russia tried to alleviate at the concerns of her former allies of the Holy 
Alliance by initiating the Munchengratz Agreement among Russia, Austria 
and Prussia, in which Russia committed to acting together with Austria and 
Prussia in the Near East in a revival of the Holy Alliance. In response, Britain 
and France forged closer ties and established the Cordiale Entente after 1833. 
 
The second rebellion of Mehmed Ali in 1839, in contrast, resulted in 
concerted European action. The Concert of Europe was again centred on the 
Anglo-Russian accord, but this time with the participation by Austria and 
Prussia On this occasion, France chose to remain outside the Concert and 
voiced her opposition, however her restricted status meant that her 
objections were mostly ignored. After the settlement of the Egyptian issue, 
the Concert also replaced the Hunkar Iskelesi bilateral defence treaty with 
the Multilateral Convention of the Straits in 1841. In this way, Russian 
influence was reduced to its pre-1833 level, although she still retained great 
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influence over the Ottoman Empire. The price of Russian moderation for 
giving up the gains she had made with the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi was the 
end of the Cordiale Entente between Britain and France.  
 
The disputes centred on the Hungarian and Polish refugee issue in 
1849 and the Holy Places in Jerusalem between the Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches in 1852–1854 were milestone events that led to the outbreak of the 
Crimean War in 1854. The Holy Places Dispute had started as a civil matter; 
however with the involvement of Russia and France on behalf of respectively, 
the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, the issue became international. Russia 
regarded the initiatives of France in the guise of defending the rights of the 
Catholic Church as a challenge to her place and influence in the Near East. 
When the Ottoman government decided partly in favour of the Catholic 
Church, Russia considered the decision as a setback to her influence and a 
boost to the influence of France, which had been a traditional ally of the 
Ottoman Empire up until the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt in 1803. To 
this end, she insisted that the Ottoman Empire formally accept Russia as 
protector of the Empire’s Orthodox subjects. The categorical refusal of the 
Ottoman Empire resulted in Russian military occupation of the autonomous 
Danube Principalities in 1854 as a precursor to the start of the Crimean War. 
 
The Crimean war was the first among the great powers since 1815, 
being fought between the Ottoman-Anglo-French block and Russia. Austria 
adopted a position of armed neutrality by temporarily occupying the 
Principalities, thus blocking any overland operation by the Russian army, 
and diverting a significant proportion of the Russian army to the Balkans, 
away from the Crimean front.  
 
The operation of the 1815 European States System took on a whole 
new form during the Crimean War, significantly different to that seen during 
the Greek and Egyptian events. Russia had not challenged the structural 
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imperatives of the System during the Greek and Egyptian events, choosing to 
remain within the limits of the Structure. In other words, she took a 
moderate stance, although she had some advantages. In the lead up to the 
Crimean War, Russia tried to change the intermediary position of the 
Ottoman Empire, resulting in the launch of balance-of-power politics against 
her by the other great powers; and it was this existing capability structure 
that hindered Russia’s bid to achieve her goal of predominance in the 1815 
European States system.  
 
As for the Concert of Europe, its intervening function to alleviate the 
security concerns of the great powers was not effective enough to prevent the 
war; however it did limit the war objectives of the Ottoman-Anglo-French 
bloc.  
 
 With the conclusion of the war at the Congress of Paris, Russia was 
drastically restrained against the Ottoman Empire, being deprived of all her 
bilateral treaty rights over the administration of the Principalities and Serbia. 
More significantly, the Black Sea was de-militarised, meaning an end to the 
constant pressure from Russia on Istanbul and its naval aspirations in the 
Mediterranean. Finally, the Ottoman Empire was formally included into the 
public law of the European States System. From an 1815 Settlement 
perspective, Russia was pushed back to her pre-1774 levels in her relations 
with Ottoman Empire, effectively bringing an end to the era of her willing 
moderation under the Concert of Europe. She would take France’s position 
as a restricted state from 1856 onwards, which can be considered to be the 
end of the 1815 European States System phase in the course of European 
States System.  
 
The objective of this research has been to understand and explain how 
Ottoman-Russian relations developed after 1815 at the time the post-
Napoleonic system was being formulated. It is evident that the path of 
  
298 
Ottoman-Russian relations was significantly different to that followed prior to 
the Napoleonic Wars era under the influence of the 1815 European States 
System. In this regard, all of the hypotheses regarding the workings and 
effects of the Structure on Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 
period can be confirmed, although to varying degrees.  
 
The structural imperatives required the Ottoman Empire to remain in 
an intermediary position, free from influence or association by any great 
power. The rise of influence of Russia in 1829 and 1833 was incompatible 
with the structural imperatives of the 1815 European States System, 
meaning that she came into confrontation with the other great powers. 
Firstly, she was forced to take a step back, and then in 1856 she was pushed 
even further back in a bid to secure the intermediary status of the Ottoman 
Empire among the great powers. 
 
  As for the effects of the Concert of Europe, it served in the first two 
cases for the self-restraint of Russia. To this end, it functioned as a peace 
making body for the Ottoman Empire, despite not being counted among the 
great powers (Figure 3). However, when Russia refused to act in moderation, 
as was the case on the eve of the Crimean War, the workings of the Concert 
of Europe were replaced by balance-of-power politics. (Figure 2) It can be said 
that the Concert of Europe served to limit the war objectives of the allies, 
which is in agreement with the second hypothesis. 
 
As long as France remained within the confines of the 1815 
Settlements, concerted European action around an Anglo-French accord was 
the most likely form of the Concert of Europe in Ottoman-Russian relations. 
The clash of interests between Austria and Russia in the Balkans prevented 
the Holy Alliance from standing as a block against the Anglo-French accord 
in Ottoman-Russian relations, as was the case in the Crimean War. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by the second rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt (1839) 
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and the events in the lead-up the Crimean War in 1854, but to a lesser 
extent in the second phase of the Greek revolt (1825–1829). This is partly 
because the Concert of Europe, rather than centring on an Anglo-French 
accord, was rather steered by an Anglo-Russian accord, with the lesser 
participation of France. An Anglo-French accord for the Concert of Europe 
with the participation of Austria would be much more compatible with the 
Ottoman interests, since the restraint of Russia would be greater than that of 
the Concert of Europe formed around an Anglo-Russian accord.  
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